State v. Snyder

1

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. GEOFFREY JOSEPH SNYDER, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 23-0038

Court of Appeals of Arizona, First Division

January 30, 2024

Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No CR2018-006515-001 The Honorable David J. Palmer, Judge

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Joshua C Smith Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix By Jesse Finn Turner Counsel for Appellant

Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

MORSE, Judge

¶1 Geoffrey Joseph Snyder appeals his convictions and sentences for one count each of harassment and aggravated harassment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 We recite the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining Snyder's convictions. State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 42, ¶ 2 (App. 1999). In March 2018, Snyder and B.B.^[1] met on an online dating application and went on a date. Around that time, B.B. had opened her own interior design contracting firm and told Snyder about her business. By April 2018, B.B. and Snyder had gone on a few dates and spent Easter together.

¶3 Shortly after Easter, and while B.B. was out-of-town, Snyder created social media accounts for B.B.'s business without her knowledge, but later texted her about them. B.B. continued "to see" Snyder but began having "serious concerns" about him in May 2018. By this time, B.B. had not received any information regarding the social media accounts Snyder created for her business. B.B. ended the relationship with Snyder, stopped all contact with him on May 19, and "block[ed]"^[2] him on all her social media accounts.

¶4 After the relationship ended, Snyder began sending B.B. various communications, which scared B.B. She then contacted a private investigator specializing in computer forensics and cyber-crimes investigations, who recommended she hire an attorney.

¶5 On May 28, B.B. sought an ex parte order of protection against Snyder. A few days later, Snyder posted a series of videos on his social media accounts concerning the order of protection. On June 1, Snyder was served with the order of protection and posted several more videos about the order of protection, B.B.'s clients, and B.B.'s former employer. Several days later, Snyder posted two more videos, referencing B.B. and the order of protection.

¶6 On June 7, Snyder obtained an ex parte order of protection against B.B., which prohibited B.B. from several locations, including her place of employment. B.B. contested Snyder's order of protection against her. The court ruled in B.B.'s favor and dismissed the order. Snyder also contested B.B.'s order of protection against him. On June 25, the court held a hearing and affirmed B.B.'s order. A detective arrested Snyder after the hearing.

¶7 The State charged Snyder with one count each of harassment and aggravated harassment. A.R.S. § 13-2921(A)(1) (2008); A.R.S. § 13-2921.01 (A)(1) (2004). At trial, the court denied Snyder's motion for judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure ("Rule") 20. The jury convicted Snyder as charged, and the court sentenced Snyder to 18 months of supervised probation. Snyder timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Rule 20 Motion.

¶8 Snyder argues the court erred by denying his Rule 20 motion as to the aggravated-harassment charge. "We review a denial of a Rule 20 motion de novo, 'viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.'" State v. Allen, 253 Ariz. 306, 335, ¶ 69 (2022) (quoting State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 595 (1993)). In conducting our review, "we compare the evidence 'against the statutorily required elements of the offense,'" State v. Brock, 248 Ariz. 583, 592, ¶ 22 (App. 2020) (quoting State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, 505, ¶ 8 (App. 2005)), and do not "reweigh the evidence to decide if [we] would reach the same conclusions as the trier of fact," State v. Barger, 167 Ariz. 563, 568 (App. 1990).

¶9 "A judgment of acquittal is appropriate when 'no substantial evidence [exists] to warrant a conviction.'" State v. Nunez, 167 Ariz. 272, 278 (1991) (quoting State v. Clabourne, 142 Ariz. 335, 345 (1984)); see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a)(1). "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 134, ¶ 65 (2006) (cleaned up). If reasonable people "could differ as to whether the evidence establishes a fact in issue, that evidence is substantial." State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 432 (1984). Substantial evidence may be direct or circumstantial. Pena, 209 Ariz. at 505, ¶ 7.

¶10 A person commits harassment under A.R.S. § 13-2921 "if, with intent to harass or with knowledge that the person is harassing another person, the person: [a]nonymously or otherwise contacts, communicates or causes a communication with another person by verbal, electronic," or "written means in a manner that harasses." A.R.S. § 13-2921(A)(1) (2008). A person commits aggravated harassment if (1) the person commits harassment under A.R.S. § 13-2921 and (2) a court has issued an order of protection against the person and in favor of the victim, and the order "has been served and is still valid." A.R.S. § 13-2921.01(A)(1) (2004). Harassment means "conduct that is directed at a specific person and that would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed and the conduct in fact seriously alarms, annoys or harasses the person." A.R.S. § 13-2921(E) (2008).

¶11 Snyder does not dispute that he was subject to an order of protection in favor of B.B. that was served and valid between June 1, 2018, and August 1, 2018. But Snyder argues the State failed to prove that he contacted or caused a communication with B.B. between June 1, 2018, and August 1, 2018, because he did not directly send B.B. any messages while her order of protection was valid and B.B. only became aware of his social media posts concerning her when third parties showed them to her.

¶12 Snyder cites to four out-of-state cases to support his argument, but we find them either unpersuasive, inapposite, or immaterial to the present case. For example, Snyder cites to J.A.W. v. State, 210 So.3d 142, 143-44 (Fla. App. 2016), in which the Florida court of appeals found that public social media threats that were not sent to a specific victim did not violate Florida law. But the Florida statute applies only when the defendant "sends or procures the sending of" a communication. Fla. Stat. § 836.10. In contrast, Arizona law applies when a defendant "contacts, communicates or causes a communication with another person." A.R.S. § 13-2921(A)(1) (2008). Because Arizona's statute contemplates a broader range of activity, J.A.W. is distinguishable.

¶13 And Synder's reliance on cases from Ohio and Arkansas is similarly misplaced. See State v. Smith, 167 N.E.3d 587 (Ohio App. 2021); Knight v. State, 758 S.W.2d 12 (Ark. App. 1988); Roberts v. State, 78 S.W.3d 743 (Ark. App. 2002). In Smith, the timing of events meant that the threatening communication could not have been intended for the alleged victim. 167 N.E.3d at 590-91, ¶¶ 16-17 ("The gun photo was not posted on Smith's Facebook page until February 27. The city's argument is based on the date that Farrell saw the friend request which was sometime in March. But the burden on the city was to prove Smith's purpose at the time the friend request was sent."). In Knight, the statement at issue was made to another inmate and only overheard by a detention officer over an intercom system. 758 S.W.2d at 13. In Roberts, a teacher found a "hit list" in a student's notebook after the student attempted to hide it. 73 S.W.3d at 745. In both cases, the inadvertently discovered statement directed to another party was insufficient to establish the defendant had "the purpose of terrorizing" the victim as required under Arkansas law. Roberts, 73 S.W.3d at 746; see also Knight, 758 S.W.2d at 14 (noting that "the defendant must intend to fill the victim with intense fright").

¶14 In contrast with those out-of-state authorities, in Arizona, neither "direct contact" nor "purpose of terrorizing" is statutorily required under A.R.S. § 13-2921.01(A)(1) (2004) (aggravated harassment), A.R.S. § 13-2921(A)(1) (2008) (harassment), and A.R.S. § 13-2921(E) (2008) (defining harassment). Rather, "harassment" is "conduct that is directed at a specific person." A.R.S. § 13-2921(E) (2008). There is substantial evidence indicating that Snyder's conduct was directed at B.B., including him posting a video on his social media account that showed the order of protection with B.B.'s name and address on it. Snyder also argues that "no contact" occurred between him and B.B. after the order of protection was served on June 1. But under the statute, a person commits harassment if the person contacts, communicates, or causes a communication with another person by verbal, electronic, or written means in a manner that harasses. A.R.S. § 13-2921(A)(1) (2008).

¶15 There is substantial evidence that Snyder caused a communication with B.B. after he was served with the order of protection. But for and proximate cause must be established in a criminal case. State v. Aragon, 252 Ariz. 525 528, ¶¶ 8-9 (2022) (requiring proof of causation for manslaughter, aggravated assault, and criminal damage while citing A.R.S. § 13-203(A)). To establish "but for" cause, "the State had...