State v. Shelton

901 N.W.2d 741

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Charles Michael SHELTON, Jr., Defendant and Appellant.

28016.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS ON AUGUST 28, 2017

OPINION FILED September 13, 2017

MARTY J. JACKLEY, Attorney General, GRANT FLYNN, Assistant Attorney

General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.

JEFF BURNS of Churchill, Manolis, Freeman, Kludt, Shelton & Burns LLP, Huron, South Dakota, Attorneys for defendant and appellant.

KERN, Justice

[¶1.] Charles Shelton appeals from a judgment of conviction for fourth-degree rape. He contends that his conviction should be reversed because the circuit court judge lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment and because he did not receive a preliminary hearing after the State filed an amended information. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[¶2.] Following accusations that he provided a minor with alcohol and then had sexual intercourse with her while she was passed out, Shelton was indicted on one count of third-degree rape and one count of fourth-degree rape. The minor was fifteen years old at the time of the incident.

[¶3.] Approximately one month before Shelton's trial, his attorney moved to withdraw from the case. Shelton's former cellmate came forward with information that Shelton confessed to him that Shelton had committed the rape. The attorney represented both Shelton and the former cellmate. Due to the conflict, the court allowed the attorney to withdraw and appointed a new attorney to represent Shelton. A week later, the circuit judge overseeing the matter sent a letter to the new attorney disclosing that the judge's ex-wife is a partner in the new attorney's law firm and that this was a potential basis for disqualification. The judge stated:

You are now advised that I will disqualify myself from this proceeding, and another judge will be assigned to hear this case, unless you and your client agree in writing that I should not be disqualified, and that I may continue to preside over this action.

A written agreement waiving disqualification was not provided and there was no further mention of the issue in the record. Nevertheless, the same judge continued to preside over the trial.

[¶4.] Three days before the trial, the State filed an amended complaint and information. This was done to correct a clerical error in the original indictment. The caption of the indictment reflected that Shelton was charged with one count of third-degree rape and one count of fourth-degree rape. However, in the body of the indictment under Count I, it stated that Shelton "did commit the public offense of RAPE—SECOND DEGREE ( SDCL 22–22–1(4) ) [.]" While the citation to the statute correctly corresponded with third-degree rape, the text before it indicated Shelton was charged with second-degree rape. The amended information corrected the mistake. Before Shelton's jury trial commenced, the court noted that the amended information had been filed and arraigned Shelton on the charges. Shelton was not advised of his right to a preliminary hearing—nor did he receive one. Yet Shelton failed to object. The jury was instructed on the elements of third-degree rape and fourth-degree rape and the evidence presented at trial conformed to those charges.

[¶5.] Following trial, Shelton was acquitted of third-degree rape but found guilty of fourth-degree rape. The court sentenced Shelton to fifteen years in the penitentiary. Shelton appeals, arguing that the judge lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment of conviction due to judicial disqualification and that in the absence of a preliminary hearing on the amended information, the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed.

Analysis

Judicial Disqualification

[¶6.] Under South Dakota law, there are three avenues for judicial disqualification. The first is under the Due Process Clause of the United States and South Dakota Constitutions. Due process violations for judicial bias constitute structural error.¹ Isaacson v. Manty, 721 F.3d 533, 540 (8th Cir. 2013). The second is a statutory right to file an affidavit for a change of judge, which is codified in SDCL chapter 15–12. This is accomplished by informally requesting the judge to disqualify themselves, and if the judge declines, filing a formal affidavit alleging that "the party making such affidavit has good reason to believe and does actually believe that such party cannot have a fair and impartial trial before the named judge or magistrate." SDCL 15–12–26. "Filing a timely and compliant affidavit results in mandatory, automatic disqualification[,]" O'Neill v. O'Neill, 2016 S.D. 15, ¶ 41, 876 N.W.2d 486, 502, and if a judge continues to preside over the proceedings after a proper affidavit is filed, "all subsequent orders and judgments are void[,]" State v. Johnson, 2004 S.D. 135, ¶ 9, 691 N.W.2d 319, 322 (quoting State v. Peterson, 531 N.W.2d 581, 583 (S.D. 1995) ). The third avenue for disqualification is provided in the Code of Judicial Conduct, which is codified at SDCL chapter 16–2, appendix A.

[¶7.] Citing Johnson, Shelton maintains that the judge lost jurisdiction over this matter when he deemed himself disqualified under the Code of Judicial Conduct and that the judgment of conviction entered by the judge is, therefore, void. Shelton conflates the issues of the statutory right to file an affidavit for a change of judge and judicial disqualification under the Code of Judicial Conduct. In Johnson, we acknowledged that "[o]nce disqualified by the filing of an affidavit for change of judge, the challenged judge has no jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the affidavit or to continue with the action." Id.¶ 8. As a consequence for continuing to preside over the proceedings after an affidavit was properly filed, we deemed that all subsequent orders and judgments were void. Id.¶ 9. But an affidavit for change of judge was not filed in this case. As such, Johnson is not applicable.

[¶8.] Rather, in this case, the judge deemed himself disqualified under Canon 3 E(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.²

Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, "[a] judge exercises discretion in deciding whether the facts and circumstances fit within the disqualifying criteria." Marko v. Marko, 2012 S.D. 54, ¶18, 816 N.W.2d 820, 826. However, once the judge answers that question affirmatively, "he must recuse himself; that is not discretionary." Id. (quoting Childers and Davis, Federal Standards of Review§ 12.05, at 12–31 (3d ed.1999)). The judge in this matter determined that he was disqualified, and absent a waiver from the parties, erred by continuing to preside over the matter.

[¶9.] We have had occasion to review whether judges have erred in refusing to disqualify themselves under the Code of Judicial Conduct. See, e.g., Id.¶¶ 17–30, 816 N.W.2d at 825–29. We have not, however, had occasion to determine what action is necessary when a judge does, in fact, err. The United States Supreme Court has provided guidance in this area.

[¶10.] In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed. 2d 855 (1988), the plaintiff claimed, after trial and entry of a final judgment, that the trial judge should have recused himself from the matter under the Code of Judicial Conduct.³ Id.at 850, 108 S.Ct. at 2198. The Court recognized that while Canon 3 E(1) "defines the circumstances that mandate disqualification of ... judges, it neither prescribes nor prohibits any particular remedy for a violation of that duty."⁴ Id.at 862, 108 S.Ct. at 2204. This decision was "wisely delegated to the judiciary" and thus, the courts are left to fashion a remedy that would "best serve the purpose of the [Code of Judicial Conduct]." Id. The Court reasoned that "[t]here need not be a draconian remedy for every violation of [Canon 3 E(1),]" and that "there is surely room for harmless error committed by busy judges who inadvertently overlook a disqualifying circumstance." Id., 108 S.Ct. at 2203–04. Keeping these principles in mind, the Court crafted a three-part test to aid in determining what action should be taken for a violation of Canon 3 E(1).

[¶11.] The test is this: in determining what action, if any, should be taken for a violation of Canon 3 E(1), "it is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process." Id.at 864, 108 S.Ct. at 2205. Other courts that employ this test emphasize that these cases are "extremely fact intensive and fact bound, and must be judged on [their] unique facts and circumstances more than by comparison to situations considered in prior jurisprudence." United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 157 (5th Cir. 1995) ; see also Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d 745, 753 (D.C. 1989) ("The extent of the risk is, of course, dependent upon the circumstances surrounding the violation."). We agree with the United States Supreme Court's reasoning and adopt the test set forth in Liljeberg.⁵

[¶12.] In upholding the conviction in this case, there is little risk of injustice to the parties. Initially, Shelton does not argue that the judge was biased or prejudiced against him in any way. Instead, Shelton erroneously argues that the judge lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the case, and as a result, the judgment of conviction was void. A thorough review of the record does not reveal any evidence of partiality. Further, it is not alleged, and it does not appear from the record, that the judge's ex-wife had any involvement in the matter. And while Shelton argues that in his experience, "an overwhelming majority of divorce cases have at least some level of animosity [,]" none was shown here.

[¶13.] There is also little risk that denial of relief would produce injustice in other cases. Unlike the situation presented in Liljeberg, where the judge failed to disclose the potential basis...