State v. Taylor

548 P.3d 82

2024-NMSC-011

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Sandi TAYLOR and Mary Taylor, Defendants-Petitioners.

NO. S-1-SC-38818

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: March 14, 2024

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI, Donna Mowrer, District Judge

Harmon, Barnett & Morris, P.C., Tye C. Harmon, Clovis, NM, Wray Law P.C., Katherine Wray, Albuquerque, NM, for Petitioners

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent

OPINION

VIGIL, Justice.

{1} This appeal calls on us to once again consider the propriety of jury instructions in a reckless child abuse case, a recurrent theme in our jurisprudence. Most recently, State v. Consaul and State v. Montoya iden- titled and examined several pervasive problems with then-existing uniform jury instructions on child abuse as defined in NMSA 1978, Section 30-6-1 (2009). See State v. Consaul, 2014-NMSC-030, ¶¶ 27-40, 332 P.3d 860 (concluding that the uniform jury instructions for child abuse did not "adequately capture[ ] the true nature of the crime and the legislative intent behind the statute"); State v. Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, ¶¶ 16-34, 345 P.3d 1056, (noting "[t]he confusion caused by the dissonance between our case law and our jury instructions for child abuse"). This Court addressed these problems by implementing in 2015 the substantial revisions to our reckless child abuse jury instructions in effect today. See UJI 14-612, -615, -621, and -622 NMRA.

{2} The problem with the jury instructions used at Defendants’ joint trial arises from confusion and misdirection due to the unfortunate use of an inappropriate conjunctive term in the complex, essential-elements instructions that set out the course of conduct the jury was required to find in order to return guilty verdicts. The confusion and misdirection stem from the use of a single and/or connector to separate and join no fewer than four distinct propositions for the jury’s consideration. The term and/or has proved singularly unsuited to formulating clear and effective jury instructions, to the degree that our trial courts would be well-served to avoid its use in jury instructions altogether. The underlying jury instructions’ use—or, more accurately, misuse—of the and/or connector requires this Court to reverse Defendants’ reckless child abuse convictions.

{3} Our determination to reverse Defendants’ convictions and remand for a new trial based on this instructional error makes it unnecessary for us to address Defendants’ remaining arguments concerning the jury instructions, a double jeopardy merger claim, and evidentiary arguments. State v. Mascarenas, 2000-NMSC-017, ¶ 1, 129 N.M. 230, 4 P.3d 1221 (declining to reach other issues brought before the Court when the first issue supports reversal and remand).

I. BACKGROUND

{4} The facts underlying this appeal are undeniably tragic. Defendants Mary Taylor and Sandi Taylor, mother and daughter, operated a licensed daycare out of their home in Portales, New Mexico. In July 2017, Defendants used two SUVs to drive the twelve children under their care to a nearby park for lunch and playtime. Of the six children who were passengers in Sandi’s SUV, two of them, M.J. and A.L. (the Victims), were less than two years old, each riding in a car seat in the middle row of the SUV.

{5} Driving from the playground in separate vehicles, Defendants and all twelve children returned to the daycare shortly before 1:00 p.m., when the outdoor temperature was 91 degrees. Upon arrival, all four of the older children who were riding with Sandi and all six of the children who were riding with Mary exited their respective vehicles and went inside the daycare. Without noticing that the Victims were still seated in Sandi’s vehicle, both Defendants entered the daycare as well. Defendants remained there until Sandi, for reasons unrelated to the whereabouts of the Victims, returned to her vehicle over two-and-a-half hours later and found M.J. blue in color and unresponsive and A.L. limp and slouched over. Defendants immediately called the police and made diligent efforts to attend to the Victims, but their efforts were futile. Due to the Victims’ prolonged heat exposure, M.J. died, and A.L. suffered severe neurological injuries.

{6} The State charged each Defendant with reckless child abuse by endangerment resulting in M.J.’s death and reckless child abuse by endangerment resulting in great bodily harm to A.L., both of which are first-degree felonies under Section 30-6-1(D)(1), (E)-(F). The evidence at trial was undisputed in several respects. The State stipulated that Defendants did not intend to leave the Victims in Sandi’s vehicle, and responding police officers agreed that there were no signs that Defendants were aware that the Victims remained in the vehicle until Sandi returned to the vehicle. On this score, Sandi told police officers at the scene that both she and her mother believed the other had removed the Victims from the vehicle and brought them inside the daycare upon returning from the park.

{7} A videotape of Sandi’s police interview containing candid admissions was played for the jury in its entirety. During the interview, Sandi acknowledged both that she "forgot" the Victims in the vehicle and that Defendants did not follow their usual practice to do a headcount of the children at any time after returning to the daycare.

{8} The jury convicted each Defendant of reckless child abuse resulting in death and reckless child abuse resulting in great bodily harm. Each Defendant was sentenced to eighteen years for each count, totaling thirty-six years each. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a precedential opinion. See State v. Taylor, 2021-NMCA-033, ¶ 1, 493 P.3d 463. On certiorari review, we reverse the Court of Appeals, holding that the essential conduct elements of the jury instructions as given constitute reversible error because they would have confused or misdirected a reasonable juror.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Jury’s Elements Instructions

{9} Defendants contend reversible error resulted when the district court failed to properly identify the conduct or course of conduct alleged to be child abuse in the elements instruction. Specifically, Defendants argue that the instruction’s listing of the elements of essential conduct with an and/or conjunction provided for alternative ways for the jury to find that Defendants committed child abuse without requiring the jury to unanimously agree on any of those alternatives. Applying a de novo standard of review, we agree with Defendants.

[1–3] {10} "The propriety of jury instructions given or denied is a mixed question of law and fact" which we review de novo. State v. Salazar, 1997-NMSC-044, ¶ 49, 123 N.M. 778, 945 P.2d 996. As Defendants preserved each of the instructional issues now raised, "we review the instructions for reversible error," State v. Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134, a process which requires us to consider the "instructions as a whole, not singly, and … look to see whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected by the … instructions," State v. Munoz, 2006-NMSC- 005, ¶ 20, 139 N.M. 106, 129 P.3d 142 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[J]uror confusion or misdirection may stem not only from instructions that are facially contradictory or ambiguous, but from instructions which, through omission or misstatement, fail to provide the juror with an accurate rendition of the relevant law." Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134.

{11} The indictments are identical in how they allege Defendants committed child abuse. Pertinent here, Count 1 alleges each Defendant "left the child unattended in a heated vehicle, which resulted in the death of M.J.", and Count 2 alleges each Defendant "left the child unattended in a heated vehicle, which resulted in great bodily harm to A.L." At trial, the parties disagreed on how to describe the conduct required for the jury to find Defendants guilty of reckless child abuse. See UJI 14-615, -622 (requiring the court to "describe [the] conduct or course of conduct alleged to have been child abuse"). Defendants requested that the jury be required to find that Defendants left the Victims "unattended in a vehicle, exposed to unsafe temperatures, for a time period exceeding two hours." The State’s requested instruction, adopted fully by the district court, identified four different acts. The district court instructed the jury that to find Defendants guilty of reckless child abuse, it had to find that

[Defendants] did not follow the proper rules and procedures mandated by CYFD in conducting the care of [the Victims], including failing to do headcounts, driving [the Victims] without CYFD permission, failing to have [a] proper care giver to child ratio when [the Victims were] in [Defendants’] care, and/or failing to remove [the Victims] from a vehicle which resulted in [the Victims] being left unattended in that vehicle and exposed to unsafe temperatures for a time period of approximately two hours and 40 minutes.

(Emphases added.)

{12} As we explain next, the presence of and/or in the all-important conduct element of the essential-elements instructions confused and misdirected the jury and allowed it to make a finding of guilt on a legally inadequate basis.¹

{13} More than seventy-five years ago, this Court criticized the use of and/or in the context of jury instructions:

[T]he highly objectionable phrase "and/or" … has no place in pleadings, findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgments or decrees, and least of all in instructions to a jury. Instructions are intended to assist. Jurors in applying the law to the facts, and trial judges should put them in as simple language as possible, and not confuse them with this linguistic abomination.

State v. Smith, 1947-NMSC-048, ¶¶ 7-8, 51 N.M. 328, 184 P.2d 301 (involving the misuse of and/or in jury instructions that defined...