State v. Stewart

State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Terry Allen Stewart, Appellant.

A20-0488

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

January 11, 2021

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Affirmed

Reilly, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court

File No. 56-CR-19-2678

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michelle M. Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Benjamin G. A. Olson, Assistant County Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leah C. Graf, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Cleary, Judge.^*

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

REILLY, Judge

Appellant challenges his conviction for failing to register as a predatory offender, arguing that his guilty plea was invalid because his requirement to register was unconstitutional and violates separation-of-powers principles. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Terry Allen Stewart is required to register as a predatory offender. Appellant's obligation to register arises out of criminal charges for assault, burglary, kidnapping, and damage to property. In June 2009, appellant pleaded guilty to assault and the remaining charges were dismissed. Under the registration requirements, appellant needed to submit paperwork to the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (the BCA) stating his primary address. In July 2019, appellant registered a primary address in Fergus Falls, Minnesota. After a traffic stop in August 2019, police officers opened an investigation to determine whether appellant lived at his registered address. Officers learned that appellant was not living at the address registered with the BCA, which belonged to appellant's wife's grandparents. The homeowners told officers that appellant had not been to their home for at least one year.

Based on this information, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with failing to register as a predatory offender in violation of Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5(a)(1) (Supp. 2019). In November 2019, appellant pleaded guilty to the offense. Appellant acknowledged that he did not notify law enforcement of his true address and knew that, bywithholding this information, he was failing to fulfill his registration requirements. The district court entered judgment of conviction and imposed sentence. This appeal follows.

DECISION

Appellant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea. "A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a valid guilty plea." State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). After sentencing, a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea only by establishing that "withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice." Id. (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1). A manifest injustice arises when a guilty plea is invalid. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). A guilty plea is valid if it is intelligent, voluntary, and accurate. Id. "A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid." Id. We review the validity of a guilty plea de novo. Id.

Appellant argues that his guilty plea is invalid because the registration statute is unconstitutional. While appellant did not raise this issue to the district court, a party may challenge the validity of a plea for the first time in a direct appeal when the grounds for the challenge do not go outside the record. State v. Newcombe, 412 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 1987). The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Hensel, 901 N.W.2d 166, 170 (Minn. 2017). "We presume that Minnesota statutes are constitutional and will strike down a statute as unconstitutional only if absolutely necessary." State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Minn. 2011). "To prevail, a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates a constitutional provision." Id.

The registration statute provides that a person "shall register" as a predatory offender if the person is charged and convicted of a "felony violation of or attempt to violate, or aiding, abetting, or conspiracy to commit" certain enumerated predatory offenses. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1) (Supp. 2019). Additionally, a person must register if the person is charged with an enumerated felony offense and is "convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for that offense or another offense arising out of the same set of circumstances." Id. One of these enumerated offenses is kidnapping. Id., subd. 1b(a)(1)(ii). Appellant acknowledges that he is required to register as a result of his assault and kidnapping charges from 2009. Under the penalty provision of the statute, a person who "knowingly commits an act or fails to fulfill a requirement that violates any provision of this section . . . is guilty of a felony." Id., subd. 5(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2019).

I. Substantive Due Process

Appellant argues that the registration statute violates his substantive-due-process rights. The United States and Minnesota Constitutions provide that the government cannot deprive a person of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7.

Appellant argues that the registration statute infringes on his right to the presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence applies to statutes that are punitive, or criminal, in nature. State v. Halvorson, 181 N.W.2d 473, 477-78 (Minn. 1970). Appellant argues that the statute is punitive. Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711 (Minn. 1999) informs our analysis. In that case, the defendant registered as a predatory offender and then sought a declaration that the registration requirement violated his constitutionalrights. Id. at 714. The supreme court held that the registration requirements of section 243.166 are regulatory, rather than punitive or criminal, in nature. Id. at 717. Boutin also held that the statute did not implicate fundamental rights, was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of solving crimes, and did not violate a registrant's substantive-due-process rights. Id. at 717-18.

Appellant acknowledges the Boutin holding but asserts that "the statute has morphed dramatically" since the supreme court's 1999 decision. Appellant is correct that the registration requirements have mushroomed since 1999. And the Minnesota Legislature continues to alter the registration statute today. For example, at the time Boutin was decided, the law required the registrant to provide "a statement in writing signed by the person, giving information required by the bureau of criminal apprehension, a fingerprint card, and [a] photograph," to register with the law enforcement authority where the person resides, and to annually "mail [a] signed verification form back to [the BCA] within ten days after receipt of the form, stating on the form the current and last address of the person." Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4(a), (c)(2) (1999). Now, a registrant must also provide a "biological specimen for DNA," "a written consent form signed by the person allowing a treatment facility or residential housing unit or shelter to release information to a law enforcement officer about the person's admission to, or residence in, a treatment facility or residential housing unit or shelter," "the person's primary address," "all of the person's secondary addresses in Minnesota, including all addresses used for residential or recreational purposes," "the addresses of all Minnesota property owned, leased, or rented by the person," "the addresses of all locations where the person is employed," "theaddresses of all schools where the person is enrolled," "the year, model, make, license plate number, and color of all motor vehicles owned or regularly driven by the person," "the expiration year for the motor vehicle license plate tabs of all motor vehicles owned by the person," and "all telephone numbers including work, school, and home and any cellular telephone service." Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subds. 4(a), 4a(1)-(8) (Supp. 2019). The statute also covers many more criminal offenses, creates more severe penalties for violations, and requires law enforcement agents to distribute this information to hospitals or health care facilities providing care to a registrant. Id., subds. 1b (enumerating offenses), 4b(c) (providing that law enforcement authorities "shall notify" health care administrators of registrant's demographic and personal information), (d) (providing that upon admission of an offender, a health care facility "shall distribute" a registrant's demographic and personal information to all residents of the facility), 5 (listing criminal penalties) (Supp. 2019).

We are sensitive to appellant's argument that the registration statute has ballooned since 1999. But this court "is bound by supreme court precedent" and must follow explicit holdings of the supreme court. State v. Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018). Boutin, which remains precedential, holds that the registration statute does not violate a registrant's substantive-due-process rights. 591 N.W.2d at 717-18. And this court is also bound by the published decisions of this court. State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating this court is "bound by" both supreme court precedent and published appellate court opinions), review denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010). This court recently acknowledged the Boutin holding and reiterated that "[w]hile the registration requirements have expanded since Boutin was decided, it remains controlling precedent." Thibodeauxv. Evans, 926 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Minn. App. 2019), review denied (Minn. June 26, 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1136 (2020); see also Bedeau v. Evans, 926 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. App. 2019) (holding that registration statute did not violate substantive- or procedural-due-process rights, did not burden...