State v. Sneed

413 Mont. 392

536 P.3d 435

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Randy Vaughn SNEED, Defendant and Appellant.

DA 21-0323

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: June 14, 2023

Decided: September 26, 2023

For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Carolyn M. Gibadlo, Assistant Appellate Defender, Missoula, Montana

For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Bree Gee, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Audrey S. Cromwell, Gallatin County Attorney, Bradley D. Bowen, Deputy County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana

Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Randy Sneed (Sneed) appeals from the May 7, 2021 Sentencing Order issued by the Eighteenth Judicial District Court of Montana. The District Court sentenced Sneed based on three counts: strangulation of a partner or family member, a felony, in violation of § 45-5-215(1),(a), MCA ; partner or family member assault, a misdemeanor, in violation of § 45-5-206(1),(a), MCA ; and endangering the welfare of a child, a misdemeanor, in violation of § 45-5-622(1), MCA.

¶2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it permitted Dr. Kuehl to testify about the legal and medical definitions of strangulation?

2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it allowed Officer Clark to testify that Sneed was charged with a felony and detained in the "high-risk, violent crimes pod?"

3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to play Sneed's statements in Exhibit 22?

4. Did the District Court's evidentiary rulings create cumulative error?

5. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it refused to address Sneed's concerns regarding Juror R.?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 On January 11, 2019, Sneed got into a fight with his partner, Kateland Stephens (Stephens). Sneed was lying on the bed with their sleeping, ten-month old daughter, IS. Stephens tried to leave with IS, but Sneed refused to let them. As Stephens attempted to exit the bedroom while holding IS, Sneed blocked her by grabbing onto her throat and pushing her to the bed.

¶4 Stephens left after that, leaving IS with Sneed, and called the police. Stephens reported to police that Sneed poked her in the eye and grabbed her by the throat, pinning her down and putting all his weight on her.

¶5 Officer Clark responded to Stephens's call. He met with Stephens at a gas station and examined her injuries. He took pictures of what appeared to be redness on Stephens's neck and puffiness in her left eye. Afterwards, Officer Clark went to Sneed's house to investigate further.

Sneed admitted he grabbed Stephens by the throat. However, Sneed claims he guided Stephens by the throat down to the bed so that he could take IS away from her. Consequently, Officer Clark arrested Sneed for felony strangulation of a partner or family member.

¶6 The District Court held a jury trial during which the State presented multiple pieces of evidence now at issue on appeal. The evidence includes expert witness testimony, Officer Clark's testimony, and a recording from an Order of Protection Hearing. Additionally, one Juror, Juror R., was checking his phone and dozing off during the trial. The District Court refused to admonish the jury member at Sneed's request. The jury convicted Sneed of count one: strangulation of a partner; count two: assault of a partner; and count three: child endangerment. The District Court sentenced Sneed to a five-year DOC commitment with three years suspended for count one; 12 months with 11 months, 21 days suspended for count two; and 6 months, all suspended for count three. Sneed appeals.

¶7 We affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 Trial courts have broad discretion to determine the relevance and admissibility of evidence. State v. Passmore , 2010 MT 34, ¶ 51, 355 Mont. 187, 207, 225 P.3d 1229, 1245. Thus, this Court generally reviews evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Passmore , ¶ 51. "A court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice." Passmore , ¶ 51.

¶9 "The trial court is in the best position to observe the jurors and to decide the potential for prejudice when allegations of juror misconduct are raised; therefore, the trial court has significant latitude when ruling on these matters, and its determination is given considerable weight by this Court. This Court will defer to that determination absent a showing of prejudice." State v. Rennaker , 2007 MT 10, ¶ 29, 335 Mont. 274, 150 P.3d 960 (internal citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

¶10 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it permitted Dr. Kuehl to testify about the legal and medical definitions of strangulation?

¶11 During trial, Dr. Tiffany Kuehl (Dr. Kuehl) testified as an expert witness, on behalf of the State. Dr. Kuehl explained the difference between choking and strangulation:

[State] So in the context of being a medical professional, could you define the term "choking"?

[Dr. Kuehl] Choking is obstruction of the airway, usually by some object that's inside the airway. Like I choked on some food, that type of thing.

[State] In the context of being a medical professional, could you define "strangulation"?

[Dr. Kuehl] Strangulation is an injury that occurs through mechanical, external compression of the neck to the point of an alteration in level of consciousness through impairment of breathing or circulation.

[State] It's complicated. What does that mean?

[Dr. Kuehl] It means that it's an injury that is occurring usually through application of force to the outside of the neck to obstruct or block the blood flow to the brain or block the flow of air into the lungs.

[State] If strangulation is defined as purposely or knowingly impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of another person by applying pressure on the throat or neck of the person, how does that compare with your understanding of that term from a medical perspective?

[Dr. Kuehl] It's nearly identical. I think it's consistent.

Although Sneed now takes issue with Dr. Kuehl's answer that the definitions are "nearly identical," he did not immediately object to this line of questioning.

¶12 However, later in the examination, Sneed objected when the State asked:

[State] If strangulation is defined as purposely or knowingly impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of a person by applying pressure on the throat or neck of the person, how hard does a person have to apply pressure to the throat or neck of another person to impede their normal breathing and circulation?

[Dr. Kuehl] Four pounds of pressure.

[State] Twelve or four?

[Dr. Kuehl] Four pounds.

[State] And that would be for the initial carotid artery; is that correct?

[Dr. Kuehl] That would be to occlude the jugular vein.

[State] If a person is asked how did you stop her and the response is "I grabbed her by the throat," how is that statement "I grabbed her by the throat" consistent with strangulation as we defined it?

[Defense] Objection, Your Honor. Facts not on the record.

[District Court] Overruled.

[Defense] Also calls for speculation, Your Honor.

[District Court] Also overruled.

[Dr. Kuehl] So grabbing the neck implies that a physical force of compression has been applied to the neck. In terms of whether that would impede the blood flow, it would meet the definition of strangulation if the victim had symptoms of impairment of consciousness in any way.

¶13 Sneed argues Dr. Kuehl made an improper legal conclusion that the facts of this case meet the criteria for strangulation. The State argues Dr. Kuehl's testimony was appropriate as she did not testify about whether Sneed had the requisite mental state to commit the crime, and her testimony was based on hypothetical questions.

¶14 We review a district court's admission of expert testimony to determine if there was an abuse of discretion. Sharbono v. Cole , 2015 MT 257, ¶ 10, 381 Mont. 13, 15, 355 P.3d 782, 785. Further, even if testimony on an ultimate issue of fact may implicate legal issues, expert testimony is admissible if it does not reach a legal conclusion or apply the law to the facts. Comm'r of Political Practices for Mont. v. Wittich , 2017 MT 210, ¶ 41, 388 Mont. 347, 360, 400 P.3d 735, 745. It is the jury's job, not the witness's, to apply the law to the facts of the case. Wittich , ¶ 41.

¶15 Here, the State posed hypothetical questions to Dr. Kuehl to clarify her medical definition of strangulation versus choking, and by asking her "[i]f a person is asked how did you stop her and the response is ‘I grabbed her by the throat,’ how is that statement ‘I grabbed her by the throat’ consistent with strangulation as we defined it?" Dr. Kuehl responded by describing the signs and symptoms of strangulation based on the hypothetical scenario the State gave. She did not apply the law to the facts of this case. Furthermore, Dr. Kuehl never reached a conclusion that Sneed committed the crime. Nor did she attest to whether Sneed had the requisite mental state to commit the crime. The jury was still tasked with determining whether Stephens experienced symptoms of strangulation and whether Sneed acted purposely or knowingly. Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion regarding Dr. Kuehl's testimony.

¶16 2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it allowed Officer Clark to testify that Sneed was charged with a felony and detained in the "high-risk, violent crimes pod?"

¶17 During trial, the State called Officer Clark to testify. The State questioned Officer Clark about Intelmate—the system that monitors all inmate phone calls. The State asked Officer Clark about factors he used to verify calls, including inmate ID numbers, phone numbers that were called, and the phone from which the inmate called. Specifically, the State asked:

[State] Okay. And you were able to review the records and they tell you which phone

...