State v. Smith

823 A.2d 664

374 Md. 527

STATE of Maryland v. Deshawn Lamont SMITH.

No. 91, Sept. Term, 2002.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 9, 2003.

Gary E. Bair, Solicitor General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Geraldine K. Sweeney, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ.

CATHELL, J.

On February 22, 2001, Deshawn Lamont Smith, respondent, after a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Harford County was convicted of transporting a handgun.¹ Respondent was sentenced to a term of three years of incarceration, with all but 30 days suspended.

On February 23, 2001, respondent appealed his conviction to the Court of Special Appeals. On appeal, respondent asserted that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. On August 27, 2002, after hearing the case en banc, the intermediate appellate court reversed the decision of the Circuit Court. Smith v. State, 145 Md.App. 400, 805 A.2d 1108 (2002).

On December 11, 2002, we granted the State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. State v. Smith, 372 Md. 132, 812 A.2d 288 (2002). The State, petitioner, presents one question for our review:

"Did the Court of Special Appeals incorrectly hold that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction of the lessee driver of a vehicle for transporting a handgun, where the gun was found in the trunk of the car under a jacket belonging to one of the two passengers also in the car?"

We reverse the Court of Special Appeals and answer yes to petitioner's question. We hold that the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom were sufficient to sustain the conviction of respondent for the crime of transporting a handgun. We shall additionally hold that, generally, a person's status as a owner or lessee/driver of a vehicle can support an inference by a fact-finder that the owner or lessee/driver has knowledge of the contents of the vehicle he or she is operating.²

I. Facts

We adopt the facts as set forth in the intermediate appellate court's plurality opinion in this case:³

"Maryland State Trooper Larry Goldstein testified that around 5:30 on the evening of March 25, 2000, he was working speed enforcement on I-95 in Harford County when he was advised by another trooper to stop a white Buick for speeding. Trooper Goldstein made the stop and parked his vehicle behind the Buick. He approached the vehicle on the driver's side and asked the driver, [respondent], for his driver's license and vehicle registration. There were two passengers in the vehicle, Michael Brandon Foster and Dayvon Smith. At trial, Trooper Goldstein did not recall the positions of the passengers in the vehicle, but did remember that one of the passengers had been sitting in the rear seat. According to the trooper, when he approached the Buick, he smelled the odor of burnt marijuana. Goldstein returned to his vehicle and checked [respondent's] drivers license and the registration of the vehicle. After calling for backup, Goldstein returned to the Buick and asked [respondent] to exit the vehicle. The trooper told [respondent] that he smelled marijuana. In response [respondent] admitted that he had smoked marijuana before he was stopped.

"When additional police arrived, the officers arrested [respondent] and his companions for the marijuana offense. Goldstein then searched the vehicle incident to the arrest of the men.

"Trooper Slide, one of the troopers who had arrived to assist Goldstein, opened the trunk of the vehicle. He lifted a jacket in the trunk and told Goldstein that he had found a handgun under the jacket. Trooper Goldstein looked into the trunk and saw a handgun in the center [the jacket was then placed back on top of the gun.]

"At trial, Goldstein testified that the vehicle had a fold-down rear seat so that there was direct access to the trunk from the back seat of the vehicle.⁴ He also stated that he had not seen any suspicious movement or attempt to hide anything by the passengers.

"Trooper Goldstein removed the handgun from the trunk. The handgun was a silver revolver, a .38 Special with a barrel approximately four inches long. The gun was loaded with five rounds. A subsequent test of the gun determined that it was operable.

"None of the men admitted to owning either the gun or the jacket. One of the passengers, Dayvon Smith, however, later admitted to owning the jacket, and the jacket was returned to him.

"According to Goldstein, [respondent] told him that he lived in Essex, Maryland, that he had rented the Buick, that he had it for a week, and that he was going to New York to return the vehicle.

"The trial court found [respondent] guilty of transporting a handgun. It relied on the fact that [respondent] had rented the car for a week and was its driver. It reasoned that [respondent], as the `driver and occupant of the car, knew of the gun's presence,' and `was at least in constructive possession of [it].'" [Some alterations added.]⁵

II. Standard of Review

The standard for appellate review of evidentiary sufficiency is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2785, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 569 (1979); Moye v. State, 369 Md. 2, 12, 796 A.2d 821, 827 (2002); White v. State, 363 Md. 150, 162, 767 A.2d 855, 861-62 (2001); State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 478-79, 649 A.2d 336, 337-38 (1994). "Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder." State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750, 720 A.2d 323, 331 (1998). See McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 474, 701 A.2d 675, 685-86 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1151, 118 S.Ct. 1173, 140 L.Ed.2d 182 (1998) (quoting Albrecht, 336 Md. at 478, 649 A.2d at 337); Binnie v. State, 321 Md. 572, 580, 583 A.2d 1037, 1040-41 (1991); Wright v. State, 312 Md. 648, 541 A.2d 988 (1988). "We give `due regard to the [fact finder's] findings of facts, its resolution of conflicting evidence, and, significantly, its opportunity to observe and assess the credibility of witnesses.'" Moye, 369 Md. at 12, 796 A.2d at 827 (quoting McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 474, 701 A.2d 675, 685 (1997) (quoting Albrecht, 336 Md. at 478, 649 A.2d at 337)). See the following recent cases quoting Albrecht: Anderson v. State, 372 Md. 285, 291-92, 812 A.2d 1016, 1020 (2002); Deese v. State, 367 Md. 293, 305, 786 A.2d 751, 758 (2001); Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 649, 781 A.2d 851, 880 (2001); White, 363 Md. at 162, 767 A.2d at 861-62. We do not re-weigh the evidence, but "we do determine whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, which could convince a rational trier of fact of the defendant's guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt." White, 363 Md. at 162, 767 A.2d at 862. A valid conviction may be based solely on circumstantial evidence. Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530, 537, 573 A.2d 831, 834 (1990). The same standard applies to all criminal cases, including those resting upon circumstantial evidence, since, generally, proof of guilt based in whole or in part on circumstantial evidence is no different from proof of guilt based on direct eyewitness accounts. See Eiland v. State, 92 Md.App. 56, 607 A.2d 42 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993).

III. Inference and Deference

The following cases further emphasize a trial judge's or a jury's ability to choose among differing inferences that might possibly be made from a factual situation and the deference we must give in that regard to the inferences a fact-finder may draw. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319,99 S.Ct. at 2789,61 L.Ed.2d at 573 (noting the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts); Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 460, 682 A.2d 248, 254 (1996) (Involving a probable cause issue the Court stated "it is the trier of fact that must draw the inferences.... Consequently, absent clear error in its fact-finding, an appellate court is required, in deference to the trial court, to accept those findings of fact."); In re Timothy F., 343 Md. 371, 379-80, 681 A.2d 501, 504-05 (1996) (in criminal cases the appropriate inquiry is not whether the reviewing court believes that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but, rather, whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt); McMillian v. State, 325 Md. 272, 281-82, 600 A.2d 430, 434-35 (1992) (stating that "The trial court's findings as to disputed facts are accepted by this Court unless found to be clearly erroneous"); see also Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183, 571 A.2d 1239, 1241 (1990).

In State v. Raines, 326 Md. 582, 590-93, 606 A.2d 265, 269-70 (1992), we stated:

"This analysis indicates that the Court of Special Appeals credited the Raines's version of the events, one that necessarily mitigated his culpability. Of course, the credibility of the witnesses was a matter for the trial court, as fact finder, not the appellate court, to resolve. Furthermore, the determination of an accused's intention is, in the first instance, for the trial judge, when sitting without a jury, and this determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. As noted, the trial court discounted Raines's version of the events. Instead, the court drew an inference based on other evidence offered at trial that the killing was intentional, deliberate and premeditated. This, the trial court, as fact finder, has the exclusive right to do. The Court

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