State v. Strachan

1

2023 MT 54N

STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. DAVID VINCENT STRACHAN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 22-0254

Supreme Court of Montana

March 28, 2023

Submitted on Briefs: March 8, 2023

APPEAL FROM District Court of the First Judicial District, In and For the County of Lewis and Clark, Cause No. CDC-2021-127 Honorable Kathy Seeley, Presiding Judge

For Appellant Palmer A. Hoovestal, Hoovestal Law Firm, PLLC Helena, Montana

For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Roy Brown, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Kevin Downs, Lewis and Clark County Attorney, Helena, Montana

Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 David Vincent Strachan (Strachan) appeals the denial of his motion to suppress entered in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County.

¶3 On March 2, 2021, around 11:08 p.m., Officers Alex Nimmick and Dakota Becker stood on a sidewalk at the corner of East Sixth Avenue and North Davis Street in Helena, Montana speaking with a pedestrian who stood just off the sidewalk in the street.

¶4 While speaking with the pedestrian, Officers Nimmick and Becker observed a white Toyota pickup truck-driven by Strachan-approaching them from the east on Sixth Avenue. The officers were in Strachan's line of sight as the truck's headlights were shining on them and the pedestrian. Officer Nimmick thought that "it looked like the [truck] was coming toward [the pedestrian]." Officer Becker believed that the truck was coming towards the officers as well.

¶5 As the truck reached the corner of Sixth Avenue and Davis Street, a second vehicle approached from the opposite direction on Sixth Avenue. Strachan braked, locking up the truck's brakes, apparently to prevent hitting the pedestrian. The truck screeched and skidded to a stop. Officer Becker's bodycam footage shows the truck coming to a stop with the front of the truck just beyond where the pedestrian stood. The second eastbound vehicle passed the intersection.

¶6 Despite no impact occurring, Officer Becker believed Strachan began braking too late because the truck nearly hit the pedestrian. Officer Becker testified he believed Strachan's untimely braking might be due to a delayed reaction time, indicating impairment.

¶7 Strachan continued driving west on Sixth Avenue. Within a half block, the officers observed the truck lock up its brakes again, apparently to avoid hitting a trash bin along the side of the road. Once again, the officers heard the truck's tires skid. The officers watched Strachan take a sharp turn into the parking lot of an apartment complex. At this point, the officers decided to approach Strachan. Strachan got out of the truck as the officers approached and Officer Nimmick observed that Strachan had a "staggering balance." The officers confirmed Strachan's identity using his driver's license and began to question him.

¶8 Before questioning Strachan, Officer Nimmick noticed the smell of alcohol on Strachan's breath and observed Strachan had "bloodshot, watery eyes." Officer Becker then asked Strachan if he was "good." Strachan replied that he was "all right" and the pedestrian "just stepped out in front of [him]." Strachan explained further, "I had a car coming the other way and the lights was in my eyes and all of the sudden I seen that guy coming out and I hit em'. . . I still got my studs on so." Strachan refuted his brakes made the skidding noise, and instead stated that his studs made the sounds. Next, Officer Becker asked Strachan if he had been drinking. Strachan said, "No."

¶9 Officer Becker then asked Strachan where he was driving from. Strachan responded with inconsistent stories, first stating he had visited a friend in East Helena, then declaring he had visited his niece, her husband, and their baby. When Officer Becker asked Strachan if the officers could look at his eyes to make sure he could drive, Strachan responded, "No! Yeah, I do!" Strachan continued, "You know, I didn't do anything wrong though . . . there was a car coming the other way ...." Strachan told the officers he was "at home right now," but he actually lived on Holter Street-not near the alleyway where he stopped along Davis Street. Officer Becker testified Strachan eventually admitted he had been drinking. Nonetheless, Strachan allowed Officer Becker to look at Strachan's eyes again. Officer Becker confirmed that Strachan's eyes were "bloodshot" and "watery." During the investigation, the officers specifically explained to Strachan the indicators of impairment they noticed. Officer Becker testified that he told Strachan he braked too late and too hard, and that this type of driving behavior may indicate someone is driving under the influence.

¶10 Following their observations of Strachan's driving, his bloodshot and watery eyes, and the alcoholic odor coming from his breath, the officers asked Strachan to submit to Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs). Strachan agreed to participate in the SFSTs but had difficulty walking and turning. The officers testified that Strachan's behavior during the SFSTs showed "multiple clues of impairment." When Officer Nimmick attempted to read Strachan the Preliminary Alcohol Screening Test Advisory, Strachan yelled at the officers and fled on foot. The officers pursued Strachan for about 15 minutes. While running away, Strachan threw an item over a fence. The officers later retrieved the item and identified it as a pill bottle containing methamphetamine. Once the officers reached Strachan, they detained him and also recovered a methamphetamine smoking device on the ground under Strachan.

¶11 Over three hours later and upon obtaining a search warrant, Strachan's blood sample was drawn. The blood sample confirmed the presence of methamphetamine and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) but showed no alcohol. Officer Nimmick believed that the three-hour delay likely "play[ed] a huge factor" in there being no alcohol in Strachan's blood.

¶12 On March 18, 2021, Strachan was charged by Information with five counts, including Driving While Under the Influence (7th), a felony (Count 1); Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs (methamphetamine), a felony (Count 2); Criminal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a misdemeanor (Count 3); Resisting Arrest, a misdemeanor (Count 4); Obstructing a Peace Officer, a misdemeanor (Count 5); and Tampering with Physical Evidence, a felony (Count 6). On June 11, 2021, Strachan moved to suppress all evidence obtained at the time of his arrest, arguing because Officers Becker and Nimmick lacked particularized suspicion to stop.

¶13 On November 22, 2021, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing and denied his motion in a written order entered December 7, 2021. Strachan pleaded guilty on January 20, 2022, to Counts 1 and 6, reserving his right to appeal the District Court's denial of his motion. The District Court committed Strachan to the Department of Corrections for four years on Count 1 and a consecutive four-year suspended sentence to the Montana State Prison on Count 6. Strachan appeals the denial of his Motion to Suppress.

¶14 We review a district court's grant or denial of a motion to suppress to determine whether the court's findings are clearly erroneous and whether those findings were applied correctly as a matter of law. State v. Gill, 2012 MT 36, ¶ 10, 364 Mont. 182, 272 P.3d 60. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial evidence, if the lower court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if this Court's review of the record leaves it with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. City of Helena v. Brown, 2017 MT 248, ¶ 7, 389 Mont. 63, 403 P.3d 341 (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. State v. Passwater, 2015 MT 159, ¶ 9, 379 Mont. 372, 350 P.3d 382 (citing State v. Aragon, 2014 MT 89, ¶ 9, 379 Mont. 391, 321 P.3d 841).

¶15 As a threshold matter, we will not reweigh the District Court's factual findings regarding the officers' testimony and its evaluation of the bodycam video footage. On appeal, Strachan argues that we should not afford the District Court's factual findings deference and asks us to compare the testimony of the officers and the recorded events in the bodycam videos in "the exact same manner as did the District Court." This Court does not reweigh conflicting evidence or substitute its own evaluation of the evidence for that of the trial court. State v Wagner, 2013 MT 159, ¶ 15, 370 Mont. 381, 303 P.3d 285. This Court defers to the trial court in cases involving conflicting evidence because it recognizes that the District Court had the...