State v. Stringfellow

425 Md. 461

42 A.3d 27

STATE of Maryland

v.Reginald STRINGFELLOW.

No. 62, Sept. Term, 2011.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 23, 2012.

Daniel J. Jawor, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for petitioner.

Piedad Gomez, Asst. Public Defender (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, BARBERA and RAYMOND G. THIEME, JR. (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.

HARRELL, J.

String theory is a scientific framework that describes the smallest, most basic particles—those building blocks of the universe so small they cannot be comprised of other particles—as indistinguishable segments of string. These infinitesimally small particles vibrate like the plucked strings of a subatomic guitar. How they vibrate determines whether they are leptons or quarks, which form atoms, which form elements, and so forth. Reginald Stringfellow's theory, on the other hand, hypothecates that his objection to a voir dire question proposed by the prosecutor and given by the trial judge during jury selection was like a string, vibrating well beyond the empaneling of the jury. Petitioner, the State, and Respondent, Mr. Stringfellow (Stringfellow), disagree whether Stringfellow's objection was a lepton or a quark. That is, the State argues that Stringfellow's unsuccessful objection to the question went to the composition of the jury, which objection he waived (for purposes of appellate review) by accepting, without qualification or reservation, the jury chosen pursuant to the questioning. Stringfellow counters that the nature of his objection was incidental to the composition of the jury and, notwithstanding his acceptance of the jury, his objection is preserved for appellate consideration.

Our case law instructs that an overruled objection to a voir dire question, where the nature of the objection was directed to the composition of the jury, is waived when the objecting party accepts thereafter the jury, without qualification. Here, Stringfellow objected timely to the trial judge asking the venire about their views regarding whether the State must demonstrate that it employed certain scientific investigative techniques and/or scientific evidence before any member of the venire could convict him. Stringfellow argued that the question would prejudice the venire against him and diminish the State's burden of proof. We conclude that Stringfellow's objection went to the composition of the jury. Thus, when he accepted (after his objection was overruled and the question propounded) the jury, without qualification, he waived any future opportunity to complain on appeal about the objected-to question and its potential effect. Even assuming that the objection was not waived, the asking of the voir dire question proved harmless error on this record.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The State's evidence at trial told the following tale. On the evening of 21 November 2009, plainclothes Baltimore City police officers, in an unmarked vehicle, patrolled the 5300 block of Beaufort Avenue in Baltimore City. They observed a person, later identified as Stringfellow, holding a handgun. They drove toward him. When Stringfellow noticed the approaching vehicle, he dropped the handgun and ran off. The officers caught Stringfellow, arrested him, and recovered the handgun. The State charged Stringfellow with two crimes: (1) possessing a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a disqualifying crime, and (2) wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun.

On the first day of what was to be Stringfellow's jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the judge considered voir dire questions proposed by the parties. Among the State's proposals was its question 14, which inquired whether any member of the venire believed that the State must use certain scientific evidence and/or scientific investigative techniquesbefore a potential juror could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Initially, the judge seemed disinclined to ask question 14, prompting the following exchanges:

PROSECUTOR: Then my Question 14.

COURT: Yeah. You always ask me for that and I always tell you no, then I always give it to you. So I'll probably do the same thing this time. I'll give it to you in voir dire. I won't give it to you in jury instructions.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I would object to it being asked in voir dire.

COURT: Of course you would. I understand, but it's a fair question to ask.

....

COURT: We'll take it—here's what we're going to do. I'll give the instruction over the objection of the defense and we'll see where we go with it because it may not become relevant at all.

But because the question reads[, “D]oes any member of the panel believe the [S]tate is required to utilize specific investigative techniques such as [fingerprints”]—we won't say DNA because it's not relevant here .... [“]in order for the defendant to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.[”] If a juror believes that they are required to do that, we know that it is not the law. And if that's their belief then that is something both sides have a right to know.

The judge propounded ultimately the State's question 14 as “Does any member of the panel believe that the State is required to utilize specific investigative or scientific techniques such as fingerprint examination in order for the defendant to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?” No response was recorded from anyone in the venire.

Immediately after posing State question 14, the judge continued:

If selected as a juror, you're required to render a fair and impartial verdict based upon the evidence presented in the courtroom and the law as I describe it to you in my instructions at the end of this case. Is there any member of the jury panel who feels as if as a matter of your own personal conscience you disagreed with the law, you would disregard the law and instead follow your conscience?

Four venire members responded affirmatively to this query; none of them served on the jury. After completion of voir dire and jury selection, and before the judge's courtroom clerk swore the jury, the clerk asked the parties if the jury was acceptable:

CLERK: Jury panel acceptable to the State?

PROSECUTOR: Yes. The jury panel is acceptable to the State.

CLERK: Acceptable to the defense?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, it is.

The judge observed, “The panel is acceptable to both sides. That's fine.”

As part of his defense, Stringfellow highlighted that the police officers failed to have examined the confiscated handgun for latent fingerprints. In an effort to suggest that it would have been relatively simple for the arresting officers to request a fingerprint analysis of the weapon, Stringfellowoffered in evidence (and the judge admitted over the State's objection) a blank police fingerprint-analysis-request form, which required a box to be checkmarked to request a fingerprint analysis of an item of evidence. In the absence of such an examination (and notwithstanding the eyewitness testimony of the officers who saw Stringfellow holding the handgun on 21 November 2009 on Beaufort Avenue), Stringfellow urged that the State failed to link him conclusively to the handgun. He reiterated the lack-of-fingerprint-evidence argument, over the prosecutor's objection, during closing argument.

The judge gave several final jury instructions at the close of all the evidence. Among them, he said, “I may have commented on evidence or asked a question of a witness. You should not draw any inferences or conclusions from my comments or questions either as to the merits of the case or as to my views regarding the witness.” He stated also that the State had the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Stringfellow was guilty. “However,” the judge cautioned, “if you are not satisfied of the defendant's guilt to that extent, then reasonable doubt exists and the defendant must be found not guilty.”

The jury convicted Stringfellow on both counts.¹ Stringfellow appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. He argued that the propounding of the State's voir dire question 14 prejudiced the jurors against him by imputing his guilt, devaluing fingerprint evidence, and lowering the State's burden of proof. Stringfellow v. State, 199 Md.App. 141, 146, 20 A.3d 825, 829 (2011). The State countered that Stringfellow failed to preserve for appellate review the bases of his voir dire objection by accepting, without qualification, the empaneled jury. Stringfellow, 199 Md.App. at 146 n. 1, 20 A.3d at 829 n. 1. In rejecting the State's waiver argument, the panel of the Court of Special Appeals agreed with Stringfellow that the nature of his objection did not require renewal of his objection (or otherwise qualify his acceptance of the jury) contemporaneously with the trial court empaneling the jury. Stringfellow, 199 Md.App. at 146 n. 1, 20 A.3d at 829 n. 1. On the merits of Stringfellow's contentions regarding the error of giving the State's voir dire question 14, the panel concluded that the question deprived Stringfellow of a fair and impartial jury. The intermediate appellate court concluded also that propounding question 14 was not harmless error because, given its precedent conclusion that the jury was prejudiced, the error influenced improperly the verdict. Stringfellow, 199 Md.App. at 154, 20 A.3d at 833. The panel reversed and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for a new trial. Stringfellow, 199 Md.App. at 151, 20 A.3d at 831.

The State filed timely a petition for a writ of certiorari. We granted the State's petition, State v. Stringfellow, 421 Md. 557, 28 A.3d 644 (2011), to consider two questions:

Did Stringfellow waive his prior objection to the voir dire question, asked to the venire, when he accepted the empaneled jury without qualification? ²

If Stringfellow did not waive his prior objection and assuming also that the judge...