State v. Stonecypher

508 P.3d 1230

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Paul Cody STONECYPHER, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 48561

Supreme Court of Idaho, Moscow, April 2022 Term.

Opinion Filed: April 29, 2022

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellant Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. Jason Pintler argued.

Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Kacey Jones argued.

BRODY, Justice.

Paul Stonecypher was stopped by law enforcement for vehicle equipment violations while driving through Idaho on a trip from California to Montana. Stonecypher alleges that his seizure was unlawfully prolonged to allow for a sniff of the vehicle by a drug-detection dog. We disagree because the extension of the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity. We affirm the district court's denial of Stonecypher's motion to suppress.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In May 2020, Idaho State Police Corporal Seth Green observed Stonecypher driving a lifted pickup truck east on I-90 in Kootenai County without mudflaps as required by Idaho Code section 49-949. The pickup also lacked license plates, and a temporary license in the rear window appeared to have been altered. Green pulled over Stonecypher and spoke with him and his passengers, Tabatha Mosca and Rodney Harrell, during the ensuing stop. Green noticed items in the cab of the truck that he associated with illegal drug activity and observed that each of the occupants displayed physical indications of recent drug use.

While waiting for the results of the warrant check from dispatch, Green asked the three about their travels. Green found the explanation for their trip to be incongruous and, because their story involved returning from a visit with a person actively sick with COVID-19, he suspected the story was designed to dissuade him from pursuing the stop further.

At about eight minutes into the stop, Green told the occupants that he suspected drug activity and began to ask them if they had any drugs or paraphernalia in the pickup. Green's questions were interrupted when dispatch informed Green that the license and warrant check were clear. Green then resumed his questions and the three denied that there were any illegal drugs in the pickup. Eventually, a K-9 unit arrived and the drug-detection dog alerted to the presence of illegal drugs. A subsequent search of the pickup uncovered more than three and a half pounds of marijuana, more than 200 grams of methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, firearms, and ammunition.

The State charged Stonecypher with possession of methamphetamine, trafficking in marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Stonecypher moved to suppress the evidence of drugs and paraphernalia, arguing that Green lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the stop for the dog sniff. The district court held a hearing at which Green testified and the dash camera video of the stop was admitted into evidence. The district court found Green's testimony "inherently credible" in its entirety and held Green had reasonable suspicion of drug activity "incredibly early" in the stop. Accordingly, the district court denied Stonecypher's motion to suppress.

Stonecypher entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of methamphetamine, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court sentenced Stonecypher to six years with two years fixed and retained jurisdiction. Stonecypher timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"When this Court reviews a district court's order granting or denying a motion to suppress, the standard of review is bifurcated." State v. Gonzales , 165 Idaho 667, 671, 450 P.3d 315, 319 (2019) (quoting State v. Purdum , 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009) ). "This Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." Id . (citing State v. Watts , 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005) ). However, "the trial court's application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found" is reviewed de novo. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. "The stop of a vehicle by law enforcement constitutes a seizure of its occupants to which the Fourth Amendment applies." State v. Linze , 161 Idaho 605, 607–08, 389 P.3d 150, 152–53 (2016) (citing Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) ). To justify the detention of a vehicle's occupants, the detention must be supported by an officer's reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed. Id. "The quantity and quality of information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that necessary to establish probable cause." State v. Gonzales , 165 Idaho 667, 673, 450 P.3d 315, 321 (2019) (quoting State v. Bishop , 146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009) ). "Still, reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion.’ " Id.

"Where a detention is justified by a traffic infraction, ‘authority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.’ " State v. Randall , 169 Idaho 358, ––––, 496 P.3d 844, 849 (2021) (quoting State v. Hale , 168 Idaho 863, 867, 489 P.3d 450, 454 (2021) ). Tasks tied to addressing traffic infractions include "checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance." Hale , 168 Idaho at 867, 489 P.3d at 454 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 354–55, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) ). However, "[t]he purpose of a stop is not permanently fixed, ... for during the course of the detention there may evolve suspicion of criminality different from that which initially prompted the stop." Randall , 169 Idaho at ––––, 496 P.3d at 849 (quoting State v. Sheldon , 139 Idaho 980, 984, 88 P.3d 1220, 1224 (Ct. App. 2003) ).

Here, the parties agree that the tasks tied to the initial purpose of the stop were completed when dispatch returned the results of the license and warrant check to Green. Further, Stonecypher does not allege that Green prolonged the stop in violation of Rodriguez by pursuing activities unrelated to its traffic purpose before this point. Therefore, the only issue before us is whether the facts and circumstances known to Green at that time established a reasonable suspicion of drug activity. We hold that they did.

The facts supporting reasonable suspicion of drug activity were numerous. While Stonecypher was pulling over to the side of the road, Green noticed furtive "movement all over the car." Upon making contact with the occupants of the pickup, all three displayed signs of recent drug use. Specifically, "Stonecypher had sunken cheekbones, flaccid facial muscles, glassy eyes, droopy eyelids ... was speaking slowly[,]" and "[h]is shoulders were very slouched"; Mosca "had glassy eyes, flaccid facial muscles, was speaking very quickly.... [and] had a lot of head movement, going back and forth, appearing unable to sit still"; and Harrell "had flaccid facial muscles, glassy eyes" and was "visibly sweating on a day that was very cool." Based on these physical indicators, Green testified that he believed all three occupants were likely under the influence of illegal drugs.

Green also observed a torch lighter in the ashtray of the pickup, which was next to a handkerchief with something rolled up inside. According to Green, torch lighters...