State v. Starling

2019 Ohio 1478

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee v. NICHOLAS STARLING Defendant-Appellant

Appellate Case No. 2018-CA-34

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY

April 19, 2019

Trial Court Case No. 2017-CR-336

(Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)

OPINION

ANDREW P. PICKERING, Atty. Reg. No. 0068770, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Clark County Prosecutor's Office, 50 East Columbia Street, Suite 449, Springfield, Ohio 45502 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee

TIMOTHY B. HACKETT, Assistant Ohio Public Defender, Atty. Reg. No. 0093480, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400, Columbus, Ohio 43215 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

WELBAUM, P.J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Nicholas Starling, appeals from his conviction in the Clark County Court of Common Pleas following his guilty plea to one count of murder. For the reasons outlined below, Starling's conviction will be affirmed.

Facts and Course of Proceedings

{¶ 2} In 2016, a then sixteen-year-old Starling was charged in the Juvenile Division of the Clark County Court of Common Pleas with acts that if committed by an adult would constitute murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) and tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). The charges arose from allegations that Starling killed his 15-year-old brother, H., while at their residence in Springfield, Clark County, Ohio. Specifically, it was alleged that Starling hit H. on the head multiple times with a baseball bat and stabbed H. multiple times in the neck with a kitchen knife. It was further alleged that after killing H., Starling discarded the baseball bat behind a fence in his backyard and then hid the kitchen knife in his computer bag.

{¶ 3} After Starling was charged in the juvenile court, the State moved for Starling's case to be transferred to adult court. The matter was then scheduled for a probable cause hearing. Following that hearing, the juvenile court determined there was sufficient evidence to find probable cause to believe that Starling committed the criminal acts as charged. Given Starling's age and the juvenile court's probable cause finding, the juvenile court transferred Starling's case to adult court pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i).

{¶ 4} Following Starling's transfer to adult court, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued its opinion in State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 463, 2016-Ohio-8278, 83 N.E.3d 862 ("Aalim I"). In Aalim I, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory-transfer statutes, R.C. 2152.10(A) and R.C. 2152.12(A), were unconstitutional. Due to the holding in Aalim I, the adult court transferred Starling's case back to juvenile court.

{¶ 5} Once Starling's case was transferred back to juvenile court, the juvenile court reaffirmed its probable cause finding and scheduled the matter for an amenability hearing. The amenability hearing was continued several times so that psychological experts could evaluate Starling. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of Ohio accepted Aalim I for reconsideration and stayed the execution of judgment. Due to the uncertainty surrounding the holding in Aalim I, the parties agreed to an additional 60-day continuance in hopes that the Supreme Court would have by then clarified its position on the constitutionality of the mandatory-transfer statutes.

{¶ 6} Shortly after the parties entered the agreed continuance, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883 ("Aalim II"). The Supreme Court's decision in Aalim II vacated Aalim I and upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory-transfer statutes. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Aalim II, the State moved for the juvenile court to transfer Starling's case back to adult court pursuant to the mandatory transfer provision in R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i). Because the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of R.C. 2152.12(A), and because the juvenile court previously found probable cause to believe that Starling had committed the criminal activity charged, the juvenile court granted the State's motion and ordered the transfer of Starling's case back to adult court without holding an amenability hearing.

{¶ 7} Once Starling's case was transferred back to adult court, the Clark County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Starling with one count of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), one count of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), three counts of felony murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), and two counts of tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). Starling thereafter entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.

{¶ 8} After entering his pleas, Starling requested the trial court to order an evaluation to determine his competency to stand trial. Starling also filed a motion to suppress certain evidence and inculpatory statements that Starling made to detectives. During the investigation of H.'s death, Starling was twice interviewed by detectives without any guardian or attorney present. Both interviews occurred on the day H. was found dead.

{¶ 9} At the first interview, Starling was not given Miranda warnings; however, it is undisputed that Starling made no inculpatory statements during the initial interview. Starling did, however, consent to detectives searching his bedroom and cell phone. Starling was permitted to go home after the first interview, but was called back four hours later for a second interview.

{¶ 10} At the second interview, detectives Mirandized Starling after asking him a few preliminary questions. Upon being Mirandized, Starling stated that he understood his Miranda rights. Starling also signed a written waiver of those rights. After his Miranda waiver, Starling told detectives that he and H. had an argument over candy two days earlier. Although Starling initially denied knowledge of how H. was killed, upon further questioning, Starling confessed to entering H.'s bedroom, grabbing a baseball bat, and hitting H. over the head 14 to 15 times while H. was asleep. Starling also confessed to stabbing H. in the neck two or three times with a kitchen knife. Starling told detectives that he then discarded the baseball bat over a fence in his back yard and hid the kitchen knife in his computer bag after cleaning it in the bathroom.

{¶ 11} As part of his motion to suppress, Starling claimed that his confession was elicited in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Specifically, Starling argued that his youth, inexperience, and learning disabilities prevented his confession from being voluntarily entered. However, before the trial court ruled on the motion to suppress, Starling entered into a plea agreement with the State and pled guilty to murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A). In exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges against him.

{¶ 12} After accepting Starling's guilty plea, the trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing. During sentencing, the parties agreed that a prison sentence of 15 years to life was mandatory for Starling's offense. Due to the mandatory nature of Starling's sentence, the trial court ordered Starling to serve 15 years to life in prison.

{¶ 13} Starling now appeals from his conviction, raising four assignments of error for review.

First Assignment of Error

{¶ 14} Under his First Assignment of Error, Starling contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress at the probable cause hearing in juvenile court. Starling claims that his trial counsel should have moved to suppress his confession based on the same argument he raised in the motion to suppress filed in adult court, i.e., that his confession was involuntary and obtained in violation of Miranda. Starling maintains that trial counsel's failure to seek suppression of his confession at the probable cause hearing prejudiced him because that failure resulted in a flawed probable cause determination that invalidated his transfer to adult court. On that basis, Starling contends he was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel. We disagree.

{¶ 15} Alleged instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are reviewed under the two-pronged analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must establish: (1) that his or her trial counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. Strickland at paragraph two of the syllabus; Bradley at paragraph two of the syllabus. The failure to make a showing of either deficient performance or prejudice defeats a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland at 697.

{¶ 16} To establish deficient performance, it must be shown that trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation. Id. at 688. In evaluating counsel's performance, "a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.' " Id. at 689, quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955).

{¶ 17} To establish prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that there is "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceeding's result would have been different." State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 204, citing Strickland at 687-688 and Bradley at paragraph two of the syllabus. " 'A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' " Bradley at 142, quoting Strickland at 694.

{¶ 18} "The...