State v. Stark

422 P.3d 1282

STATE of Oklahoma, Appellant

v.Louis Kilakila STARK, Appellee.

Case Number: S-2017-66

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Decided: May 24, 2018

FRED C. SMITH, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, KYLE A. CABELKA, ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY, 315 SW 5TH STREET, ROOM 502, LAWTON, OK 73501, COUNSEL FOR STATE/APPELLANT

EDDIE D. VALDEZ, ATTORNEY AT LAW, 513 SW "C" AVENUE, LAWTON, OK 73501, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

OPINION

ROWLAND, JUDGE:

¶1 The State of Oklahoma charged Appellee Louis Kilakila Stark in the District Court of Comanche County, Case Number CF-2015-530, with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Drug (Marijuana) With Intent to Distribute (Count 1) in violation of 63 O.S.Supp.2012, § 2-401, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (Cocaine) (Count 2) in violation of 63 O.S.Supp.2012, 2-402, Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (Count 3) in violation of 63 O.S.2011, 2-405, and Felon in Possession of a Firearm (Count 4) in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2014, § 1283(A). The State filed a Supplemental Information alleging one prior felony conviction for sentence enhancement on Counts 1, 2, and 4. Stark filed a motion to quash the Information and Bind Over Order and to suppress the narcotics and firearms evidence, alleging the search yielding the contraband was illegal. The Honorable Gerald Neuwirth sustained on the record Stark's motion to quash and suppress on January 11, 2017, and again by written order dated January 18, 2017. The court found that the warrantless entry into the trailer house under the guise of a protective sweep was a subterfuge and amounted to an illegal search that tainted the later consent search and search conducted pursuant to a search warrant. The State of Oklahoma filed the instant appeal of the district court's order.

¶2 Once the cause was submitted for decision, this Court determined supplementation of the record was necessary to resolve the issues presented. We remanded the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the police officers had permission from any lawful occupant to enter the trailer house before officers conducted a protective sweep and whether Stark's presence in the trailer house was with the permission of the home's lessee resident. The district court filed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law after the evidentiary hearing, finding that Stark had permission to be in the trailer house from the lawful lessee resident and that no lawful occupant gave the officers permission to enter before they conducted the protective sweep of the trailer.

¶3 The State of Oklahoma raises four issues:

(1) The district court's order granting Appellee's Motion to Quash the Information, Quash the Arrest and to Suppress Evidence should be reversed because Appellee has not established that he has standing to challenge any search of the residence;

(2) The district court erred in its ruling that Officer Witten conducted an illegal search of the residence when it was in fact a protective sweep of the residence for the purpose of officer safety;

(3) The district court erred in its ruling that Officer Witten did not obtain proper consent from the homeowner before conducting any type of search of the residence; and

(4) The district court erred in its ruling that the actions of the officers rose to the level of misconduct requiring suppression of the evidence.

¶4 We reverse the district court's order and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings for the reasons discussed below.

BACKGROUND

¶5 Siya Menefee called the Lawton Police Department, on October 5, 2015, requesting assistance in retrieving her belongings from inside a trailer house where she had been living. She reported to the dispatcher and to the patrol officers who responded to her call that the men inside, out-of-town visitors of her roommate, had marijuana, cocaine, and guns. She further stated that the men would not let her inside her residence and that she feared for her safety while attempting to retrieve her belongings. Officers knocked on the door with guns drawn in a ready position, removed the men, including Stark, and then made entry for the stated purpose of a "protective sweep" based on Ms. Menefee's report of the presence of weapons in the home. The officers secured two firearms in plain view and cleared the home of occupants, with the exception of one man with mobility issues who was seated just inside the front door of the trailer house. The odor of raw marijuana was noticeable. The police informed the lessee resident, whom they had summoned home, of the presence of firearms and the odor of marijuana in her trailer. She consented to a search of her trailer house. Patrol officers found a large amount of marijuana in a backpack in the lessee resident's bedroom and notified special operations. The special operations detectives obtained a search warrant and seized the drugs and guns.

DISCUSSION

¶6 The State challenges the district court's order granting Stark's motion to quash and suppress. We exercise jurisdiction under 22 O.S.2011, § 1053(5)¹ because the State's ability to prosecute Stark on the felony charges is substantially impaired absent the suppressed evidence, making review appropriate. See State v. Strawn, 2018 OK CR 2, ¶ 18, 419 P.3d 249.

¶7 The State's argument challenging Stark's standing to contest the search requires only brief consideration. The record before us amply supports the district court's finding that Stark was an overnight guest of the lawful lessee resident and therefore had standing to challenge the search in this case. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1688-90, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) (holding overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in host's home and standing to challenge a search thereof). Hence, we find the district court did not err by rejecting the State's standing challenge. See Terry v. State, 2014 OK CR 14, ¶ 7, 334 P.3d 953, 955 ("To establish standing to contest the constitutionality of a search, a defendant must show he had a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.’ ") (citation omitted). The State's standing claim is without merit.

¶8 Whether the search of the trailer and the seizure of items in it violated Stark's constitutional rights is an issue that must be analyzed under substantive Fourth Amendment law. See State v. Marcum, 2014 OK CR 1, ¶ 7, 319 P.3d 681, 683. In reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence based upon an allegation the search or seizure was illegal, we credit the district court's findings of fact unless they are unsupported by the record and are clearly erroneous, and we review the legal conclusions based on those facts de novo . Strawn, 2018 OK CR 2, at ¶ 19, 419 P.3d 249. Review of this record leads us to conclude that the district court erred in sustaining Stark's motion to suppress evidence based on its flawed assessment of probable cause, exigent circumstances, and the independent source doctrine.

¶9 The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. "It is axiomatic that the ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’ " Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (quoting United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southerndivision, et al., 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) ). Warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are "presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). This presumption can be overcome by a showing of one of the few "specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), such as " ‘hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence, ... or the need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling.’ " Olson, 495 U.S. at 100, 110 S.Ct. at 1690 (citations omitted). Even where officers make an unlawful entry to secure a residence, any resultant search warrant based upon information not gained by the illegal entry will be upheld.

On this issue, we hold that the evidence discovered during the subsequent search of the apartment the following day pursuant to the valid search warrant issued wholly on information known to the officers before the entry into the apartment need not have been suppressed as "fruit" of the illegal entry because the warrant and the information on which it was based were unrelated to the entry and therefore constituted an independent source for the evidence under Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States , 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920).

Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 799, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3382, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984).

¶10 The instant case is remarkably similar to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v. McArthur , 531 U.S. 326, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001). In McArthur , police officers were called out to a trailer house to stand by while a female retrieved her belongings from inside where she had been staying. Id., 531 U.S. at 328-29, 121 S.Ct. at 948-49. As she exited the residence she told officers they should search the trailer because the man inside, her husband, had "dope" inside there. Id. Officers knocked on the door, asked the man for permission to search and upon being denied, kept him detained outside the trailer until a search warrant was obtained. Id. The Supreme Court found the officers' actions reasonable because they had probable cause to search based upon the eyewitness account of the wife, and an exigent circumstance requiring them to secure the residence while a warrant was obtained...