State v. Shoaf

199 N.E.3d 43

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Anna Mae SHOAF, Defendant-Appellant.

State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Anna Mae Shoaf, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 5-21-21

NO. 5-21-22

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Hancock County.

Date of Decision: October 11, 2022

Adam H. Houser, Toledo, for Appellant.

Elliott T. Worth, for Appellee.

SHAW, J.

{¶1} In this consolidated appeal, defendant-appellant, Anna M. Shoaf ("Shoaf"), appeals from her convictions in the Findlay Municipal Court.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On August 23, 2020, Shoaf was ticketed for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol ("OVI") in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first-degree misdemeanor, leaving the scene of an accident (hit-skip) in violation of R.C. 4549.02, a first-degree misdemeanor, and driving between marked lanes in violation of R.C. 4511.33, a minor misdemeanor. The traffic ticket complaints were filed in Case No. 20TRC04154 (Hancock App. No. 5-21-21). Case No. 20CRB01177 (Hancock App. No. 5-21-22) concerns a complaint charging Shoaf with endangering children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(C)(1), a first-degree misdemeanor. The charges arose from an alleged car accident occurring on Interstate 75. Shoaf's vehicle allegedly side-swiped another vehicle, but did not stop.

{¶3} Shoaf pled not guilty to the charges. Prior to trial, Shoaf filed the same motion to suppress evidence in each case. A suppression hearing proceeded in regard to the legality of the stop of her vehicle. At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court denied the motions, finding reasonable, articulable suspicion more than sufficient to justify the stop of Shoaf's vehicle to investigate the alleged hit-skip accident.

{¶4} The cases proceeded to a one-day jury trial. At the conclusion of the trial, Shoaf was found guilty by the jury on all charges, except that Shoaf's determination of guilt of the marked lane violation was by the trial court.

{¶5} Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Shoaf, inter alia, to 90 days in jail, with all days suspended, for the leaving the scene of an accident conviction; 180 days in jail, with 110 days suspended and 5 days’ credit for successful completion of a driver intervention program, plus 60 days’ credit for successful post-sentence home arrest, for the OVI conviction; and 90 days in jail, with 85 days suspended, for the endangering children conviction, to be served consecutively. The trial court also fined Shoaf for each offense of which she was convicted, plus costs. Additionally, the trial court placed Shoaf on probation for a period of two years in each case, with reconsideration after one-year.

{¶6} Shoaf now appeals, raising the following assignments of error for our review.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

IT WAS AGAINST MANIFEST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DEN[Y] APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3

THE TRIAL COURT MADE REVERSABLE [SIC] ERROR WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4

THE APPELLANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT THE TRIAL LEVEL.

First Assignment of Error

{¶7} In her first assignment of error, Shoaf challenges the trial court's ruling on her motion to suppress contending that it was against the manifest weight of the evidence when the totality of the circumstances is considered. She argues that two witnesses for the defense, herself and her daughter, testified that there was no accident or vehicle collision, and that the only information the police had was based upon the phone call of the alleged victim. She also argues that none of the police saw any of the alleged traffic violations that lead to the traffic stop, that the only photograph of Shoaf's vehicle shows no damages to the vehicle, and that there was also no debris found on the highway where the accident took place.

Standard of Review

{¶8} As we recently stated in State v. Henson , 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-19-75, 2020-Ohio-4019, 2020 WL 4578605, ¶ 17 :

"Appellate review of a decision on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Burnside , 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372 [797 N.E.2d 71], ¶ 8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. citing State v. Mills , 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 [582 N.E.2d 972] (1992). When reviewing a motion to suppress, "an appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence." Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. Fanning , 1 Ohio St.3d 19 [437 N.E.2d 583] (1982). With respect to the trial court's conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id. citing State v. McNamara , 124 Ohio App.3d 706 [707 N.E.2d 539] (4th Dist. 1997).

Law and Analysis

{¶9} "The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures, including unreasonable automobile stops."

Bowling Green v. Godwin , 110 Ohio St.3d 58, 2006-Ohio-3563, 850 N.E.2d 698, ¶ 11. Generally, " ‘the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.’ " Id. , quoting Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). However, as noted by the Ohio Supreme Court:

Probable cause is certainly a complete justification for a traffic stop, but we have not held that probable cause is required. Probable cause is a stricter standard than reasonable and articulable suspicion. State v. Evans , 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 411 [618 N.E.2d 162] (1993). The former subsumes the latter. Just as a fact proven beyond a reasonable doubt has by necessity been proven by a preponderance, an officer who has probable cause necessarily has a reasonable and articulable suspicion, which is all the officer needs to justify a stop.

State v. Mays , 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 23.

{¶10} An officer only needs a reasonable articulable suspicion that a driver may have committed a traffic offense in order to justify an investigative stop. See State v. Gartrell , 3d Dist., 2014-Ohio-5203, 24 N.E.3d 680, ¶ 52. As this Court has noted:

"The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ as ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion [upon an individual's freedom of movement].’ " State v. Shaffer , 3d Dist., 2013-Ohio-3581 [4 N.E.3d 400], ¶ 18, quoting Bobo at 178. "In determining whether reasonable articulable suspicion exists, a reviewing court must look to the totality of the circumstances." Steinbrunner at ¶ 14, citing State v. Andrews , 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 [565 N.E.2d 1271] (1991). "Under this analysis, a court should consider ‘both the content of the information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.’ " Id. , quoting City of Maumee v. Weisner , 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 299 [720 N.E.2d 507] (1999).

Gartrell at ¶ 53.

{¶11} As a result, " ‘[a]n officer does not have to have personally observed a traffic violation * * * to justify detaining someone; rather, an officer can rely on information transmitted to him through a dispatch[.]’ " Gartrell at ¶ 54, quoting State v. Steinbrunner , 2012-Ohio-2358, 2012 WL 1926395, at ¶ 15, citing Weisner at 297, 720 N.E.2d 507. As noted by the Fourth District:

An informant's tip may provide officers with the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigative stop. [State v. ]Abernathy , 4th Dist. No. 07CA3160, 2008-Ohio-2949 [2008 WL 2429274] at ¶ 26. Where the information possessed by the police before the stop stems solely from an informant's tip, the determination of reasonable suspicion will be limited to an examination of the weight and reliability due that tip. Maumee , 87 Ohio St.3d 295, at 299 [720 N.E.2d 507]. The appropriate analysis then is whether the tip itself has sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigative stop. Id. Factors considered "highly relevant in determining the value of the [informant's] report" are the informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge. Id. (Citations omitted).

State v. George , 4th Dist. Ross No. 12CA3351, 2013-Ohio-2511, 2013 WL 3148312, ¶ 16. In Maumee , the Ohio Supreme Court further explained that a tip from an identified citizen informant, even though it does not determine the outcome of the case and is only one element of the totality-of-the-circumstances review of the tip itself, weighs in favor of the informant's reliability and veracity. Maumee at 302, 720 N.E.2d 507. In Maumee , the Court concluded that the "informant was an identified citizen who based his knowledge of the facts he described upon his own observations as the events occurred. As a result, his tip merits a high degree of credibility and value, rendering it sufficient to withstand the Fourth Amendment challenge without independent police corroboration." Id.

{¶12} In this case, at the suppression hearing, the victim Ms. Newyear testified that Shoaf's vehicle (a dark Nissan Rogue) hit, or side-swiped, her vehicle on the driver's side while she was driving on Interstate 75 in the Findlay area. She stated that Shoaf did not stop. She then followed the Shoaf vehicle and her passenger immediately contacted the police. She also testified she followed the vehicle, never losing sight of it, until it was stopped by police.

{¶13} Trooper Gossard and Sergeant Kinney of the Ohio State Highway Patrol both testified that they responded to the call the Findlay Dispatch Center received about a hit-skip incident on Interstate 75 near mile post 156. The caller was from the...