State v. Sparks

State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Micheal Anthony Sparks, Appellant.

A18-1444

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

August 12, 2019

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

Affirmed; motion granted

Reyes, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-18-5815

Keith Ellison, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Scott A. Hersey, Special Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Richard Schmitz, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Reyes, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

REYES, Judge

On appeal from his convictions of and sentences for five counts of felony domestic-abuse-no-contact order (DANCO) violations, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) failing to take further action after he complained about his court-appointed attorney's representation; (2) allowing the state to introduce, as relationship evidence, 911 and Scales recordings from a previously dismissed domestic-assault case to prove his identity; (3) denying his motion for a mistrial after the district court made a statement suggesting that his court-appointed attorney worked for the public defender's office; and (4) imposing an excessive total aggregate sentence of 87 months and four days. We affirm.

FACTS

In early December 2017, A.G. called 911 to report that appellant Micheal Sparks was "acting like he[ ] [was] gonna kill [her]." Officers went to A.G.'s residence and arrested appellant. They brought appellant to the police department and took a recorded Scales statement from him.¹ The state charged appellant with felony domestic assault, and the district court issued a DANCO prohibiting appellant from contacting A.G. The state later dismissed appellant's felony domestic-assault charge.

In January 2018, with the DANCO still in effect, Hennepin County Sherriff's Department officers reviewed five jail calls originating from the Hennepin County Public Safety Facility, made with appellant's individual PIN, to A.G's phone number. Officers recognized the male voice on the calls as appellant's and the female voice as A.G.'s One of the calls was made with another inmate's PIN, but the male and female voices soundedsimilar to the other completed calls. Based on appellant's prior convictions of four DANCO-violation offenses in the last five years, the state charged appellant with five counts of felony DANCO-violation offenses, under Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 2(d)(1) (2016)—one count for each answered phone call.

Following a trial, a jury found appellant guilty of all five counts. The district court sentenced appellant to prison for a total aggregate term of 87 months and four days. This appeal follows.

DECISION

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to take further action when appellant complained about his court-appointed attorney's representation.

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to inquire into the nature of his complaints regarding his court-appointed attorney and alleged requests for a different attorney. Appellant also encourages this court to adopt a per se rule requiring the appointment of new counsel when, like here, the court-appointed attorney is alleged to be unprepared for trial and the defendant has no opportunity to bring the matter to the district court's attention before the first day of trial. We disagree and decline appellant's invitation.

We review a district court's decision to grant or deny a request for substitute counsel for an abuse of discretion. State v. Clark, 722 N.W.2d 460, 464 (Minn. 2006). Both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to the assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. A criminal defendant does not have the "unbridled" right to choose his or her counsel andmust generally accept the court's appointed counsel. State v. Fagerstrom, 176 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Minn. 1970). Nor does a defendant have a right to a "meaningful relationship" with appointed counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1617 (1983).

If a defendant "voices serious allegations of inadequate representation," then the district court should conduct a "searching inquiry" to determine whether the situation warrants appointing substitute counsel. State v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 586 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). A district court will grant a request for substitution of counsel only if "exceptional circumstances exist and the demand is timely." Id. (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). Exceptional circumstances are those that affect a court-appointed attorney's ability or competence to provide representation. State v. Gillam, 629 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 2001). General dissatisfaction with appointed counsel does not rise to the level of exceptional circumstances. Munt, 831 N .W.2d at 586.

On the first day of the trial, outside of the presence of the jury, appellant made the following statements to the district court:

THE DEFENDANT: Um -- yeah. I just I wanted to be on record that -- um - it's kind of hard to get a fair shot in this trial. First time I even spoke to my counsel was yesterday morning, less than 24 hours later I'm in front of jury. Okay. So I want that to be on record as part of my appeal.

THE COURT: Okay. It will be so noted.

The district court took no further action on appellant's complaint. On the second day of the trial, outside the presence of the jury, appellant addressed the district court:

THE DEFENDANT: What happens if I fire [my court-appointed attorney]? I'm not entitled to another lawyer?

THE COURT: No. Then you try --then you -

THE DEFENDANT: Then I sit here and cross-examine these people myself?

THE COURT: Yes. If you choose to, yes.

After some discussion, the district court asked appellant whether he intended to continue proceedings with his court-appointed attorney or if he wanted to represent himself, to which appellant said "Go ahead."

Appellant relies on Clark, 722 N.W.2d at 464, for guidance on "how a [district] court should proceed when a defendant makes complaints about his public defender." Clark does not advance appellant's case. Clark challenged the district court's denial of his request for substitute counsel after he alleged, among other things, that his public defender had failed to "represent[ ] his interests in [the] case." Id. at 463. The supreme court affirmed the district court's denial of Clark's request on three grounds: (1) Clark requested a speedy trial and there is a strong reluctance to continue matters after trial begins; (2) the record belied Clark's allegation that his public defender provided inadequate representation leading up to trial; and (3) Clark made an untimely request on the morning of trial and after jury selection had begun. Id. at 464-65.

Similar to Clark, appellant requested a speedy trial. Second, as in Clark, the record belies appellant's claims that he first spoke with his court-appointed attorney the morning before trial, and he could not raise his concern earlier. Appellant met with his attorney in preparation for a pretrial hearing to review the state's settlement offer and other evidence. They also appeared before the district court for a bail and omnibus hearing where appellantaddressed the district court but made no mention of his attorney's representation. Moreover, appellant acquiesced to his court-appointed attorney's continued representation, and such acquiescence is interpreted to be confirmation that further inquiry by the district court is unnecessary. Munt, 831 N.W.2d at 587.

Third, appellant concedes that, under Clark, his request for substitute counsel is untimely. And significantly, unlike in Clark, appellant never made a request for substitute counsel, but rather only inquired into what would happen if he were to discharge his attorney.

Appellant also relies on State v. Paige, 765 N.W.2d 134, 134 (Minn. App. 2009), for the proposition that the district court should have asked how appellant intended to proceed pro se. The defense counsel in Paige presented no arguments at the sentencing hearing and advised the district court that he was in a "difficult position" because the defendant was going to allege ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 137. In Paige, we concluded that counsel's comments combined with his failure to make arguments on Paige's behalf were sufficient to trigger the district court's duty to ascertain whether an impermissible conflict of interest existed that could materially limit defense counsel's representation of defendant. Id. at 141. Paige is inapposite. Unlike in Paige, appellant's court-appointed attorney provided adequate representation throughout trial. Further, appellant made an untimely request, and we made clear in Paige that our decision does "not absolve a criminal defendant of the responsibility to make a timely request." Id. at 139. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not taking action on appellant's complaints about his attorney's representation.

II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to introduce the 911 and Scales recordings.

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the state to introduce the 911 and Scales recordings as relationship evidence, under Minn. Stat. § 634.20, to identify appellant's and A.G.'s voices, when Spreigl evidence² governs the admissibility of prior bad-act evidence introduced to prove identity. Appellant's argument is misguided.

Evidentiary rulings will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of the district court's discretion. State v. Robinson, 604 N.W.2d 355, 363 (Minn. 2000). A district court...