State v. Stahl

1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. KARL T. STAHL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-1165-23

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division

November 18, 2024

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

Argued October 29, 2024,.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Ocean County, Municipal Appeal No. 23-03.

Kevin T. Flood argued the cause for appellant (Law Office of Kevin T. Flood, LLC, attorneys; Lon C. Taylor, of counsel and on the briefs; Kevin T. Flood, on the briefs).

Cheryl L. Hammel, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor attorney; Samuel Marzarella, Chief Appellate Attorney, of counsel; Cheryl L. Hammel, on the brief).

Before Chase and Vanek, Judges.

PER CURIAM

More than ten years after pleading guilty to his fourth charge of driving while intoxicated ("DWI"), N.J.S.A 39:4-50(a), defendant Karl T. Stahl sought to run his sentence concurrent with his other license suspensions, to renegotiate his sentence, or withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant now appeals from the November 2, 2023 Law Division order denying, de novo, his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR") and motion to vacate his guilty plea. We affirm.

I.

On June 4, 2011, defendant was arrested and charged with several motor vehicle violations, including DWI in Ship Bottom. At the scene, defendant presented a Pennsylvania driver's license bearing his picture and the name, "Michael Wendroff." It was subsequently discovered that this Pennsylvania license was fraudulent.

After defendant was admitted into the pre-trial intervention program on the indictable charge stemming from presenting false identification, defendant appeared with counsel in the Borough of Ship Bottom Municipal Court on five Title 39 summonses: reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; DWI, N.J.S.A 39:4-50; traffic on marked lanes, N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b); driving while suspended, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40; and failure to produce a valid driver's license, N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.

At his court appearance, defendant entered a guilty plea. The court began the plea proceeding by having the prosecutor and defendant's counsel place the terms of the agreement, including a ten-year license suspension, on the record. Then the court conducted a colloquy with defendant. First, the court confirmed that defendant had ample opportunity to review his case with counsel and was satisfied with counsel's advice. Next, the court confirmed that defendant understood he had a right to trial but was waiving his rights by entering the plea; that he was entering the plea freely and voluntarily; and that nobody was forcing him to do so. The judge next established that defendant was pleading guilty to DWI with the understanding that the balance of the charges against him would be dismissed. Defendant was explained the fines and penalties he faced because of his plea specifying, "[y]ou're going to receive a 10-year loss of your driving privileges." Defendant agreed and then gave a factual statement admitting that he had been imbibing alcoholic beverages and his ability to operate his vehicle was impaired. He further admitted to taking an Alcotest with a result of 0.12 blood alcohol content.

The court found there was a sufficient factual basis to accept the plea and sentenced defendant to ten years' loss of driving privileges; 180 days in Ocean County Jail, ninety days of which would be served at an inpatient rehabilitation program; two years' ignition interlock (subsequent to the ten-year revocation period); and payment of all applicable fines and penalties. The court then dismissed all remaining charges. Defendant had the following colloquy with the court after the sentence was imposed:

THE COURT: Do you have a driver's license?

DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Suspended already?

DEFENDANT: Yeah.

THE COURT: Yes?

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Well as a result of your plea of guilty here today, sir, it's suspended for 10 more years from today's date, you understand that?

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

On December 12, 2022, defendant moved for PCR pursuant to Rule 7:10-2(b)(1) and, "in the alternative, vacating [his] plea." In support of this motion, PCR counsel provided their own certification stating that his client "only learned recently that he was not sentenced in accordance with the terms of his plea agreement," and that plea counsel had passed away. Defense counsel argued that the ten-year suspension of defendant's driving privileges was supposed to run concurrent to the suspension period he was already serving at the time of his plea, but the Division of Motor Vehicles was running it consecutively. Defense counsel thus argued that either defendant's sentence needed to be "corrected" so that his license would be restored or alternatively, he should be permitted to have his plea back. Defendant provided neither a certification nor support for his alternative argument to vacate his plea.

In January 2023, the Ship Bottom Municipal Court conducted a hearing on defendant's PCR motion, and reserved decision. The court then denied the motion, issuing an order supported by a written statement of reasons. The court citied to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 which states, in relevant part:

If the driving privilege of any person is under revocation or suspension for a violation of any provision of this Title or Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes at the time of any conviction for a violation of this section, the revocation or suspension period imposed shall commence as of the date of termination of the existing revocation or suspension period.

As such, the court determined, pursuant to the plain language of the statute, it had no authority to run defendant's DWI sentence concurrent to his other license suspension as it would be an illegal sentence.

Defendant then filed a motion for reconsideration, supplementing his prior filing with a certification from defendant. The court denied reconsideration and issued an order and accompanying statement of reasons finding the motion untimely. Moreover, the court explained, that on a motion for reconsideration, it is improper to supplement one's original moving papers with additional information in order to cure an inadequacy in the motion record. Defendant then filed a notice of appeal with the Law Division, Ocean County.

Trial de novo was held on November 2, 2023, in the Law Division. At its conclusion, the court denied defendant's request to run his license suspensions concurrently. Moreover, the court denied defendant's requested relief to remand the matter for a renegotiation of the plea agreement or withdrawal of defendant's plea. As to the argument that defendant's sentence should be corrected, the de novo court found the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3) "clear and unambiguous." The court found that even if it "were to accept [] defendant's argument . . . it cannot do so because having the suspensions run concurrently would be tantamount to an illegal sentence which this [c]ourt cannot endorse." The de novo court then found:

When the Municipal Court Judge stated that his license would be suspended for [ten] more years from today's date, this was in the broader context of the discussion on defendant's license already having been suspended. The con-in this context, "more" implies that the suspension is in addition to the earlier suspension and it's not simply to run concurrently.

. . . .

Upon a de novo review of the trial [c]ourt's record, this [c]ourt is satisfied that the defendant's plea was made knowingly, intelligently[,] and voluntarily and that [] defendant was fully apprised of the potential consequences of a guilty plea. Thus, the court held defendant's argument that he was not aware of the consecutive nature was without merit.

On appeal, defendant makes the following argument:

DEFENDANT MUST BE GIVEN THE OPTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA BASED UPON HIS ATTORNEY AND THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE FACT THAT HIS LICENSE SUSPENSION WAS REQUIRED, BY STATUTE, TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY WITH THE PRIOR LICENSE SUSPENSION, A MATERIAL PENAL CONSEQUENCE. INSTEAD, DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY AND THE TRIAL COURT MISLED DEFENDANT BY INDICATING THAT THE LICENSE SUSPENSION WOULD END IN 2023, RATHER THAN 2033.

II.

"Our review of a de novo decision in the Law Division is limited." State v. Troisi, 471 N.J.Super. 158, 164 (App. Div. 2022) (citing State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J.Super. 624, 639 (App. Div. 2005)). Importantly, "[w]e do not independently assess the evidence as if we were the court of first instance." Ibid. (citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)). Instead, our review involves "whether there is 'sufficient credible evidence . . . in the record' to support the trial court's findings." State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 148 (2017) (omission in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).

Deference is especially appropriate when, as in this case, two judges have examined the facts and reached the same conclusion. As the Supreme Court made clear in Locurto "[u]nder the two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error." 157 N.J. at 474 (citing Midler v. Heinowitz, 10 N.J. 123, 128-29 (1952)). Therefore, our review of the factual and credibility findings of the municipal and the Law Division "'is exceedingly narrow.'" State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 167 (2015) (quoting Locurto, 157 N.J. at 470). But "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty,...