State v. Todd

233 N.E.3d 181

2023-Ohio-4847

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Casey TODD, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 20AP-587, No. 20AP-588

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Rendered on December 29, 2023

APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, (C.P.C. No. 97CR-6191), (C.P.C. No. 98CR-0033).

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert for appellant. Argued: Seth L. Gilbert.

On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and Robert D. Essex, Columbus, for appellee. Argued: Robert D. Essex.

DECISION

MENTEL, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, filed a motion seeking a nunc pro tunc entry from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas stating the sex offender classification of defendant-appellee, Casey Todd, arguing that its omission from his judgments of conviction was a clerical error. The trial court denied the state’s motion and granted Mr. Todd’s petition challenging his sex offender reclassification. As explained below, the trial court’s rulings were not erroneous, although some of its reasoning was. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

{¶ 2} On November 7, 1997, the state filed an indictment against Mr. Todd alleging seven counts of rape under R.C. 2907.02, with six counts carrying sexually violent predator specifications under R.C. 2941.148. (Nov. 7, 1997 Indictment, Case No. 97CR-6191 (hereinafter, "Case No. 6191.")) The counts alleged that Mr. Todd had inflicted multiple sexual acts by force or threat of force on a minor victim over a period of years when the victim was aged nine to thirteen. Id. Two months later, the state filed another indictment alleging fourteen counts of rape committed by Mr. Todd, eight with sexually violent predator specifications. (Jan. 6, 1998 Indictment, Case No. 98CR-0033 (hereinafter, "Case No. 33.")) The victim was another minor who was six and seven years old on the offense dates. Id.

{¶ 3} Mr. Todd entered into plea agreements with the state to resolve the charges. In Case No. 6191, he pled guilty to one first degree felony count of rape with no violent sexual predator specification and, in lieu of one other rape count, he pled guilty to the lesser included offense of gross sexual imposition under R.C. 2907.05, a third degree felony. In Case No. 33, he pled guilty to one first degree felony count of rape absent a violent predator specification. He agreed to serve a ten-year prison sentence for each rape conviction, to be served concurrently, and he agreed to a term of probation for the gross sexual imposition conviction. (July 14, 1999 Entry of Guilty Plea, Case No. 6191; July 14, 1999 Entry of Guilty Plea, Case No. 33.) Both plea agreements noted Mr. Todd’s stipulation to be classified as a sexual predator under Megan’s Law, the then-current sexual offender registry notification ("SORN") law. See Former R.C. 2950.09, repealed in 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10.

{¶ 4} The trial court’s judgment in Case No. 6191 stated that it had "found the Defendant guilty of the charge to which the plea was entered" and sentenced Mr. Todd to ten years imprisonment on the rape charge, to run concurrently with the sentence in Case No. 33. (July 14, 1999 Jgmt. Entry, Case No. 6191 at 1.) The judgment made no mention of the gross sexual imposition charge from the plea agreement or Mr. Todd’s stipulation to the sexual predator classification. Id. The judgment in Case No. 33 stated that the trial court had accepted Mr. Todd’s plea, found him guilty of the offense of rape, and imposed a ten-year prison term to run concurrently with the sentence in Case No. 6191. (July 14,1999 Jgmt. Entry, Case No. 33.) A year later, the trial court entered a "Corrected Judgment Entry" stating that five years of the sentence was mandatory. (Aug. 10, 2000 Corrected Jgmt. Entry, Case No. 33.) However, as in Case No. 6191, the entry made no mention of Mr. Todd’s sexual offender classification under Megan’s Law.

{¶ 5} Megan’s Law had two statutorily defined sex offender classifications: "habitual sex offender" and "sexual predator." See Former R.C. 2950.01(B) (defining "ha- bitual sex offender" as "a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexually oriented offense and who previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to one or more sexually oriented offenses") and R.C. 2950.01(E) (defining a "sexual predator" as "a person who has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to committing a sexually oriented offense and is likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented offenses"). The sentencing judge was required to conduct a hearing and consider a number of statutory factors to classify the defendant as a sexual predator. Former R.C. 2950.09(B). The habitual sex offender classification depended on the defendant’s criminal history and could also attach to a defendant classified as a sexual predator. Former R.C. 2950.09(E).

{¶ 6} Another category, "sexually oriented offender," applied to a defendant who had committed what qualified as a "sexually oriented offense" under Megan’s Law but otherwise did "not fit the description of either habitual sex offender or sexual predator." State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 407, 700 N.E.2d 570 (1998), superseded by statute as recognized in State v. Williams, 114 Ohio St.3d 103, 2007-Ohio-3268, 868 N.E.2d 969, ¶ 9. The "sexually oriented offender" classification was "the least restrictive designation" under Megan’s Law. State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 502, ¶ 9. For a defendant who was "neither a habitual sex offender nor a sexual predator, the sexually oriented offender designation attache[d] as a matter of law." Id., paragraph two of the syllabus. Upon conviction for a sexually oriented offense under Megan’s Law, a defendant was "automatically classified as a sexually oriented offender" and subject to the registration and notification requirements applicable to that classification. Id. at ¶ 15. See also State v. Zerla, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-1087, 2005-Ohio-5077, 2005 WL 2365174, ¶ 7 (applying Hayden and holding that the "defendant’s status as a sexually oriented offender arose by operation of law, and not as a result of the trial court’s * * * judgment," as "the trial court plays no role in the imposition of the sexually oriented offender designation").

{¶ 7} Megan’s Law was repealed in 2007 with the passage of Senate Bill 10, the Adam Walsh Act ("AWA"). The General Assembly passed the AWA in order to comply with the requirements of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, P.L. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, a federal statute that "created national standards for sex-offender registration, community notification, and classification." State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 18-20 (describing passage of the AWA and its federal counterpart). Unlike Megan’s Law, the AWA does not rely on any judicial determination of a defendant’s sex offender classification. "Instead, offenders are classified as Tier I, Tier II, or Tier III sex offenders (or child-victim offenders) based solely on the offender’s offense." Id. at ¶ 21. The AWA directed the Attorney General to reclassify offenders with a previous Megan’s Law classification under the new law’s tier system and notify them by mail of them new classification before its effective date. R.C. 2950.031(A). The AWA also provided offenders with the "right [to] a court hearing to contest" the Attorney General’s reclassification. R.C. 2950.031(E).

{¶ 8} Against these changes in Ohio’s SORN laws, Mr. Todd was released from prison in 2007 and, with no mention of a judicially determined classification in the judgment entries of his criminal cases, was classified by operation of law as a sexually oriented offender. (Nov. 5, 2020 Supp. to Def.’s Petition to Contest Reclassification at 2.) Under Megan’s Law, a sexually oriented offender had to comply with the registration and notification requirements for ten years. Former R.C. 2950.07(B)(3). After receiving notification from the Attorney General that he was to be reclassified as a Tier III sex offender under the AWA, a classification that carries a lifetime registration requirement under R.C. 2950.07(B)(1), Mr. Todd filed a petition under R.C. 2950.031(E) to contest the reclassification on July 24, 2008. He argued that the Tier III reclassification under the AWA was unconstitutional under the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution because it violated his right to due process, subjected him to double jeopardy, and was being applied retroactively. (July 24, 2008 Def.’s Petition to Contest Reclassification.) As relief, he requested orders from the trial court declaring the AWA unconstitutional as applied to him, as well as an order declaring that he "shall be subject only to those requirements and sanctions contemplated and agreed upon by the parties at the time of his plea agreement, guilty plea and sentencing, and only to those understood and voluntarily agreed to by him at the time of his plea agreement, guilty plea and sentencing."¹ Id. at 4-5. Nearly a year later, the state filed a motion for leave to file a memorandum opposing the petition. The state argued that the AWA was constitutional as applied to Mr. Todd and noted that he had stipulated to his "status as a sexual predator" by referencing the plea agreements he had signed. (July 1, 2009 Mot. for Leave to File Memo Opp. Petition Contesting Reclassification at 2.)

[1] {¶ 9} For the next eleven years, the trial court did not rule on Mr. Todd’s petition. During this time, a number of cases challenged the constitutionality of the AWA. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that its automatic reclassification provisions, R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032, violated the doctrine of separation of powers because they authorized the executive branch to reopen final judgments and reclassify offenders who had already been subject to judicial classification under Megan’s Law. Bodyke at paragraphs one and two of...