State v. Sitaras

942 A.2d 1071

106 Conn.App. 493

STATE of Connecticut v. John B. SITARAS.

No. 27675.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 19, 2007.

Decided March 25, 2008.

Glenn T. Terk, Wethersfield, with whom, on the brief, was Katherine L. Matthews, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant).

John A. East III, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, former state's attorney,

and Lisa Herskowitz, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

FLYNN, C.J., and DiPENTIMA and LAVINE, Js.

LAVINE, J.

The unfortunate facts of this case demonstrate that it is impermissible to interfere with a peace officer performing his or her duties, even if one believes that the officer is mistaken or improperly used a pretext to execute an arrest warrant. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2003) § 53a-167a (a);¹ see also State v. Aloi, 280 Conn 824, 834, 911 A.2d 1086 (2007) ("§ 53a-167a broadly proscribes conduct that hinders, obstructs or impedes a police officer in the performance of his or her duties irrespective of whether the offending conduct is active or passive").

The defendant, John B. Sitaras, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of interfering with an officer in violation of § 53a-167a (a). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) there was insufficient evidence by which the jury reasonably could have found that he interfered with an officer, (2) the court improperly instructed the jury, and (3) he was denied the right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial impropriety. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts from the evidence presented. On August 26, 2005, Joseph Ficacelli of the East Hartford police department was on routine patrol when he observed a motorist take a shortcut through private property. While checking on the vehicle's registration, Ficacelli learned that there was an outstanding warrant for the arrest of the owner of the vehicle that had been issued by the Plainville police department.² Ficacelli stopped the vehicle, which was owned by the defendant, and identified the defendant's son as the operator. Ficacelli decided to use a ruse to arrest the defendant³ and borrowed the son's cellular telephone to call the defendant. Ficacelli told the defendant that they needed to meet so that Ficacelli could discuss a stolen vehicle report the defendant had filed.⁴ Ficacelli and the defendant agreed to meet at the parking lot of Mayberry School. Ficacelli then radioed fellow officer Patrick Sullivan, who was on patrol near the school, and asked him to help take the defendant into custody.

Sullivan, wearing his uniform and operating a marked police vehicle, arrived at the school at approximately 6:20 p.m. Ficacelli had not yet arrived. Sullivan did not know why an arrest warrant had been issued for the defendant or by which jurisdiction. When the defendant saw Sullivan enter the parking lot, he waved to him and engaged Sullivan in cordial conversation. Sullivan asked the defendant if he knew there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. The defendant responded with astonishment, which Sullivan interpreted as a warning signal. The defendant explained to Sullivan that he had come to the school to talk to Ficacelli about a stolen vehicle report and that there must be some mistake about the warrant. The defendant produced his operator's license when Sullivan asked for it. As a result of the defendant's protestations, Sullivan decided to confirm the arrest warrant to ensure that a mistake had not been made. Sullivan asked the defendant to sit in the back of the police vehicle while he radioed for confirmation of the warrant. The defendant refused to get into the vehicle, telling Sullivan that the officer had "no right to put him back there" and that he did not "need to be back there."

In response, Sullivan initially did not compel the defendant to sit in the vehicle but radioed for confirmation of the warrant while the defendant stood within earshot. When Sullivan received confirmation of the warrant, he asked the defendant to turn around and put his hands behind him. According to Sullivan, the defendant became angry, belligerent and refused to comply. He protested loudly that the police had made a "mistake," he was "the wrong person," "there's no way I should be getting arrested," and, "I'm not going to do it."

Sullivan feared for his safety as the defendant, who was larger than Sullivan, became more agitated. Sullivan grabbed the defendant's arm in an attempt to turn him around and put on the handcuffs. The defendant resisted, tensing his muscles and backing away. He ignored all of Sullivan's verbal commands. Sullivan then saw Ficacelli enter the parking lot. Assured that help was on the way, Sullivan executed a takedown of the defendant by hooking his leg behind one of the defendant's and using body leverage to throw the defendant to the ground. The defendant resisted, but Sullivan was able to turn him onto his stomach. The defendant continued to resist until Ficacelli informed him that he would use a chemical spray. The defendant then permitted the officers to handcuff him and take him into custody. He was cooperative thereafter. The defendant was charged with interfering with an officer.

As his defense, the defendant asserted that he never attempted to flee or physically resist arrest. He admitted, however, that he did not enter the police vehicle at Sullivan's request. The defendant described Sullivan as curt, unreasonable and overzealous. According to the defendant, when Sullivan told him that he was under arrest, he simply, but politely, told Sullivan that there must be some mistake and suggested that they wait for Ficacelli to arrive. When Sullivan saw Ficacelli arrive Sullivan suddenly and without provocation threw the defendant to the ground. The defendant was under the impression that Sullivan was trying to impress Ficacelli and earn arrest points with the police department. The defendant claimed that if Ficacelli had been forthright with him from the beginning, he would have met the officer at police headquarters to discuss the arrest warrant.

After the jury found the defendant guilty of interfering with an officer, the court sentenced him to one year in prison execution suspended after thirty days, followed by a year of probation. The court also imposed special conditions requiring the defendant to make a $500 contribution to the Brian Aselton Fund, a $500 contribution to the Sarah McDermott Scholarship Fund, to perform 100 hours of community service and undergo anger management counseling.⁵ The defendant timely appealed.

I

The defendant's first claim is that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of interfering with an officer. More specifically, the defendant argues that there was no evidence that he physically prevented Sullivan from arresting him and that verbal statements and nonphysical refusal to comply with an officer's directive does not constitute a violation of § 53a-167a. We disagree.

A claim of insufficient evidence implicates the constitutional right not to be convicted on inadequate proof. State v. Morgan, 70 Conn.App. 255, 281, 797 A.2d 616, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 919, 806 A.2d 1056 (2002). We review this claim first as it may be dispositive of the appeal; see State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138, 179, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); because a defendant convicted on insufficient evidence cannot be retried without violating the double jeopardy clause. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).

"The standard of review we apply to a claim of insufficient evidence is well established. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt....

"We note that the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.... If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lopez, 289 Conn. 779, 808, 911 A.2d 1099 (2007).

The relevant language of § 53a-167a (a) is, "when such person obstructs, resists, hinders or endangers" the officer in the performance of his or her duties. In support of his claim, the defendant relies on language from this court's decision in State v. Aloi, 86 Conn.App. 363, 373, 861 A.2d 1180 (2004), rev'd in part on other grounds, 280 Conn. 824, 911 A.2d 1086 (2007), namely "[a] reasonable and natural construction of the terms `obstruct,' `resist,' `hinder' and `endanger' reveals that they do not proscribe being verbally defensive or voicing mere declaratory statements, but proscribe some act that imposes an obstacle that may impede, hinder, prevent or substantially delay the performance of the officer's duties."⁶

Although the defendant admitted that he told Sullivan that there must be some mistake concerning the arrest warrant, that he had the wrong man and that he did not obey Sullivan's order to get into the police vehicle, he vigorously denied that he physically resisted Sullivan's attempt to arrest him. According to Sullivan, however, the defendant...