State v. Smith

State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. David L. Smith, a/k/a Mont, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-4-21

Supreme Court of New Jersey

June 28, 2022

Argued April 26, 2022

On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.

Margaret McLane, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender attorney; Margaret McLane, of counsel and on the briefs).

William P. Cooper-Daub, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney; William P. Cooper-Daub, of counsel and on the briefs, and Randolph E. Mershon, III, Assistant Mercer County Prosecutor, on the briefs).

Karen Thompson argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Karen Thompson Alexander Shalom, and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief).

Jonathan Romberg submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Social Justice (Seton Hall University School of Law Center for Social Justice, attorneys; Jonathan Romberg, of counsel and on the brief).

SOLOMON, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 prohibits operation of a vehicle with any "non-transparent material" on the front windshield or front side windows. Although the statute predates automotive window tinting, it commonly serves as the statutory basis for tinted window citations. In this appeal, the Court considers whether a purported violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 based on tinted windows justified an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle.

In November 2018, at approximately 10:20 p.m., Trenton detectives stopped defendant David Smith's motor vehicle for a purported tinted windows violation after the detectives observed dark tinting on defendant's rear windshield. Despite the rear windshield's tint, detectives were able to see that defendant was alone in the car and was making a furtive "shoving" motion, raising suspicions that he was trying to conceal a weapon. When the detectives searched the vehicle, they found a firearm. The detectives cited defendant for a tinted windows violation and charged him with various weapons offenses.

The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the firearm, concluding that the car stop was supported by a reasonable suspicion of a tinted windows violation pursuant to adjacent statute N.J.S.A. 39:3-75. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to suppress.

The Court granted certification, limited to whether the State established a reasonable and articulable suspicion for the car stop. 248 N.J. 386 (2021). The Court later granted the State's motion for a limited remand to the trial court to vacate defendant's convictions and dismiss the charges against him. Despite the stipulation of dismissal, the Court considers the issues presented by this appeal because they are of sufficient public importance and likely to surface again.

HELD: The stop was not supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation. N.J.S.A. 39:3-75, which governs automotive safety glass, does not apply to window tint violations. Consistent with the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, reasonable and articulable suspicion of a tinted windows violation arises only when a vehicle's front windshield or front side windows are so darkly tinted that police cannot clearly see people or articles within the car.

1. A motor vehicle stop by a police officer is a seizure of persons under both the Federal and State Constitutions. To justify such a seizure, a police officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons offense. Defendant was cited for a tinted windows violation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, which provides in pertinent part that "[n]o person shall drive any motor vehicle with any . . . non-transparent material upon the front windshield, . . . or front side windows of such vehicle." (emphases added). Here, the arresting officers observed window tint only on the rear windshield of defendant's vehicle. Under the statute's plain language, the tint on defendant's rear windshield could not constitute a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74. It did not give rise to the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to justify this motor vehicle stop. (pp. 10-14)

2. The Court considers the other authorities and principles on which the State and the trial and appellate courts relied. N.J.S.A. 39:3-75 prohibits the use of "safety glazing material which causes undue or unsafe distortion of visibility or . . . unduly fractured, discolored or deteriorated safety glazing material" on any of a vehicle's windows. The plain language of section 75 indicates that it is concerned solely with the quality and maintenance of safety glazing material, not aftermarket tinted window film. N.J.S.A. 39:3-75.1 provides an exception to window tinting restrictions for medical reasons not claimed here. N.J.S.A. 39:3-75.2 authorizes the promulgation of rules and regulations specifying standards for permissible window tint but does not itself establish such specifications. In short, no statute supports the stop at issue. (pp. 14-16)

3. Related regulations are equally inapposite. In State v. Cohen, the Appellate Division construed N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 as prohibiting tinted windows that do not meet N.J.A.C. 13:20-33.7's delineated window tint specifications. 347 N.J.Super. 375, 380 (App. Div. 2002). Through 2013, all motor vehicles had to comply with N.J.A.C. 13:20-33.7's safety requirements to pass biannual inspection. N.J.A.C. 13:20-33.7 contains two paragraphs -- (d) and (g) -- that set forth standards for tinted windows, but neither justifies the stop here. N.J.A.C. 13:20-33.7(d) prohibits the addition of any tint to areas not relevant here. N.J.A.C. 13:20-33.7(g) addresses rear windows and windshields -- but the statute authorizes the application of tint to those surfaces so long as the car has an exterior wing mirror on each side and vision through the windows and windshields is only partially obscured. Even if N.J.A.C. 13:20-33.7 did prohibit the tint observed on defendant's rear windshield, the regulation no longer applies to non-commercial vehicles. The Court departs from Cohen to the extent that it ties violations of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 to the standards set forth in N.J.A.C. 13:20-33.7. N.J.A.C. 13:20-1.2(a) is likewise inapplicable because its light transmittance standard applies only to a vehicle's front windshield where a Medical Exemption Certificate has been issued. (pp. 16-17)

4. The facts of this case do not support application of the community caretaking function, which may be implicated where police observe "something abnormal . . . concerning the operation of a motor vehicle." Cohen, 347 N.J.Super. at 378. Unlike the darkly tinted front driver- and passenger-side windows that prompted the investigatory stop in Cohen, defendant's tinted rear windshield could not be considered a "significant obstruction" of the driver's vision or "a hazardous vehicular condition that deviates from the norm," see id. at 381, because, whether or not defendant's car was equipped with exterior side mirrors, New Jersey law allows for rear window tinting on passenger vehicles. Furthermore, detectives were able to see through the rear windshield that there was "just the driver" making furtive motions inside the car. The initial stop of defendant's vehicle was thus unconstitutional because no statutory or regulatory provision forms the basis for a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant committed a tinted windows violation. (pp. 17-18)

5. For completeness and future guidance, the Court considers whether N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 is unconstitutionally vague. A statute is unconstitutionally vague, in violation of due process, if persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. The term "non-transparent" used in N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 is not impermissibly vague and means that reasonable suspicion of a tinted windows violation arises when a vehicle's front windshield or front side windows are so darkly tinted that police cannot clearly see people or articles within the car. Here, despite the tinting on defendant's rear windshield, detectives were able to see with just the police SUV's headlights and street lighting that there was only one person in the vehicle and that the person was making movements. Such a degree of window tint is not "non-transparent" within the meaning of the statute. In order to establish a reasonable suspicion of a tinted windows violation under N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, the State will therefore need to present evidence that tinting on the front windshield or front side windows inhibited officers' ability to clearly see the vehicle's occupants or articles inside. (pp. 18-22)

REVERSED.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, and PIERRE-LOUIS; and JUDGE FUENTES (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE SOLOMON's opinion.

OPINION

SOLOMON JUSTICE

N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 prohibits operation of a vehicle with any "non-transparent material" on the front windshield or front side windows. Although the statute predates automotive window tinting, it commonly serves as the statutory basis for tinted window citations. See State v. Cohen, 347 N.J.Super. 375, 379-81 (App. Div. 2002). In this appeal, the Court considers whether a purported violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74 based on tinted windows justified an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle.

Trenton detectives stopped defe...