State v. Tallent

430 S.C. 438

845 S.E.2d 508

The STATE, Respondent,

v.Dwayne Cameron TALLENT, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2017-001585

Opinion No. 5729

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard March 17, 2020

Filed June 10, 2020

Rehearing Denied August 6, 2020

Matthew J. Kappel, of Law Office of Matthew J. Kappel, PC, and J. Falkner Wilkes, both of Greenville, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of Columbia; and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III, of Greenville, all for Respondent.

HEWITT, J.:

This case is chiefly about whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining to sever criminal charges from being tried together. The State alleged that Dwayne C. Tallent sexually abused his minor stepdaughter for several years and he gave her and one of her brothers (the only brother who was a minor at the time) illegal drugs and alcohol after the brothers moved into the house Tallent shared with the siblings' mother. Tallent was charged with first and second degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor; lewd act upon a child; and a single count of contributing to the delinquency of stepdaughter and brother. A jury convicted him of the charges. The trial court ordered concurrent sentences of thirty years' imprisonment.

Here, Tallent argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the contributing to the delinquency of a minor charge from the other charges. He also argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his manufacture, sale, and use of cocaine, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine. In his view, allowing the more egregious drug-related testimony into evidence violated Rule 403 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence.

We reject these arguments for the same basic reason: both decisions are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, and the record reveals no abuse of discretion. Thus, we affirm.

FACTS

This was a delayed reporting case. The abuse allegedly began in the early 1990s when stepdaughter was five or so years old. Stepdaughter testified Tallent's abusive conduct escalated over several years. Details of the abuse need not be repeated here.

Stepdaughter said the abuse ended when she was approximately fourteen years old and went to live with her biological father. She reported the abuse to authorities when she was twenty-six.

Stepdaughter also recalled being around illegal drugs in the household as early as five years old. She testified Tallent let her try marijuana when she was twelve and continued providing her with marijuana and alcohol until she moved out. Stepdaughter also testified crack cocaine and other drugs were present in the home.

The brothers moved into the home some years after their sister. Tallent allegedly exposed both brothers to illegal drugs and alcohol. Both brothers also testified to witnessing Tallent's odd behavior with their sister and, eventually, his abuse of her.

For example, the younger brother stated marijuana use was common in the house. He recalled that Tallent provided all of the children with marijuana, gave the brothers cocaine and other drugs, and taught the brothers how to make crack cocaine.

The younger brother also recalled Tallent frequently touched stepdaughter and rubbed her inner thigh in ways that seemed awkward and inappropriate. He stated it was not uncommon for stepdaughter to be in bed with Tallent. He additionally testified that on one occasion he looked through the keyhole of the bedroom door, witnessed Tallent sexually abusing stepdaughter, kicked the door open, and confronted Tallent.

Older brother corroborated this account about the illegal drug activity and the episode where younger brother witnessed his sister being sexually abused.

Before trial, Tallent moved to sever the contributing to the delinquency of a minor charge from the remaining charges on the ground that trying the charges together would cause undue prejudice by allowing evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible if the trial only involved the CSC and lewd act charges. Tallent argued his involvement in manufacturing, selling, and using cocaine, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine had no substantial connection to the CSC or lewd act charges and would have never passed the probative versus prejudicial threshold if offered as "prior bad acts" in a trial solely concerning the alleged sexual abuse.

The trial court disagreed and found that the charges were interconnected and interwoven. Therefore, the court determined it was appropriate to try them together. The court nevertheless reserved the right to exclude certain testimony if it was unduly prejudicial and specifically mentioned that it was not ruling evidence of drug transactions and manufacturing would be admitted.

Prior to stepdaughter's testimony regarding drug activity in the house, the State requested that the jury be sent out of the courtroom to seek clarification on the trial court's ruling. The State said it planned to introduce testimony that Tallent provided stepdaughter with marijuana and alcohol, provided cocaine and other drugs to other people in the household, and manufactured crack cocaine in front of stepdaughter. The State argued this evidence was relevant to the contributing to the delinquency of a minor charge.

Tallent objected, arguing the drug evidence was so prejudicial that he would not be able to receive a fair trial and its admission would violate Rule 403. Tallent acknowledged evidence that he gave stepdaughter marijuana and alcohol was relevant to the contributing to the delinquency of a minor charge and admissible. However, Tallent claimed testimony and evidence regarding drug manufacturing, drug transactions, extortion, and firearms was more prejudicial than probative and inadmissible.

The trial court held testimony regarding drug activity was relevant to the contributing to the delinquency of a minor charge and admissible. However, and as before, the court noted Tallent should object if he felt specific testimony violated Rule 403 or went "beyond simply proving the elements of contributing to the delinquency of a minor."

The trial court and the parties continued addressing this issue throughout the trial as various drug-related testimony came out. The court generally allowed testimony regarding drug use and manufacturing in which stepdaughter and her brothers were personally involved. The court also sustained objections and provided curative instructions as to testimony of drug transactions with third parties and other evidence not directly related to Tallent's charges.

Multiple witnesses testified in Tallent's defense, generally stating they did not witness any inappropriate conduct by Tallent toward stepdaughter or other minors. The jury convicted Tallent of all four charges.

SEVERANCE

Tallent argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the contributing to the delinquency of a minor charge. Tallent contends this charge was not "the same general kind of charge, or related in kind, place or character sufficiently to be tried with the sexual offense charges." Additionally, Tallent claims the evidence related to his manufacture, sales, and use of cocaine, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine was unrelated and overly prejudicial with regard to the CSC and lewd act charges. In his view, the court improperly focused on whether the drug-related evidence was relevant to the contributing to the delinquency of a minor charge rather than asking whether this evidence would be admissible if the CSC and lewd act charges were tried alone.

In simple terms, the law explains that multiple charges can be tried together when they have a logical relationship to each other and when there is no prejudice. The "test" is that the charges must "(1) arise out of a single chain of circumstances, (2) [be] proved by the same evidence, [and] (3) [be] of the same general nature ...." State v. Tucker , 324 S.C. 155, 164, 478 S.E.2d 260, 265 (1996). Further, no real right of the defendant can be prejudiced. Id. "Where the offenses charged in separate indictments are of the same general nature involving connected transactions closely related in kind, place and character, the trial [court] has the power, in [its] discretion, to order the indictments tried together if the defendant's substantive rights would not be prejudiced." State v. Rice , 368 S.C. 610, 614, 629 S.E.2d 393, 395 (Ct. App. 2006).

Decisions on severance and joinder are reviewed under a deferential standard. These rulings "should not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is shown." Tucker , 324 S.C. at 164, 478 S.E.2d at 265. "An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision is unsupported by the evidence or controlled by an error of law." Rice , 368 S.C. at 613, 629 S.E.2d at 395.

Cases use variants of the same general language to describe when the joinder of charges is appropriate. Recent precedent describes joinder as being appropriate for crimes that involve "connected transactions closely related in kind, place, and character." State v. Beekman , 415 S.C. 632, 637, 785 S.E.2d 202, 205 (2016) (quoting State v. Cutro , 365 S.C. 366, 374, 618 S.E.2d 890, 894 (2005) ). This same decision rejected a restrictive reading of the phrase "a single chain of circumstances." Beekman , 415 S.C. at 636, 785 S.E.2d at 204.

"Offenses are considered to be of the same general nature where they are interconnected." Rice , 368 S.C. at 614, 629 S.E.2d at 395. "Conversely, offenses which are of the same nature, but which do not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and are not provable by the same evidence may not properly be tried together." Id.

Mindful of these principles, we do not see an abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying Tallent's motion to sever the charges. In our view, one can sensibly say that these charges arose out of a single chain of circumstances, were proved by the same evidence, and were of the same general nature and Tallent was not unfairly prejudiced. See ...