State v. Stanley, 14238

Page 788

613 A.2d 788

223 Conn. 674

STATE of Connecticut v. Kevin STANLEY.

No. 14238.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 30, 1992.

Decided Aug. 25, 1992.

Berdon, J., dissented and filed opinion. Neal Cone, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, was G. Douglas Nash, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Mitchell S. Brody, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, State's Atty. and Robert J. O'Brien, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (State).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, GLASS, BORDEN and BERDON, JJ.

BORDEN, Associate Justice.

The defendant, Kevin Stanley, appeals to this court ¹ from the judgment of conviction after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. ² The defendant claims that: (1) there was insufficient evidence of an intent to kill in order to convict him of murder; (2) the trial court improperly admitted a statement made by the defendant because the waiver of his Miranda ³ rights was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily; (3) the trial court improperly admitted a statement made by the defendant because his right to terminate police interrogation after he had invoked his right to remain silent was not scrupulously honored; and (4) the trial court's instructions to the jury undermined the defendant's presumption of innocence and diluted the state's burden of proof. We affirm.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On November 7, 1989, at approximately 5:50 p.m., Bridget Page left her home on Orchard Street in New Haven and drove to the home of Javin Green, a friend whom she had been dating, in order to celebrate her birthday. Green lived on Dixwell Avenue in New Haven. Along the way, at the corner of Dixwell Avenue and Argyle Street, Page heard a noise that sounded like a "tap"; then her car's rear window began to break up and fall out as she drove along. When Page arrived at Green's home she told him about the broken window and said that she thought some children had thrown rocks at the window. Green and Page decided to return to the intersection in order to determine who was responsible for the broken window.

They drove back to the intersection of Dixwell Avenue and Argyle Street, parked the car on Argyle Street near the corner and walked over to five individuals who had congregated at the corner. The group consisted of three children, each approximately eight years old, and two young men, each approximately eighteen years old. Located on the corner of Dixwell Avenue and Argyle Street was a laundromat, an entrance to an apartment building and a beauty salon, all fronting on Dixwell Avenue. A street light and the lights from the laundromat were on. Green first spoke to the children, stating that one of them was responsible for the broken window.

At this point, Brenda Clark, who resided at 425 Dixwell Avenue in an apartment directly over the laundromat opened the apartment building entrance door. Her attention was drawn to Green and one of the young men, whom she later identified in court as the defendant. Green and the defendant were standing close to each other, face to face, in front of the laundromat. Green was facing the street with his back to the laundromat. The defendant was facing Green with his back to the street. Page stood within inches of Green, facing him, on his left. Green was upset and was thrusting his chest towards the defendant's chest, saying "I want that little dude that, you know, shot the rock." The defendant began walking towards Green's right side in an effort to get behind Green. Green told him to stop and the defendant replied "Oh, yes." The defendant next moved back three or four steps towards the street, reached into his pants, pulled out a revolver and fired three or four shots at Green.

After the shots were fired, Green grabbed his face and stomach, cried out "oh, oh" and left the scene by running around the corner onto Argyle Street. Following the departure of Green and Page, the defendant turned his gun towards a "little boy" who ran into the door where Clark was standing. The defendant looked over at Clark, turned around, walked away and entered a nearby car. Page, who initially had not been aware that Green had been shot, followed him around the corner and saw him enter her car on the passenger side. Green told her that he had been shot and she drove him to the hospital, where he died.

I

The defendant first claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction because the record does not reflect proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an intent to kill Green. We disagree.

"The standard of review of an insufficiency claim is clear. We first review the evidence presented at trial, construing it in the light most favorable to sustaining the facts expressly found by the trial court or impliedly found by the jury. We then decide whether, upon the facts thus established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the trial court or the jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jarrett, 218 Conn. 766, 770-71, 591 A.2d 1225 (1991); State v. Weinberg, 215 Conn. 231, 253, 575 A.2d 1003 (1990), cert. denied, [---] U.S. [----], 111 S.Ct. 430, 112 L.Ed.2d 413 (1990); State v. Rollinson, 203 Conn. 641, 665-66, 526 A.2d 1283 (1987); State v. Garrison, 203 Conn. 466, 471, 525 A.2d 498 (1987). State v. Lewis, 220 Conn. 602, 606, 600 A.2d 1330 (1991). While the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Castonguay, 218 Conn. 486, 507, 590 A.2d 901 (1991). If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Grant, 219 Conn. 596, 604-605, 594 A.2d 459 (1991)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pinnock, 220 Conn. 765, 770-71, 601 A.2d 521 (1992).

The defendant was charged with murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. "In order to be convicted under our murder statute, the defendant must possess the specific intent to cause the death of the victim. General Statutes § 53a-54a. To act intentionally, the defendant must have had the conscious objective to cause the death of the victim. General Statutes § 53a-3(11).... State v. Carpenter, 214 Conn. 77, 82, 570 A.2d 203 (1990). Ordinarily, intent can only be proved by circumstantial evidence; it may be and usually is inferred from the defendant's conduct. Id. Intent to cause death may be inferred from the type of weapon used, the manner in which it was used, the type of wound inflicted and the events leading to and immediately following the death.... Id., at 82-83, 570 A.2d 203, quoting State v. Patterson, 213 Conn. 708, 721, 570 A.2d 174 (1990). Furthermore, it is a permissible, albeit not a necessary or mandatory, inference that a defendant intended the natural consequences of his voluntary conduct. State v. Amarillo, 198 Conn. 285, 300-304, 503 A.2d 146 (1986)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Montanez, 219 Conn. 16, 20, 592 A.2d 149 (1991).

On the basis of the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the jury reasonably could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to kill Green. Clark testified that the defendant and Green had been involved in an argument in front of the laundromat before the shooting. She testified that Green had been thrusting his chest into the defendant's chest demanding the name of the child who had broken Page's car window. The jury was given copies of a statement made by the defendant to a New Haven police officer, approximately one month after the shooting had occurred, in which the defendant stated that Green had accused the defendant's younger brother, who was at the scene of the shooting, of breaking Page's window. In that statement, the defendant also stated that Green had threatened to harm the defendant's younger brother and that the defendant had replied that Green "wasn't [going to] ... do [anything] to [his brother]." From this evidence, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant had a motive for shooting Green, namely, to prevent Green from harming his younger brother or discovering who had broken the window. See State v. Moye, 177 Conn. 487, 514-15, 418 A.2d 870, vacated, 444 U.S. 893, 100 S.Ct. 199, 62 L.Ed.2d 129, on appeal after remand, 179 Conn. 761, 409 A.2d 149 (1979) (evidence of motive probative of intent to kill).

Moreover, Clark and Page, who witnessed the shooting, testified that while the defendant and Green had been standing face to face, the defendant had taken three or four steps back toward the street, away from Green, had pulled out a gun and had fired three or four shots. Clark further testified that Green had grabbed his face and stomach, cried out and left the scene.

Two bullets entered Green. One bullet entered the chest cavity on Green's right side and traveled upward before lodging in the left side of Green's neck. The other bullet entered the perforation in the right side of Green's chest, penetrated the diaphragm and abdominal cavity, and traveled downward before lodging in the left side of Green's lower abdomen.

We have stated that "[o]ne who uses a deadly weapon upon a vital part of another will be deemed to have intended the probable result of that act, and from such a circumstance a proper inference may be drawn in some cases that there was an intent to kill." (Internal quotation marks...