State v. Stovall

316 Conn. 514

115 A.3d 1071

STATE of Connecticut

v.Thomas STOVALL.

No. 19167.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 28, 2014.

Decided April 28, 2015.

John W. Cerreta, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant).

James A. Killen, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state's attorney, and Richard L. Palombo, Jr., senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

Opinion

VERTEFEUILLE, J.

The defendant, Thomas Stovall, was convicted after a jury trial of possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a public housing project in violation of General Statutes § 21a–278a (b) and other narcotics and firearm charges.¹ The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Appellate Court, although it reversed in part the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial due to improper jury instructions, properly concluded that the state had produced sufficient evidence at trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to sell narcotics within 1500 feet of a public housing project. See State v. Stovall, 142 Conn.App. 562, 572, 64 A.3d 819 (2013). The defendant contends that although the evidence adduced at trial may have suggested a general intent to sell narcotics, it was not sufficient to satisfy the state's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to sell narcotics at a particular location within 1500 feet of a public housing project. We agree and reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court with respect to the conviction of possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a housing project.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts, as set forth in the Appellate Court opinion. “On January 16, 2010, at approximately midnight, a raid team from the Bridgeport [P]olice [D]epartment executed a search warrant for apartment 449 in building four of the Charles F. Greene Homes housing complex (Greene Homes), a federally funded housing project.... [T]he officers detained and secured five people—Librea Patrick, the tenant of the apartment, Latavia Goss, Roderick Williams, Shawndell Gaynard and the defendant. Patrick's two small children were allowed to remain sleeping. All of the adults were searched. The search of the defendant revealed $1125 in mixed denominations. After [the police] search[ed] all of the adults, Patrick remained in the apartment and the other suspects were transported to the police station....

“The search of the apartment revealed a [D]epartment of [S]ocial [S]ervices card and incident report belonging to the defendant in one of the bedrooms, sixteen cellular phones found throughout the apartment, an empty scale box, two razor blades with a residue that was later determined to be cocaine and small ziplock bags in the kitchen. A search of the hallway closet across from the kitchen revealed a shoe box that contained a loaded .38 caliber revolver, a loaded .32 caliber revolver, a Remington bullet box with two live bullets inside, and several letters that referenced Tom–Tom, Thomas and Tomster. The contents of the shoe box were collected as evidence, but the shoe box itself was not. An officer also searched the clothing in the closet. In a heavy, men's winter jacket, he found thirteen orange-tinged plastic ziplock bags, each containing a white, rock-like substance that was later determined to be crack cocaine. The jacket was not collected as evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 565, 64 A.3d 819.

“The sole witness who testified about the ownership of the contents of the items in the hallway closet was Patrick. She testified that she allowed the defendant to keep a box of sneakers in her hallway closet. Patrick also testified that the defendant was allowed to keep coats there [in exchange for $20 to $30 a month]....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 570, 64 A.3d 819.

“Patrick testified that she and the defendant became friends in 2005 and that she knew him as Tom Tom. She also testified that the defendant would come to her apartment two to three times a week and that Patrick would see him around Greene Homes two to three times per week. When at Patrick's apartment, the defendant would visit her and her friend, Goss. Additionally, Patrick testified, Greene Homes is known as an area where narcotics can be purchased, and she had never seen the defendant sell drugs in her apartment or in the area of Greene Homes.

“William Reilly, a detective with the Bridgeport [P]olice [D]epartment who participated in the execution of the warrant, also testified. He testified that Greene Homes is a high crime and drug trafficking area....

During direct examination, Reilly identified the sixteen cell phones recovered from the apartment, the small empty ziplock bags and two razor blades with narcotics residue and the thirteen orange-tinted ziplock bags that contained crack cocaine. Based on his training and experience, Reilly stated that the empty ziplock bags were consistent with the type generally used to package crack cocaine, that the razors were used to cut up narcotics into smaller pieces so as to fit in the small ziplock bags and that the substance in the thirteen orange-tinted bags was crack cocaine. Reilly testified that based on the way the drugs were packaged, individually, the crack cocaine was packaged to be resold and that the street value of one bag was $10. Furthermore, [he testified that] the absence of a crack pipe or another device to ingest crack cocaine suggested that the drugs were being sold out of the house.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 572–73, 64 A.3d 819.

“In a substitute long form information, the defendant was charged with possession of narcotics with intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent, possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a public housing project and two counts of criminal possession of a firearm. On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts [and the court imposed a total effective sentence of seventeen years].” Id., at 566, 64 A.3d 819 ; see id., at 566 n. 2, 64 A.3d 819.

The defendant then appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that the state had failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his conviction of possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a housing project. After reviewing the evidence, the Appellate Court rejected the defendant's sufficiency claim but found that the trial court had improperly instructed the jury on that possession charge and reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge; id., at 578, 582, 64 A.3d 819 ; from which the defendant, on the granting of certification, now appeals.² He contends that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that the state satisfied its evidentiary burden with respect to the charge of possession of narcotics with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a public housing project. We agree and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court.³

“In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [trier of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.... In evaluating evidence, the trier of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant's innocence.... The trier may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jordan, 314 Conn. 89, 106–107, 101 A.3d 179 (2014).

It is well established that “[i]ntent is generally proven by circumstantial evidence because direct evidence of the accused's state of mind is rarely available.... Therefore, intent is often inferred from conduct ... and from the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence and the rational inferences drawn therefrom.... This does not require that each subordinate conclusion established by or inferred from evidence, or even from other inferences, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt ... because this court has held that a jury's factual inferences that support a guilty verdict need only be reasonable.... Nevertheless, because intent ... is an element of the crime ... that intent must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 126–27, 646 A.2d 169 (1994).

“Due process requires that the state prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.... It follows that insufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's ultimate findings on each of these elements requires acquittal.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Crafts, 226 Conn. 237, 244, 627 A.2d 877 (1993). Ultimately, “[i]t is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving substantial circumstantial evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 245, 627 A.2d 877.

Under § 21a–278a (b), “[a]ny person who violates section 21a–277 or 21a–278 by ... possessing with the intent to sell ... to another person any controlled substance in or on, or within one thousand five hundred feet of ... a public housing project ... shall be imprisoned for a term of three years, which shall not be suspended and shall be in addition and consecutive to any term of imprisonment imposed for violation of section 21a–277 or 21a–278. To constitute a violation of this subsection, an act of ... possessing a controlled substance shall be with intent to sell or dispense in or on, or within one thousand five hundred...