State v. Taylor

539 P.3d 351

STATE of Utah, Appellant,

v.William Lansing TAYLOR, Appellee.

No. 20210366-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed November 2, 2023

Sean D. Reyes, Salt Lake City and Lindsey L. Wheeler, Attorneys for Appellant

Freyja Johnson, Salt Lake City and Emily Adams, Attorneys for Appellee

Judge John D. Luthy authored this Opinion, in which Judges Michele M. Christiansen Forster and Ryan M. Harris concurred.

Opinion

LUTHY, Judge:

¶1 This is a witness tampering case. William Lansing Taylor and a former coworker (Colleague) are both geologists, and they worked for the same research institute (Employer) until Employer fired Taylor in the spring of 2018. When Taylor was later charged with multiple misdemeanors, the charging document for that case (Information) contained a summary of a statement given by Colleague that described an interaction the pair had at a professional conference. Upon reviewing the Information, Taylor sent Colleague a series of emails accusing her of lying and asking her to "renounce" her statement. Based on these emails, Taylor was charged with witness tampering. After a jury convicted Taylor of this offense, the district court arrested judgment, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that Taylor had the mental state necessary to support a witness tampering conviction. The State now appeals, challenging the court's order arresting judgment. We conclude that when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, it was sufficient to support that verdict. We therefore reverse.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In May 2018, sometime after Employer terminated Taylor, both Taylor and Colleague attended a professional conference. While there, the pair had an interaction that Colleague found disturbing. Because of "ongoing problems" between Taylor and Employer's staff, Colleague reported the incident to her supervisor and then to the police.

¶3 Prior to the conference—in April 2018—the police had begun investigating Taylor. The investigation resulted in charges being filed against Taylor in a separate case, and Taylor first appeared in court on those charges on January 15, 2019. Taylor chose to represent himself at his arraignment, and he was there presented with the Information that included, in the probable cause statement, a summary of a statement given by Colleague describing the incident at the conference. That summary read:

[F]ollowing a presentation [Colleague] gave[,] she was approached by [Taylor] in the main convention hall where he blocked her path, not allowing her to return to [Employer's] booth. [Colleague] states that she took an unusual path to avoid [Taylor], but he sought her out. During the conversation [Taylor] was irate and unstable. [Colleague] tried to get away from [Taylor] multiple times, but he stayed with her and often mentioned other ... staff members [of Employer]. [Taylor] only left when he saw [Colleague's] coworkers approaching.

While this summary was included in the Information for Taylor's other case, none of the charges filed against Taylor in that case stemmed from the interaction between Taylor and Colleague at the conference.

¶4 Soon after he left his arraignment, Taylor began emailing Colleague. In his first email, sent at 9:33 a.m. the same day, he wrote:

You provided false testimony. We did not have an altercation of any sort at [the conference]. I did not seek you out, I did not block your path, I was neither irate nor unstable, you did not try to get away multiple times and I did not pursue you. I can't believe you lied. You will now be subpoenaed and required to recount the true story in front of a Salt Lake City district cour[t] judge.

A second email contained only an attachment consisting of the portion of the Information summarizing Colleague's statement to police, as quoted above. A third email, sent at 2:44 p.m. on the same day, said:

Because of your statement, I'm being prosecuted by the State of Utah[.] I face 2.5 years in prison, fines, and a permanent criminal record. None of my interactions with you warrant this attack nor these consequence[s]. Please renounce your statement.

¶5 Based on these emails, the State charged Taylor—in a case separate from the misdemeanors—with one count of witness tampering, a third-degree felony. The witness tampering case is the subject of this appeal, and it was tried before a jury in October 2019.

¶6 During trial, Colleague provided the following testimony in response to questioning by the State:

Q: [B]etween the time that the defendant had been terminated [by Employer] and this conference in May, had there been problems between the defendant and the staff [of Employer]?

A: There have been some emails that have been received [by] a different staff member and some ongoing problems.

Q: Okay. So given that, what were your feelings when you saw the defendant at this [conference] in May?

A: I was concerned. I was worried ....

Q: Okay. And at this conference when you saw him there, was there some sort of confrontation or incident that took place?

A: Yeah. We were in the main hall, and he blocked my path from moving through the hallway. I tried to move one way, he'd move that way. Again, tried to move another way, he'd move that way. And then some things were said, mostly in a very irate manner by Mr. Taylor.

¶7 The State asked about Colleague's reaction to Taylor's emails, and Colleague responded that she "was scared." The State asked why the messages made her feel scared, and she answered that the incident at the conference "had been a behavioral pattern" and "[t]here had been other things leading up to that as well." She continued, "And so when I got the email saying that I had lied and that I needed to recant those lies, I was scared." The State asked, "And ... how did it make you feel about going forward with the statement that you had given to police?" Colleague responded, "I was scared to go forward." At this point, Taylor's counsel objected as to relevancy, and the court said, "I think it is [relevant]. I'll overrule the objection." Colleague then further testified that she "didn't know whether to phone the police and say that [she] needed to recant the statement because [she] was worried of threatening behavior in the future." The State then asked, "So calling the police and recanting, is that something you considered as a result of these emails?" Colleague responded, "Yes."

¶8 On cross-examination, Taylor's counsel asked Colleague whether Taylor's statement that the pair "did not have an altercation of any sort" was correct, and Colleague testified that while there was no physical altercation, she "believe[d] that an altercation is any kind of aggressive behavior toward" a person and she "viewed [Taylor] blocking [her] path as aggressive." Taylor's counsel referred to Taylor's first email as describing his "version of events" and asked Colleague whether it was "fair to say that [she] disagree[d] with Mr. Taylor as to what happened that day." Colleague said, "Yes." Taylor's counsel then said, "Right. So ... maybe there's a car wreck. Someone says the light's red. Someone says the light's green. They just think different things. So you believe that he viewed that differently?" Colleague responded, "I don't think he did. I think he's saying he did."

¶9 Taylor's counsel later asked Colleague, "Now, did [Taylor] ask you to tell a false story?" Colleague responded, "He has in the [third] email." Counsel replied, "No, no. But—no. He didn't say tell a false story, right?" Colleague responded, "Well, he says you need to recant the story ...." Counsel asked, "He said recant ... what story?" Colleague responded, "The true story." Counsel also asked, "Did he ever say ‘Don't answer a subpoena, don't respond to court’?" Colleague answered, "That's in the third [email], yes." Counsel pressed, "Where did he say don't go to court?" Colleague responded, "When it says ‘Please renounce your statement.’ "

¶10 After the State presented its case, Taylor's counsel moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the State had produced no evidence that Taylor had the intent "to induce or otherwise cause a person to testify or inform falsely," see Utah Code § 76-8-508(1), because Taylor had merely said, in effect, "I want you to tell the true story. I believe your previous statement was false." The court indicated that it would take the motion under advisement but it would also proceed with the remainder of the trial.

¶11 Taylor testified in his defense. When asked why he accused Colleague of providing false testimony, he said, "Because I believed that the summary statement describes events that did not occur, and they were being used to charge me with a crime I did not commit." He read aloud from his first email his version of the events at the convention center. He also described how the alleged incident occurred in "[a] giant room" accommodating "[t]en thousand people," and he then testified that he "[a]bsolutely" did not block Colleague's path. He presented his statements in the third email as "correct factual statement[s]" and his asking Colleague to "[p]lease renounce [her] statement" as a request to "come to court, bring your statement with you and say that it has inaccuracies, that it's not a valid representation of the events that transpired on that day."

¶12 After Taylor testified, his counsel renewed his motion for a directed verdict. The court denied the motion, saying, "I do think that ... it is a jury determination to determine Mr. Taylor's intent, also to consider the meaning of those words when taken in conjunction with each other, and I do find that a reasonable jury could interpret that [third] email as meeting the prima facia case for witness tampering." The jury then found Taylor guilty of witness tampering.

¶13 Before sentencing, Taylor moved to arrest judgment. Taylor again insisted that "the evidence shows only that the two had different perspectives about what had occurred, that Mr. Taylor believed [Colleague] was lying, and that he...