State v. Teasdale

364 Wis.2d 529

868 N.W.2d 200 (Table)

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent

v.Nathan Lewis TEASDALE, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 2015AP338–CR.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

June 25, 2015.

Opinion

¶ 1 KLOPPENBURG, J.¹

Nathan Teasdale appeals the judgment of conviction for Operating While Revoked contrary to Wis. Stat. § 343.44(1)(b). Teasdale argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because the traffic stop that led to his conviction was unlawful. The dispositive issue is whether the deputy's observation of Teasdale's vehicle and the registration plates displayed on it supported a reasonable suspicion that Teasdale was violating a traffic statute. The State asserts that the deputy's observation provided reasonable suspicion that Teasdale violated Wis. Stat. § 341.61(2), which imposes a forfeiture for displaying upon a vehicle registration plates not issued for that vehicle.² Teasdale contends that there is no reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop because there are “insufficient facts” to support the finding that the deputy made a reasonable mistake of fact as to the make and model of the vehicle that Teasdale was driving. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the deputy's mistake of fact was reasonable, and that the traffic stop was lawful based on the deputy's reasonable—even if mistaken—suspicion that Teasdale was violating Wis. Stat. § 341.61. Therefore, the judgment is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 The State charged Teasdale with operating a motor vehicle while his operating privileges were revoked, contrary to Wis. Stat . § 343.44(1)(b). Teasdale filed a suppression motion challenging the lawfulness of the traffic stop and the evidence subsequently obtained. Deputy Duane Jacobson provided the only testimony at the motion hearing. A video and audio recording from the deputy's squad car camera was admitted into evidence. The following is a summary of the undisputed facts leading up to Teasdale's arrest.

¶ 3 At approximately 7:15 p.m. on February 14, 2014, Deputy Jacobson was parked near a state highway in the Village of Livingston in Wisconsin and was “checking vehicle registrations” when he observed what he “believed to be a teal colored Pontiac Sunfire drive by.” The deputy checked the vehicle's registration and saw that the license plate displayed was registered to a red Chevrolet Cavalier. According to the deputy's report attached to the criminal complaint, the deputy “believed that the license plates displayed were not on the vehicle that they were registered to[ ].” The deputy then made the traffic stop.

¶ 4 The deputy testified that he told the driver, who identified himself as Teasdale, that he stopped the vehicle because the registration was to a red Chevrolet Cavalier. The deputy asked Teasdale to present his license. Teasdale responded that his license was suspended. The deputy then arrested Teasdale for operating a motor vehicle while his operating privileges were revoked. The deputy testified that he did not know the vehicle was actually a Chevrolet Cavalier, as opposed to a Pontiac Sunfire, until after he returned to his squad car.

¶ 5 The circuit court found that the deputy made a reasonable mistake of fact and concluded that the traffic stop was lawful. Accordingly, the circuit court denied Teasdale's motion to suppress evidence obtained after the traffic stop.

DISCUSSION

¶ 6 The dispositive issue here is whether the deputy's observations of Teasdale's vehicle and the registration plates displayed on it supported a reasonable suspicion that Teasdale was violating a traffic statute. As we explain below, we answer this question in the affirmative and conclude that the traffic stop was lawful such that the circuit court properly denied Teasdale's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the traffic stop.

Standard of Review

¶ 7 This court analyzes the denial of a suppression motion under a two-part standard of review: we uphold the circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we independently review whether those facts warrant suppression. State v. Conner, 2012 WI App 105, ¶ 15, 344 Wis.2d 233, 821 N.W.2d 267. “We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess the witnesses' credibility, but will search the record for evidence that supports findings the [circuit] court made, not for findings it could have made but did not.” Dickman v. Vollmer, 2007 WI App 141, ¶ 14, 303 Wis.2d 241, 736 N.W.2d 202.

¶ 8 “Whether there is probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle is a question of constitutional fact.” State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶ 10, 317 Wis.2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569. The ultimate question of “whether the facts as found by the [circuit] court meet the constitutional standard” is reviewed de novo. State v. Hindsley, 2000 WI App 130, ¶ 22, 237 Wis.2d 358, 614 N.W.2d 48.

Reasonable Suspicion to Support Traffic Stop

¶ 9 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution offer protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.³ “ ‘The temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a seizure of persons within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.’ “ Popke, 317 Wis.2d 118, ¶ 11, 765 N.W.2d 569 (quoted source omitted). “If the seizure is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional, then evidence obtained as a result is generally inadmissible.” State v. Brown, 2014 WI 69, ¶ 19, 355 Wis.2d 668, 850 N.W.2d 66.

¶ 10 A traffic stop is reasonable if supported by probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred or by reasonable suspicion that a violation has been or will be committed. Popke, 317 Wis.2d 118, ¶ 11, 765 N.W.2d 569. The United States Supreme Court has “recognized that searches and seizures based on mistakes of fact can be reasonable.” Heien v. North Carolina, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 530, 536, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014). “The limiting factor is that ‘the mistakes must be those of reasonable men.’ “ Id. (quoted source omitted). “The determination of reasonableness is a common sense test.” State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶ 13, 301 Wis.2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634. “The reasonableness of a stop is determined based on the totality of the facts and circumstances.” Id.

¶ 11 In this case, there are no factual disputes arising out of the deputy's testimony. Implicit in the circuit court's finding that there was a reasonable mistake of fact is that the court found the deputy's testimony credible. See State v. Echols, 175 Wis.2d 653, 672–73, 499 N.W.2d 631 (1993) (“When a [circuit] court does not expressly make a finding necessary to support its legal conclusion, an appellate court can assume that the [circuit] court made the finding in the way that supports its decision.”). We accept the circuit court's credibility determination as it is not patently incredible. See Dickman, 303 Wis.2d 241, ¶ 14, 736 N.W.2d 202 (“Because it is for the [circuit] court to resolve conflicts in the testimony, we will uphold its calls as to witness credibility unless they are inherently or patently incredible, and we will not second-guess the [circuit] court's reasonable factual inferences.”).

¶ 12 As noted above, the deputy testified that he made the traffic stop because the license plate on Teasdale's vehicle was registered to a red Chevrolet Cavalier and that, based upon his observation from a distance of three car lengths away at approximately 7:15 at night, he believed the vehicle was a teal Pontiac Sunfire. The deputy testified that his focus, after checking the license plate registration, was on the three occupants in the vehicle, and that he did not know that the vehicle was actually a Chevrolet Cavalier, rather than a Pontiac Sunfire, until he later returned to his squad car. The deputy confirmed that he believed the Chevrolet Cavalier and the Pontiac Sunfire look similar.

¶ 13 Teasdale does not present any evidence discrediting the deputy's reasonable belief that the car he observed was not the same car to which the registration...