State v. Thomas

1

STATE OF MARYLAND v. STEVEN ANTHONY THOMAS

No. 15-2023

Maryland Supreme Court

August 29, 2024

Argued: February 5, 2024

Circuit Court for Charles County Case No.: 08-K-02-000568

Fader, C.J., Watts, ^[*] Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ.

OPINION

Gould, J.

At common law, the circuit court's power to revise a sentence expired at the end of the term in which the sentence was imposed. State v. Schlick (Schlick II), 465 Md. 566, 574 (2019). The harshness of this common-law rule was ameliorated in 1951, when this Court adopted the predecessor to today's Rule 4-345(e). See id. at 574 (citing Part 4, Rule 10(c) of the Maryland General Rules of Practice and Procedure (1951)); Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 29, 40 (1975). Since then, this rule has been substantively amended four times to expand or contract the circuit court's authority to modify a sentence. Today, Rule 4-345(e) authorizes the circuit court to modify a sentence upon a motion that is filed within 90 days after the sentence was imposed. But the rule also imposes an expiration date for the court's authority: A circuit court "may not revise the sentence after the expiration of five years from the date the sentence originally was imposed on the defendant[.]" Md. Rule 4-345(e)(1).

Here, during the five-year period after Petitioner Steven Anthony Thomas's sentence was imposed, the court neither formally denied nor granted his timely motion to reduce his sentence, notwithstanding his multiple requests for a hearing. The court did, however, consider the motion during that period. After the five-year period expired, the circuit court held a hearing and concluded that it lacked the authority to revise the sentence. Relying on Schlick v. State (Schlick I), 238 Md.App. 681 (2018), the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, holding that the circuit court retained fundamental jurisdiction to decide the motion even though the five-year period had expired.

We disagree with the Appellate Court and reverse. In doing so, we overrule Schlick I.

I

A

In 2002, Mr. Thomas was indicted in the Circuit Court for Charles County for three alleged hotel robberies that occurred over two days. Mr. Thomas pleaded guilty to two counts of armed robbery and one count of second-degree burglary. His plea agreement called for a within-guidelines sentence and required the State to nolle prosequi the remaining charges.

At that time, Mr. Thomas had already been sentenced to 15 years of incarceration in an unrelated case. On May 15, 2003, the court sentenced him to 20 years of incarceration for the first armed robbery count, consecutive to the sentence in the unrelated case. For the second armed robbery count, the court sentenced him to 20 years of incarceration, consecutive to the sentence for the first armed robbery count. For the second-degree burglary count, the court sentenced him to 15 years of incarceration, concurrent with the sentence for the second armed robbery count. All told, the sentences in this case aggregated to 40 years of incarceration.

B

Mr. Thomas petitioned for postconviction relief in 2013. On December 3, 2014, based on an agreement between Mr. Thomas and the State, the circuit court reduced Mr. Thomas's sentence on the first armed robbery count to 12½ years, but left the other sentences intact. That resentencing triggered anew Mr. Thomas's right under Rule 4-345(e) to move for a modification of his sentence. Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 431-33 (1997). The new five-year period expired on December 3, 2019.

In early 2015, while represented by counsel, Mr. Thomas timely moved to modify his sentence under Rule 4-345(e). Among other things, he emphasized his remorse, good behavior as an inmate, participation in individual and group therapy, and participation in vocational programs and workshops. Mr. Thomas concluded his motion with a request for a hearing to present additional supportive information. About four months later, the court (Bragunier, J.) entered an order stating that "[u]pon consideration of" Mr. Thomas's motion, the motion would "be HELD IN ABEYANCE."

On September 7, 2017, Mr. Thomas's counsel supplemented his motion to "inform the court of his additional progress and [to] respectfully request[] that a hearing now be scheduled on" the motion. The supplement acknowledged that the court had entered an order holding his initial motion in abeyance. This time, 22 days later, the court (Greer, J.), entered "NOTED. NO ACTION" on the first page of the supplemental motion.

One year later, on September 21, 2018, Mr. Thomas's counsel again supplemented his motion and requested a hearing. The supplement elaborated on Mr. Thomas's progress and alerted the court to the "5 year time limit for which the court has jurisdiction to take action," which was then just over one year away. The supplement acknowledged that the court held Mr. Thomas's initial motion in abeyance and that it took no action on his September 2017 supplement. On October 18, 2018, the court (Greer, J.) entered "NOTED. NO ACTION" on the first page of the motion. Five days later, the State opposed Mr. Thomas's motion.

One year later, on August 9, 2019, Mr. Thomas's counsel again supplemented his motion and requested a hearing. The supplement again alerted the court to the approaching deadline of "December [3], 2019," when the court would lose jurisdiction under Rule 4-345(e). The supplement further acknowledged that Mr. Thomas's initial motion was held in abeyance, that the court took no action on his initial supplement, and that Mr. Thomas had filed a second supplemental motion. On December 6, just days after the five-year period ended, the court (Greer, J.) entered "NOTED. NO ACTION" on the first page of the motion.

On January 8, 2021, Mr. Thomas, this time acting pro se, again supplemented his motion and requested a hearing. On January 26, 2021, the court (Greer, J.) entered "SET FOR HEARING" on the first page of the motion. The State opposed the motion, arguing that the court no longer had authority to rule on the motion under Rule 4-345(e), as the five-year deadline had passed.

A hearing was held on June 16, 2021. Mr. Thomas was represented by counsel. The court heard argument on whether the court had the authority to reduce his sentence after the expiration of the five-year period under Rule 4-345(e). The court concluded that it had no such authority and denied the motion.

C

Mr. Thomas appealed. In an unreported opinion, the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed and remanded the case "so that the court, in the exercise of its discretion, can decide whether to deny [Mr. Thomas's] motion without a hearing, or to hold a hearing and then to decide whether to deny or to grant" his motion. Thomas v. State, No. 657, Sept. Term 2021, 2023 WL 3300896, at *7 (Md.App. Ct. May 8, 2023). In doing so, the court applied Schlick I, which held that the circuit court retained fundamental jurisdiction over a timely-filed Rule 4-345(e) motion after the expiration of the five-year period. Id. at *3.

The State petitioned for a writ of certiorari, and Mr. Thomas cross-petitioned. We granted both petitions. State v. Thomas, 486 Md. 95 (2023). The State and Mr. Thomas each present one question, both of which we have rephrased:

The State's Question Presented: May the circuit court decide the merits of a Maryland Rule 4-345(e) motion for modification of a sentence more than five years after the sentence was imposed?

Mr. Thomas's Question Presented: When a defendant timely moves for a sentence modification under Rule 4-345(e) and requests a hearing on the motion, must the trial court manifest an exercise of its discretion by either denying the motion without a hearing or holding a hearing to determine whether to grant the motion?

We answer both questions in the negative.

II

A

These two questions require this Court to construe the text of Rule 4-345(e) and examine the common law constraints on the circuit court's revisory power over its judgments. These are legal issues that we review without deference. Schlick II, 465 Md. at 573; Davis v Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604 (2004).

B

Subsection (e)(1) of Maryland Rule 4-345 provides:

Upon a motion filed within 90 days after imposition of a sentence (A) in the District Court, if an appeal has not been perfected or has been dismissed, and (B) in a circuit court whether or not an appeal has been filed, the court has revisory power over the sentence except that it may not revise the sentence after the expiration of five years from the date the sentence originally was imposed on the defendant and it may not increase the sentence.

The State argues that subsection (e)(1)(B) means what it says: The circuit court "may not revise the sentence after the expiration of five years from the date the sentence originally was imposed on the defendant[.]" The State insists that the phrase "may not" imposes a mandatory restriction on the court's power to modify a sentence.

As Mr Thomas sees it, the State's interpretation adheres to the rule's plain language only "on a superficial level and produces an unreasonable outcome-one that is inconsistent with the legislative scheme." He argues that since Rule 4-345(e)(1) grants the circuit court discretion to modify a sentence within the five-year period, a strict reading of its text would "require trial courts to exercise their discretion on timely motions for sentence modification within the five years where a hearing has been requested on the motion." He contends that, his best efforts notwithstanding, the court let the five-year period lapse without considering his motion; that is, the court failed to exercise discretion. So, according to Mr. Thomas, "[t]o interpret Rule 4-345(e) correctly, and leniently in the...