State v. Simons

296 P.3d 721

726 Utah Adv. Rep. 32

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Milo SIMONS, Defendant and Petitioner.

No. 20110842.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Jan. 25, 2013.

John E. Swallow, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey S. Gray, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Douglas J. Thompson, Provo, for petitioner.

Justice PARRISH, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 On certiorari, petitioner Milo Simons asks us to determine whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. Simons, a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic infraction, was arrested for possession of methamphetamine after being questioned and searched by Deputy Sheriff John Luke. Simons unsuccessfully moved to suppress the fruits of the search in the district court and then unsuccessfully appealed to the court of appeals.

¶ 2 Simons argues the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court because Deputy Luke improperly extended the length of a detention that began as a routine traffic stop without any reasonable suspicion that Simons was engaged in criminal activity. The State counters that Deputy Luke's investigation was proper because he had reasonable suspicion to question Simons. The State alternatively argues that Deputy Luke did not impermissibly extend the duration of the detention when he asked Simons a single question in the midst of Deputy Luke's investigation of the driver.

¶ 3 We hold that Deputy Luke's questioning of Simons, during which Simons admitted to possession of illegal drugs and paraphernalia, was proper based on Deputy Luke's reasonable suspicion occasioned by the driver's likely impairment and the presence of used drug paraphernalia in plain sight. We further hold that Deputy Luke did not improperly extend the duration of Simons detention because Deputy Luke's single question to Simons resulted in only a de minimis extension of the otherwise lawful detention.

BACKGROUND

¶ 4 “Because the legal analysis of a search and seizure case is highly fact dependent, we recite the facts in detail.” ¹State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 5, 63 P.3d 650 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). On October 12, 2006, Deputy Sheriff John Luke was on patrol with a deputy-in-training, Deputy Thomas. While patrolling SR–77 near Springville, the deputies saw a car traveling ten miles above the speed limit. The deputies paced the car and ran a records check. After determining the car was uninsured, Deputy Thomas initiated a traffic stop and made contact with the driver, Kevin Sorensen. Deputy Luke approached the passenger side of the vehicle.

¶ 5 After Deputy Thomas spoke with Sorensen, the deputies conferred at the front of the patrol car. Deputy Luke then approached the driver's side of the vehicle to collect Sorensen's license and registration. Although he did not smell alcohol, Deputy Luke believed Sorensen was impaired because “[Sorensen] had very watery eyes that were bloodshot [and] ... [h]e had very rapid speech [,] movement[,] ... [and] body language.” When Deputy Luke returned to his patrol car to conduct a records check, he observed that Sorensen's “movements [were] ... very agitated. He moved constantly touching his mirror several times, moving his head several times.” Deputy Luke determined that Sorensen's continued erratic behavior “was a possible sign of impairment.”

¶ 6 When Deputy Luke reapproached the driver's side of the vehicle, he testified that “Sorensen ... forced his face towards the window ... [and] blurted [ ] out ... I'm not drunk, I haven't been drinking, look at my eyes.” Deputy Luke then ordered Sorensen out of the vehicle to check for intoxication. As Sorensen exited the vehicle, Deputy Luke saw in the driver's side door compartment several “baggies that had been chewed on.” Based on his experience and the presence of a “white powder of a small crystal residue” in at least one of the baggies, Deputy Luke believed the baggies to be drug paraphernalia.

¶ 7 While Deputy Luke was investigating his suspicion of Sorensen's impairment, he briefly turned his attention to Simons based on Deputy Luke's belief that both men were involved in illegal drug use. Deputy Luke “explained to [Simons] that [he] had found paraphernalia in the car and asked [Simons] if he had anything on his person [Deputy Luke] need[ed] to know about.” Simons admitted to having a pipe in his underwear and, at Deputy Luke's command, shook a methamphetamine pipe from his pants. The deputies then continued with Sorensen's arrest, finding methamphetamine in a search incident to arrest. Shortly after the completion of Sorensen's arrest, Simons told Deputy Luke that “he had some [methamphetamine] in his pocket.” The deputies thereafter arrested Simons.

¶ 8 Simons was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of a controlled substance. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop, alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The district court denied the motion, ruling that evidence of used drug paraphernalia in plain sight, “coupled with the signs of possible impairment [of the driver,] le[ ]d to a reasonable suspicion and concern about both occupants of the car.” Simons subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance ² and was sentenced to a suspended prison term of five years with thirty-six months probation.

¶ 9 Simons timely appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. State v. Simons, 2011 UT App 251, ¶ 11, 262 P.3d 53. The appellate court found that it “need not determine whether Deputy Luke's questioning of Simons was supported by reasonable suspicion” as the district court had concluded. Id. ¶ 6. Rather, it held that because Deputy Luke's inquiry “did not measurably extend the length of the traffic stop or render the overall duration of the stop unreasonable,” the inquiry was constitutional. Id. ¶ 11.

¶ 10 We granted certiorari on the issue of whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's denial of Simons's motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. We affirm the court of appeals' holding that the district court's denial of Simons's motion to suppress was proper. Deputy Luke's investigation of Simons was supported by his reasonable suspicion that Simons was engaged in criminal activity based on the chewed baggies and Sorensen's apparent impairment. Additionally, Deputy Luke's solitary question to Simons did not unconstitutionally extend the duration of the stop.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11 “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals and not that of the district court.” State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 699. We review “the decision of the court of appeals for correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions of law.” State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 7, 229 P.3d 650. “[B]ecause there must be state-wide standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials,” State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 26, 63 P.3d 650 (internal quotation marks omitted), we afford no deference to the district court's “application of law to the underlying factual findings in search and seizure cases.” Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 15, 103 P.3d 699.

¶ 12 Because this case turns, in part, on the presence or absence of reasonable suspicion, we state the legal standard under which it is reviewed. Though reasonable suspicion “is highly fact dependent and the fact patterns are quite variable,” the determination that reasonable suspicion exists is not a factual one. State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “whether a particular set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a question of law, which [we] review[ ] for correctness.” Id.

ANALYSIS

I. SIMONS'S INITIAL DETENTION WAS PROPER

¶ 13 We begin our analysis with Simons's initial detention stemming from Sorensen's traffic violation. Simons argues that his detention was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Under the primacy doctrine, “[t]he fact that the state and federal constitutional language is identical does not require a claimant to create some threshold for independent analysis of the state language. This court, not the United States Supreme Court, has the authority and obligation to interpret Utah's constitutional guarantees....” State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 33, 162 P.3d 1106. Unlike the petitioner in Tiedemann, however, Simons did not “clearly raise[ ] and extensively brief [his] state law claims.” Id. ¶ 32. In fact, Simons does not present any support for his claim under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. We therefore review the constitutionality of the detention only under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. SeeU.S. Const. amend. IV (applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).

¶ 14 The Fourth Amendment protects United States citizens from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. “Although police must have a warrant to conduct most searches and seizures, officers may temporarily detain a vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the purpose of conducting a limited investigation of the suspicion.” State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, ¶ 11, 229 P.3d 650 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the Fourth Amendment, we apply a two-part test to determine whether a traffic stop is reasonable. Id. ¶ 12. “The first step is to determine whether the police officer's action was justified at its inception.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If so, we proceed to the second step, where we “determine whether the detention following the stop was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the...