State v. Signad Ltd.

675 S.W.3d 19

The STATE of Texas, Appellant

v.SIGNAD LTD., f/k/a SignAd, Inc., Appellee

NO. 01-20-00715-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Opinion issued July 28, 2022

Richard L. Rothfelder, Christopher Rothfelder, Houston, for Appellee.

Susan Desmarais Bonnen, Warren Kenneth Paxton Jr., Lisa Marie Mitchell, Nicole Fagerberg, Austin, for Appellant.

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Goodman, and Guerra.

OPINION

Gordon Goodman, Justice

This appeal arises out of a condemnation suit filed by the State with respect to a highway billboard owned by SignAd Ltd. After the State dismissed its own suit, the trial court awarded attorney's fees and expenses to SignAd. On appeal, the State contends that SignAd is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees and expenses on several independent grounds. Because we agree with the State in part, we reverse the trial court's judgment and render a judgment that SignAd take nothing.

BACKGROUND

The trial court filed findings of fact about this case's background and the parties’ disputes. Neither side has challenged any of these findings. When, as here, the trial court files findings of fact and they are unchallenged on appeal, those factual findings are binding on us, provided they are supported by some evidence. Tenaska Energy v. Ponderosa Pine Energy , 437 S.W.3d 518, 526 (Tex. 2014) ; see also McGalliard v. Kuhlmann , 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986) (unchallenged findings of fact are entitled to same weight as jury verdict and therefore bind appellate court unless contrary is established as matter of law or no evidence supports finding).

Trial Court's Findings

SignAd owns a billboard that sits on land it leases from a third party adjacent to an IH-10 overpass bridge, which the State planned to expand. As part of this planned bridge expansion, in September 2017, the State sent a notice of taking to SignAd about the billboard. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 21.0113(a) (requiring entity that has eminent domain authority to make bona fide offer to buy property).

After receiving the State's notice, SignAd determined that the State's planned bridge expansion would bisect the billboard by two feet at most. Rather than accept the State's offer of around $106,000 in compensation for the taking, in March 2018, SignAd applied for an amended permit to move the billboard out of the way of the State's planned bridge expansion.

In May 2018, the Texas Department of Transportation denied SignAd's application to move the billboard. SignAd appealed, but the Department affirmed the denial of SignAd's application in July 2018.

Nonetheless, around August 2018, SignAd moved the billboard so that it was no longer within the area of the State's planned bridge expansion. After SignAd had moved the billboard, it was located at least five feet outside of the area required by the State for its planned bridge expansion.

In October 2018, the State filed suit to condemn the billboard. See id. § 21.012 (authorizing entity with eminent domain authority to initiate condemnation suit if unable to agree with property owner as to damages).

Two months later, in December 2018, the appointed special commissioners held a hearing to decide what amount would adequately compensate SignAd for the taking of its billboard. See id. § 21.014(a) (providing for trial court to appoint special commissioners to assess amount of damages that property owner will suffer from condemnation); id. at § 21.015(a) (providing for prompt hearing before special commissioners). At the time of the hearing, the State was unaware that SignAd had moved its billboard. Or, at the very least, the transcript of the December hearing does not show that the State's counsel, engineer, or appraiser knew that SignAd had moved its billboard.

The special commissioners decided the fair market value of the billboard was $118,000. SignAd objected to their decision. See id. § 21.018 (providing that party may object to findings made by special commissioners and requiring trial court to then try case like any other civil suit); see also PR Invs. & Specialty Retailers v. State , 251 S.W.3d 472, 476 (Tex. 2008) (hearings before special commissioners generally not recorded and condemnation suit is tried de novo by trial court when party objects to commissioners’ findings).

In January 2019, SignAd applied for a temporary injunction to bar the State from removing the billboard before the State's suit was tried. The trial court heard the injunction application in mid-February 2019.

During the temporary injunction hearing, SignAd disclosed that it had moved its billboard. SignAd's surveyor testified that the billboard was at least five feet outside the State's proposed right of way. The State's counsel agreed that if the billboard was not within the proposed right of way, the State did not have the authority to condemn the billboard.

After the hearing, the trial court, with the State's agreement, enjoined the State from removing the billboard. The State also agreed to commission a survey to confirm the billboard's new location. The State never took possession of or removed SignAd's billboard.

Trial was set for April 2020. Before then, in December 2019, the State dismissed its condemnation suit with prejudice. See PROP. § 21.0195(a)–(b) (authorizing Texas Department of Transportation, the state entity at issue here, to seek dismissal of condemnation suit with leave of court).

Trial Court's Award of Fees and Expenses

The trial court later held a bench trial to decide whether SignAd was entitled to attorney's fees and expenses due to the State's voluntary dismissal. See id. § 21.0195(c) (providing for award of expenses and fees upon dismissal). The trial court awarded SignAd $48,304.06 in expenses, which consisted of various expenses associated with SignAd's relocation of the billboard out of the State's proposed right of way, as well as $171,509.57 in reasonable and necessary attorney's fees.

DISCUSSION

The State appeals from the award of fees and expenses on multiple grounds. First, the State contends its sovereign immunity is waived solely to the extent stated in Section 21.0195(c) of the Property Code, which allows a property owner to recover fees and expenses after the voluntary dismissal of a condemnation suit. Because SignAd's billboard was not inside the State's planned bridge expansion area when the State filed its condemnation suit, the State maintains that SignAd does not qualify as a property owner and cannot recover under Section 21.0195(c).

Moreover, even if SignAd does qualify as a property owner under the statute, the State contends that SignAd cannot recover its fees or expenses. With respect to SignAd's fees, the State maintains they are not reasonable or necessary because SignAd moved its billboard without informing the State that this had been done before the State filed its condemnation suit. Had SignAd informed the State that the billboard was no longer within the planned bridge expansion area, the State would not have filed suit to condemn the billboard. Thus, SignAd caused its own fees.

Similarly, the State contends that SignAd cannot recover expenses under the statute because SignAd incurred these expenses in moving the billboard. Because SignAd moved the billboard before the State filed its condemnation suit, the State maintains that the expenses were not caused by its suit and cannot be recovered.

I. Property Owner Status

A. Standard of review

The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Yates Energy Corp. , 631 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Tex. 2021). When we review a question of law de novo, we give the trial court's ruling no deference. McFadin v. Broadway Coffeehouse , 539 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. 2018).

B. Applicable law

In interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect to the Legislature's intent, which we discern first and foremost from the statute's plain language. Odyssey 2020 Academy v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist. , 624 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. 2021). If the statute's words are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning, unless a contrary meaning is apparent from the statute's language. Tex. State Bd. of Examiners of Marriage & Fam. Therapists v. Tex. Med. Ass'n , 511 S.W.3d 28, 34 (Tex. 2017). In determining the ordinary meaning of undefined words, we usually look first to their dictionary definitions and then turn to other sources of meaning, like their usage in other statutes, court decisions, and similar authorities, as necessary. Id. at 35. We must give effect to all the statute's words so none are rendered meaningless. Odyssey 2020 Academy , 624 S.W.3d at 540. But we also cannot add words to the statute that the Legislature omitted. Broadway Nat'l Bank , 631 S.W.3d at 24. Context matters; so, we consider the statute as a whole, rather than interpreting its provisions in isolation. Id. at 23. Unless a statute is ambiguous or its plain meaning yields an absurd result, we do not consider extrinsic evidence of meaning. Sunstate Equip. Co. v. Hegar , 601 S.W.3d 685, 690 (Tex. 2020).

C. Analysis

Both sides agree that if SignAd is to recover attorney's fees or expenses in this suit, it must do so under Section 21.0195(c) of the Property Code. It provides:

If a court dismisses a condemnation proceeding on the motion of the department or as a result of the failure of the department to bring the proceeding properly, the court shall make an allowance to the property owner for the value of the department's use of the property while in possession of the property, any damage that the condemnation has caused to the property owner, and any expenses the property owner has incurred in connection with the condemnation, including reasonable and necessary fees for attorneys.

PROP. § 21.0195(c). Both sides also agree that solely expenses, including attorney's fees, are at issue in this appeal, as the trial court did not award any sums relating to the value of the State's use of the property or for damage caused by...