State v. Taylor G.

315 Conn. 734

110 A.3d 338

STATE of Connecticut

v.TAYLOR G.^*

No. 19222.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 16, 2014.

Decided March 17, 2015.

Mark Rademacher, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Robin S. Schwartz, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Michael Pepper, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.

Opinion

ZARELLA, J.

The defendant, Taylor G., appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a–70 (a)(2), one count of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a–73a (a)(1)(A), as amended by Public Acts 2007, No. 07–143, § 2, and one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53–21(a)(2), as amended by Public Acts 2007, No. 07–143, § 4. The defendant claims that (1) the trial court's imposition of the ten year mandatory minimum sentence for the first degree sexual assault conviction¹ and the five year mandatory minimum sentence for the risk of injury conviction,² even though the defendant was only fourteen and fifteen years old when he committed the crimes,³ violates the requirement under the eighth amendment to the United States constitution⁴ that a child offender receive a proportionate and individualized sentence from a sentencer empowered to consider and give effect to the mitigating qualities of the child's youth, (2) the state's expert witness improperly vouched for the credibility of the victim, C, and (3) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of sexual misconduct committed by the defendant when he was thirteen years old. The state responds that (1) the trial court considered the defendant's status as a juvenile offender when it imposed the mandatory minimum sentences, which were proportional to the crimes, (2) the state's expert witness did not vouch for C's credibility, and (3) the court properly admitted evidence of the defendant's sexual misconduct when he was thirteen years old. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On November 13, 2009, the defendant was arrested for sexually assaulting his cousin, C. The assaults occurred between July 17, 2007, and February, 2009, at the home of the defendant's mother in the city of New Haven and at the homes of the defendant's relatives in the town of Hamden. At the time of the assaults, the defendant was fourteen and fifteen years old, and C was six and seven years old. When C finally told his mother about the assaults, she immediately reported them to the police.

Due to the serious nature of the charges, the defendant's cases were transferred from the juvenile docket to the regular criminal docket pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–127 (a)(1).⁵ On June 5, 2012, following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of all three offenses. On November 2, 2012, while awaiting his sentence, the defendant filed a motion requesting a sentence below the mandatory minimums of ten years and five years, respectively, for first degree sexual assault and risk of injury to a child, claiming that imposition of the mandatory minimums for crimes he had committed when he was fourteen and fifteen years old would violate the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. On that date, the defendant also filed a motion for a new trial, claiming that the trial court improperly had admitted the testimony of an expert witness who impermissibly had vouched for C's credibility, which was critical to the outcome of the case. At a hearing in January, 2013, the trial court considered both motions. On February 27, 2013, the court denied the motion for a new trial, and, on March 12, 2013, it denied the motion to sentence the defendant below the mandatory minimums. On March 13, 2013, the court imposed a total effective sentence of ten years incarceration followed by three years of special parole.⁶ This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the ten and five year mandatory minimum sentences for first degree sexual assault and risk of injury to a child, respectively, when applied to a juvenile offender, violate the eighth amendment right to an individualized, proportionate sentence because the sentencing court is unable to consider and give effect to relevant mitigating evidence of the offender's youth and immaturity. The state rejects the defendant's claim on the ground that he overstates the scope of the governing federal law. We agree with the state.

The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this claim. In its memorandum of decision on the motion to sentence the defendant below the mandatory minimums, the court discussed the applicable federal law and concluded that the mandatory minimum sentences in the defendant's case “lack[ed] the severity necessary to be considered constitutionally disproportionate.” The court also concluded that the mandatory minimum sentences did not “strip the court of its ability to exercise broad discretion in fashioning an appropriate sentence.” The court explained that, “[f]or his three convictions, the defendant faces up to fifty-five ... years incarceration. The court may impose this maximum sentence, or may choose to impose a sentence considerably more lenient. In making that determination, the court may consider the mitigating effects of the defendant's youth, including ... a juvenile's diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.... The court thereby may ensure that the defendant receives the individualized sentencing consideration to which he is entitled.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

During the sentencing hearing on March 3, 2013, the court expressed reservations as to whether mandatory minimum sentences were appropriate in a juvenile setting, especially when an offender, like the defendant, was only fourteen and fifteen years old at the time he committed the crimes. The court observed that it appeared that the defendant had experienced abuse as a child, and that such a child sometimes becomes an abuser as an adult. The court also noted that, when the legislature enacted the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions, it was not contemplating fourteen year old offenders but, rather, offenders who were significantly older. The court nonetheless concluded: “I still feel duty bound under my role in our criminal justice system to follow the rules and the sentences the legislature has enacted. But to the extent that people have asked me to be as lenient as I can, that's what I'm being. I'm being as lenient as I can. I suspect not lenient enough in the view of those who spoke on [the defendant's] behalf, but, to quote what somebody said, I am being as lenient as I possibly can, but I think that's adequate punishment for an individual who commits crimes when he's fourteen years of age.” The court then sentenced the defendant to the mandatory minimum of ten years incarceration on the first degree sexual assault count followed by three years of special parole, one year incarceration on the fourth degree sexual assault count, and ten years incarceration, five of which were mandatory, on the risk of injury count. The court ordered that the latter two sentences be served concurrently with the first sentence, for a total effective sentence of ten years incarceration followed by three years of special parole.

The standard of review is well established. “A challenge to [t]he constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Keane v. Fischetti, 300 Conn. 395, 402, 13 A.3d 1089 (2011). With respect to the governing legal principles, the defendant relies on Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, –––U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), in which the United States Supreme Court established a series of rules to be applied in the sentencing of juvenile offenders.⁷

In explaining the evolution and development of these rules, the court in Miller began by noting that “[t]he [e]ighth [a]mendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions ... [and] flows from the basic precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to both the offender and the offense.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Alabama, supra, 132 S.Ct. at 2463. The court then described “two strands of precedent reflecting [its] concern with proportionate punishment.” Id. The first strand consisted of cases in which the court had “adopted categorical bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty.... Several of the cases in this group ... specially focused on juvenile offenders, because of their lesser culpability. Thus, Roper held that the [e]ighth [a]mendment bars capital punishment for children, and Graham concluded that the [a]mendment also prohibits a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a child who committed a nonhomicide offense. Graham further likened life without parole for juveniles to the death penalty itself, thereby evoking a second line of ... precedents. In those cases, [the court] ... prohibited mandatory imposition of capital punishment, requiring that sentencing authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before sentencing him to death.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks...