State v. Singh

684 S.W.3d 774

STATE of Tennessee

v.Raghu SINGH

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee, AT JACKSON.

Assigned on Briefs September 7, 2023

FILED September 21, 2023

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County, No. 19-00926, Chris Craft, Judge

Joseph McClusky, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Raghu Singh.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Vanessa R. Murtaugh, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Tom Greenholtz, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Robert L. Holloway, Jr., and J. Ross Dyer, JJ., joined.

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Mr. Raghu Singh, guilty of two counts of driving under the influence and one count of reckless driving. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, after service of ten days in confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his convictions for driving under the influence. He also asserts that the trial court erred (1) in finding that the State had established a proper chain of custody for his blood sample; and (2) by denying a motion to suppress statements he made at the scene. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On February 14, 2019, the Shelby County grand jury charged the Defendant with two counts of driving under the influence of an intoxicant ("DUI") and one count of reckless driving. The incident arose from a one-car accident that was investigated by Germantown Police Department Officers Christian Jefferson and Johnny Vo in March 2018.

The trial of the case began on May 9, 2022. On the morning of trial, the trial court heard a motion filed by the Defendant seeking to suppress statements he made to law enforcement officers at the scene. The Defendant argued that he was in custody and that officers did not administer Miranda warnings before asking him questions. After the hearing, the trial court denied the motion, concluding that the Defendant was not in custody and that Miranda warnings were not required.

At trial, the State first called Officers Jefferson and Vo to testify. The officers testified that they responded to the scene of an accident around 10:15 p.m. on March 3, 2018. When they arrived, the officers saw that a car had crashed into a brick mailbox. Officer Jefferson also saw a man, later identified as the Defendant, walking away from the vehicle.

Officer Jefferson began questioning the Defendant to determine his identity and ensure he was not injured. During the conversation, he noticed signs of intoxication, such as the smell of alcohol on the Defendant’s breath, slurred speech, bloodshot and watery eyes, and an unsteady balance. The Defendant admitted to consuming alcohol earlier in the evening and that he had been driving the car and hit the mailbox. The officers confirmed that the Defendant owned the vehicle.

Officer Jefferson asked the Defendant to perform a series of standard field sobriety tests, including the walk-and-turn test and the one-legged stand test. According to Officer Jefferson, the Defendant could not keep his balance during the instructions and failed to follow test directions. The officer believed that the Defendant "did not perform successfully on the field sobriety tests," and he placed the Defendant under arrest for DUI.

The officers informed the Defendant of his Miranda rights before taking him to jail for booking. At the jail, Officer Vo obtained a warrant for a blood draw, and he transported the Defendant to Germantown Methodist Hospital for the procedure around 2:00 a.m. Officer Vo was present during the blood draw, though he was not involved in the procedure.

Officer Vo described the process of sealing and handling the blood samples for evidence. He stated that the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation ("TBI") had previously provided a "blood draw kit" to the department that included, among other things, two blood vials. He gave both vials from this kit to the hospital nurse, who drew the Defendant’s blood. The officer received the blood-filled vials from the nurse, sealed them in the evidence box, and completed the form paperwork. He then gave the evidence box to his supervisor, who placed it in an evidence locker. The supervisor or another officer later transported the box to the TBI for analysis.

The State also called TBI Special Agent Julian Conyers to testify. Special Agent Conyers stated that TBI took possession of the evidence box containing the Defendant’s blood samples after Officer Jefferson left it in the TBI drop box. From there, TBI evidence technician Fallo Howard retrieved the samples and placed them in the evidence vault. The samples were labeled and refrigerated until Special Agent Conyers conducted the testing.

Special Agent Conyers testified that there was no indication that the evidence box had been tampered with or that the blood samples were contaminated. The agent stated that the blood alcohol concentration for the Defendant’s blood samples was 0.13 grams percent ethyl alcohol. The agent confirmed that the Defendant’s blood was drawn about four hours following the officers’ first encounter with the Defendant. As such, at the time of the encounter, the Defendant may have had a blood alcohol concentration of between 0.17 percent and 0.21 percent, depending on the elimination rate used for the calculation.

Following the trial, the jury found the Defendant guilty as charged. After a sentencing hearing on September 2, 2022, the trial court merged the DUI convictions and sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days. The court suspended the sentence to probation after service of ten days in confinement and imposed a $500.00 fine.

The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion for a new trial on October 7, 2022. The Defendant thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal on November 4, 2022.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Defendant raises three issues. First, he asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his convictions for DUI.¹ He also argues that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody for the blood evidence and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We address each issue in turn.

A. Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Defendant first argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convictions for DUI. More specifically, the Defendant argues that there was "no evidence that [the Defendant] was operating or in control of the vehicle at the time of the arrest." In addition, he argues that the State could not establish when he drank in relation to his driving and that this "uncertainty" could not sustain the verdicts. We respectfully disagree.

1. Standard of Appellate Review

[1–5] "The standard for appellate review of a claim challenging the sufficiency of the State’s evidence is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " State v. Miller, 638 S.W.3d 136, 157 (Tenn. 2021) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). This standard of review is "highly deferential" in favor of the jury’s verdict. See State v. Lyons, 669 S.W.3d 775, 791 (Tenn. 2023). Indeed, this standard requires us to resolve all conflicts in favor of the State’s theory and to view the credited testimony in a light most favorable to the State. State v. McKinney, 669 S.W.3d 753, 772 (Tenn. 2023). To that end, "[w]e do not reweigh the evidence, because questions regarding witness credibility, the weight to be given the evidence, and factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the jury, as the trier of fact." State v. Shackleford, 673 S.W.3d 243, 250 (Tenn. 2023) (citations omitted). "The standard of review is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence." State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2. Driving Under the Influence

[6, 7] The Defendant was convicted of DUI under two separate theories: driving while under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI by intoxication) and DUI committed with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more (DUI per se). As is relevant to this case, Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401 provides as follows:

It is unlawful for any person to drive or to be in physical control of any automobile or other motor driven vehicle on any of the public roads and highways of the state, or on any streets or alleys, or while on the premises of any shopping center, trailer park, or apartment house complex, or any other premises that is generally frequented by the public at large, while:

(1) Under the influence of any intoxicant, marijuana, controlled substance, controlled substance analogue, drug, substance affecting the central nervous system, or combination thereof that impairs the driver’s ability to safely operate a motor vehicle by depriving the driver of the clearness of mind and control of oneself that the driver would otherwise possess; [and]

(2) The alcohol concentration in the person’s blood or breath is eight-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or more[.]

Although charged separately in this case, "DUI by intoxication and DUI per se are alternative means of committing the offense of DUI[.]" See State v. Wilburn, 647 S.W.3d 893, 900 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2021). If a jury finds a defendant guilty under both theories, the trial court should merge the convictions into a single judgment, as the trial court did here. State v. Cooper, 336 S.W.3d 522, 524 (Tenn. 2011).

[8] Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a reasonable juror could have found the essential...