State v. Thompson

942 N.W.2d 350

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v. Stafon Edward THOMPSON , Appellant.

A19-0717

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: April 29, 2020

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Rachel Moran, University of St. Thomas Legal Services Clinic, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant.

OPINION

McKEIG, Justice.

Appellant Stafon Edward Thompson appeals from a state district court order that revised his sentence from two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of release to two consecutive terms of life with the possibility of release after 30 years. According to Thompson, when the federal district court partially granted his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remanded for resentencing, the state district court should have held a hearing on the issue of whether his sentences should be served consecutively. Because the language of the federal district court’s order indicated a limited remand, the state district court did not abuse its discretion when it strictly followed the terms of the remand order. We therefore affirm.

FACTS

In 2009, after a 3-week trial, a Hennepin County jury found Stafon Edward Thompson guilty of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2018), for the brutal killings of Katricia Daniels and her 10-year-old son, Robert Shepard. The 2009 sentencing statutes mandated that Thompson be sentenced to life without the possibility of release (LWOR). See Minn. Stat. § 609.106, subd. 2(1) (2008). The district court did not order a presentence investigation or hear any argument on the issue of consecutive sentencing. The district court heard eight victim-impact statements and asked Thompson if he would like to address the court, but Thompson declined. In accordance with Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 2.F.2.a(1)(ii), the district court ordered that Thompson serve two LWOR sentences consecutively. We affirmed Thompson’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. State v. Thompson , 788 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. 2010).

Two years after we affirmed Thompson’s convictions and sentences, the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory LWOR sentences for juvenile homicide offenders violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). After Miller , qualifying juvenile homicide offenders could challenge the duration of their confinement as unconstitutional by a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2018).¹

In 2013, Thompson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, claiming that he was incarcerated in violation of the Constitution.² He asked the federal district court to "[r]everse the sentence imposed" and remand to the state district court for resentencing. The federal district court dismissed the petition and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Thompson v. Roy , No. 13-CV-1524 (PJS/JJK), 2014 WL 1234498, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 25, 2014), aff'd , 793 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. granted , judgment vacated , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1375, 194 L.Ed.2d 355 (2016). Thompson petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.

While Thompson’s petition was pending, the Supreme Court held that the rule announced in Miller applies retroactively. Montgomery v. Louisiana , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) ; see also Jackson v. State , 883 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Minn. 2016) (acknowledging that Montgomery "holds that the Miller rule applies retroactively"). The Court remanded Thompson’s case to the Eighth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 735, and the Eighth Circuit remanded to the federal district court, Thompson v. Roy , 641 F. App'x 681, 682 (8th Cir. 2016).

On remand, a federal magistrate judge recommended that Thompson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus be granted in part and denied in part. More specifically, the magistrate judge recommended that the sentence vacatur be "limited" to the "without possibility of release provision" of Thompson’s sentences, as opposed to "a complete reversal of [his] sentences." Thompson v. Roy , No. 13-CV-1524 (PJS/HB), 2016 WL 7242566, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 23, 2016), adopted by 2016 WL 7231599 (D. Minn. Dec. 14, 2016). After conducting a de novo review of the record, the federal district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation "in its entirety," vacated the "without possibility of release" provision of Thompson’s sentences, remanded to Hennepin County District Court for resentencing, and denied the petition "in all other respects." Thompson , 2016 WL 7231599, at *1.

A hearing before the Hennepin County District Court was scheduled. The district court deferred the hearing because of our pending decisions in State v. Ali , 895 N.W.2d 237 (Minn. 2017), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 640, 199 L.Ed.2d 543 (2018) and Flowers v. State , 907 N.W.2d 901 (Minn.), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 194, 202 L.Ed.2d 120 (2018). After we decided Ali and Flowers , the district court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether a hearing was required on the issue of whether the sentences should be served consecutively.

After discussing federal habeas corpus principles, federal and state case law on juvenile offender sentencing, and the federal district court order, the district court concluded that the federal district court had ordered a limited remand and therefore determined that a hearing on the issue of whether the sentences should be served consecutively was beyond the scope of the remand order. The district court cancelled all further hearings, mooted all pending motions, and, without a resentencing hearing, revised Thompson’s sentence to two consecutive terms of life with the possibility of release after 30 years.³ This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

This case presents two issues. First, whether the district court erred in concluding that the language of the federal district court order indicated a limited remand. Second, whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the issue of whether Thompson’s sentences should be served consecutively was beyond the scope of the remand order. We consider each issue in turn.

I.

We have previously said that trial courts generally have "broad discretion to determine how to proceed on remand." Dobbins v. State , 845 N.W.2d 148, 156 (Minn. 2013) (citing Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, LLP , 704 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Minn. 2005)). But we have also said that, "[o]n remand, it is the duty of the district court to execute the mandate of [the remanding court] strictly according to its terms." State v. Roman Nose , 667 N.W.2d 386, 394 (Minn. 2003). These statements reflect the distinction between two types of remand: general and limited.

The distinction between general and limited remands is well recognized in the federal courts. For example, in United States v. Campbell , the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained that:

Remands ... can be either general or limited in scope. Limited remands explicitly outline the issues to be addressed by the district court and create a narrow framework within which the district court must operate. General remands, in contrast, give district courts authority to address all matters as long as remaining consistent with the remand.

168 F.3d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Walker , 918 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2019) (discussing general and limited remands); United States v. Malki , 718 F.3d 178, 182–83 (2nd Cir. 2013) (same); United States v. Young , 66 F.3d 830, 835–37 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Klump , 57 F.3d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1995) ("This court’s remand was general, not limited."). "A general remand permits the district court to redo the entire sentencing process, including considering new evidence and issues." United States v. McFalls , 675 F.3d 599, 604 (6th Cir. 2012). "A limited remand, by comparison, does not allow a de novo resentencing and instead constrains the district court’s authority to the issue or issues adjudicated." Id.

According to the federal courts, the issue of whether a remand order is general or limited is a legal question that is reviewed de novo. See, e.g. , United States v. Watson , 189 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999) ("The scope of the remand is a question of law that we review de novo. "). When determining whether a remand is general or limited, federal courts consider the remand language in the context of an entire opinion or order. See Campbell , 168 F.3d at 266–67 ; United States v. Parker , 101 F.3d 527, 528 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he scope of the remand is determined not by formula, but by inference from the opinion as a whole."). For example, in United States v. Patterson , the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that a remand was limited because the opinion as a whole focused solely on one aspect of sentencing. 147 F.3d 736, 737 (8th Cir. 1998).

Although we have not previously used the terms "general" and "limited" when discussing remand orders, our statements in Dobbins and Roman Nose implicitly reflect the well-reasoned distinction between general and limited remands drawn by the federal appellate courts. We are also persuaded that the issue of whether a remand order is general or limited is a legal question that should be reviewed de novo.

Having clarified the relevant legal standards, we turn to the language of the federal district court’s remand order to determine whether it involved a general or limited remand. The federal district court order adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation "in its entirety." The report...