State v. Spencer

STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff, v. TYRIK SPENCER, Defendants.

ID No.: 1609004631A

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

Submitted: April 5, 2021

April 22, 2021

ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF: DENIED

OPINION AND ORDER

Amanda Buckworth, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Carvel State Office Building, 820 N. French Street, 7^th floor, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Mr. Tyrik Spencer, SBI: 00320684, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, 1181 Paddock Road, Smyrna, DE 19977, Pro-Se Defendant

Jones, J.

INTRODUCTION

On July 3, 2019, Defendant Tyrik Spencer filed a Motion for Post Conviction Relief pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61 Motion"). Defendant was appointed counsel, who filed a Motion to Withdraw on September 8, 2020. The Motion to Withdraw was granted on February 1, 2021. Defendant was granted leave to proceed pro-se. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is Denied.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 6, 2016, New Castle County Police arrested Tyrik Spencer on drug and firearm charges stemming from a traffic stop. On December 5, 2016, a grand jury indited Mr. Spencer on a number of charges. On February 8, 2017, Spencer's trial counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence. This Court denied that motion after a hearing. On July 13, 2017, a jury found Mr. Spencer guilty of two counts of Drug Dealing, Aggravated Possession, two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of Felony and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Defendant was declared a habitual offender as to one count of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of Felony. The Court sentenced Mr. Spencer to the minimum of 32 years of unsuspended Level 5 time, followed by probation.

Mr. Spencer filed a timely notice of appeal. The Delaware Supreme Court held the Superior Court did not abuses its discretion in denying the motion to suppress and affirmed his convictions and sentence.

After the Supreme Court rejected Spencer's appeal, Spencer filed a timely Motion for Post-Conviction relief. In his motion Defendant asserted 3 grounds for relief. Simultaneously, Mr. Spencer requested appointment of counsel to assist with his postconviction relief efforts under Rule 61(e)(2). The Court appointed Patrick Collins to assist Mr. Spencer with his postconviction relief efforts. Collins and Kimberly Price ultimately found no meritorious claims for postconviction relief in September 2020 and moved to withdraw. The Court granted Collins and Price's motion to withdraw and allowed defendant to proceed pro se.

In his direct appeal the Delaware Supreme Court found the following relevant facts.

On September 6, 2016, multiple police officers were patrolling in the Llangollen area, which includes a development known as Buena Vista. The New Castle County Police had received multiple complaints about street-level illegal drug dealing in the area. Around Noon, an undercover officer saw Tyrik Spencer on Buena Vista Drive riding a bicycle on the wrong side of the road while smoking what appeared to be a marijuana cigar. He radioed another officer, Andrew Rosaio, who saw Spencer stop alongside the driver-side window of a vehicle, speak with the driver, and hand the driver the marijuana cigar. Officer Rosaio approached Spencer and smelled the "odor of burnt marijuana." He detained Spencer and the driver of the vehicle, placing them in handcuffs and putting them in the police car. The Officer later testified that "[it] was a drug investigation from that point forward."

The Officer conducted a "probable cause search" and found a bundle of heroin in the driver's shoe. The Officer searched Spencer and found two cell phones and a key to a townhouse at 15 Vista Court in Buena Vista in his pockets. The police read the driver his Miranda rights and then questioned him. The driver first stated that he already had the heroin when he came to speak with Spencer. Later, still during the stop, he admitted that he came tothe neighborhood to purchase heroin from Spencer, which he then hid in his shoe. Spencer told the Officer that he came from his girlfriend's house at 15 Vista Court. The police contacted Spencer's girlfriend, who identified herself as Spencer's wife and stated that she saw Spencer leave 15 Vista Court on his bike around noon, which was around the time the police officers stopped Spencer.

Officer Rosaio applied for a warrant to search 15 Vista Court, and supported the request with the following facts:

• Spencer contacted the driver through the driver side window, holding what appeared to be a marijuana cigar;

• When Officer Rosaio approached the car, he smelled burnt marijuana and saw Spencer discretely hand the marijuana cigar to the driver;

• The Officer located two cell phones, and he knew drug dealers often used multiple phones to conduct illegal drug transactions;

• He found a white substance that field-tested as positive heroin in the driver's shoe;

• The driver admitted to the Officer that he came to Buena Vista to buy heroin from Spencer for $35; and

• Spencer had just left 15 Vista Court, had a key to the townhouse in his pocket, and his wife confirmed he had left the townhouse on his bicycle just before being stopped by police.

The court issued the search warrant for the townhouse, which the officers executed and found cash, guns, ammunition, drugs, and drug paraphernalia.

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

Defendant states two grounds for relief which I summarize as follows:

1. Ineffective Assistance of trial counsel in that counsel did not effectively argue the suppression motion. First Defendant argues that trial counsel did not challenge the original stop. Second Defendant maintains that "counsel failed to effectively argue that the officers lied to the Magistrate Judge inorder to obtain the warrant because Officer Rosaio did not include in the search warrant affidavit that Mr. Malandruccolo initially told the police he obtained the heroin prior to meeting the defendant. Defendant's final claim about trial counsel is that "counsel failed to request the complete video."

2. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in that counsel failed to present all potentially meritorious claims for relief.

III. PROCEDURAL BARS UNDER RULE 61(i)

Before addressing the substance of the arguments contained in Defendant's instant Motions, I will first address whether any procedural bars to relief contained in Rule 61 apply.

First, a motion for postconviction relief under Rule 61 is untimely if it is filed more than one year after a conviction is finalized. In this case, Spencer's initial Rule 61 Motion was filed within this time frame, and the Court granted Spencer leave to amend his Motion after he was appointed an attorney to assist his postconviction relief efforts. This bar does not apply.

Next, second or subsequent Rule 61 motions are not permitted and will be summarily denied unless certain limited exceptions apply. The Rule 61 Motion and the Amended Motion represent Defendant's first such motion, and this bar to relief does not apply.

Third, grounds for relief "not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction" are barred unless the moving party can show "cause for relief" and "prejudice from [the] violation."¹ Defendant has asserted several such grounds for relief, which are noted below. These grounds for relief are barred.

Fourth, grounds for relief which were previously adjudicated are barred. Defendant previously asserted several of the grounds for relief contained in his Rule 61 Motion, which are noted below. These arguments are procedurally barred.²

Finally, procedural bars to relief do not apply to claims that the Court lacked proper jurisdiction over the case, to claims that plead with particularity that new evidence exists which creates a strong inference that a defendant is actually innocent, or that a new and retroactively applicable rule of Constitutional law renders a conviction invalid. Defendant makes no such claims in either of the instant motions.

The framework governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims was most famously articled by the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington (1984). Under Strickland, in order to establish that a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant is required to demonstrate that both: (1) defense counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel'sunprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.³ If a defendant cannot prove both prongs of this standard, then their ineffective assistance of counsel claim will fail as a matter of law. Mere allegations of ineffectiveness will not suffice to meet this standard. Instead, a defendant must make and substantiate concrete allegations of actual prejudice.⁴ A defendant pleading an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must also overcome the strong presumption that their counsel's performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.⁵ This includes a strong presumption that defense counsel's conduct constituted sound trial strategy.⁶ Furthermore, "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of conviction if the error had no effect on the judgment" and "[a] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies."⁷ Accordingly the Supreme Court of the United States had stated that "surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task."⁸

CLAIMS AS TO TRIAL COUNSEL

Within his first claim for relief, Mr. Spencer raises three subclaims related to trial counsel's performance regarding the suppression motion and hearing. To theextent Mr. Spencer is trying to relitigate the suppression motion, this ground for...