State v. Topolski

303 A.3d 338

STATE of Delaware, v. Justin M. TOPOLSKI, Defendant.

I.D. Nos. 1906017002 & 1906016532

Superior Court of Delaware.

Submitted: March 16, 2023

Decided: June 27, 2023

Corrected: June 28, 2023

Stephen Welch, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for the State.

John R. Garey, Esquire, John R. Garey, PA, Dover, Delaware, for Defendant.

OPINION

Primos, J.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Justin Topolski (hereinafter "Mr. Topolski") has been in state custody for over four years, i.e., since June 25, 2019. ¹ For most of that time, he has been held at the Delaware Psychiatric Center (hereinafter the "DPC") pending efforts to restore his competency to stand trial. For the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated February 7, 2023, it appears unlikely that he will become competent to stand trial in the foreseeable future, if ever. ² The question now before this Court is whether Mr. Topolski's continued detention is authorized by Delaware law, and if so, whether such detention is consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana .³ For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Mr. Topolski's continued detention is authorized by Delaware statute until the Court "is satisfied that the public safety will not be endangered" by his release. ⁴ Nevertheless, indefinite detention under that standard violates Mr. Topolski's right to equal protection of the law by denying him the procedural protections, and burden-of-proof benefits, of a civil commitment proceeding. Having found this continued detention unconstitutional, the Court requires expedited supplemental briefing on the next procedural steps to bring about Mr. Topolski's release from custody.

BACKGROUND

I. Statutory Background

In 1972, as part of a broader revision to the Delaware criminal code, the General Assembly enacted the original versions of the statutory provisions governing Mr. Topolski's commitment— 11 Del. C. §§ 403 and 404. In its initial form, 11 Del. C. § 403 applied only to people found not guilty by reason of insanity (hereinafter "insanity acquittees"). It provided that upon such acquittal, an insanity acquittee "shall forthwith be committed to the Delaware State Hospital" and kept there "until the Superior Court of the county wherein the case was tried is satisfied that the public safety will not be endangered by his release." ⁵

At the same time, the General Assembly enacted the original 11 Del. C. § 404 to govern pre-trial procedure for criminal defendants who are found incompetent to stand trial. ⁶ It provided that "the Court may order the accused person to be confined and treated in the Delaware State Hospital until he is capable of standing trail [sic]." ⁷ However, the legislature enacted one mechanism for an accused to avoid continued detention absent restoration to competency—the defendant could move the Court to "conduct a hearing to determine whether the State can make out a prima facie case against the defendant, and if the State fails to present sufficient evidence to constitute a prima facie case, the Court shall dismiss the charge." ⁸

Just under a month before the General Assembly enacted these provisions, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a constitutional challenge to the indefinite pre-trial commitment of an incompetent defendant in Jackson v. Indiana . ⁹ The Indiana statute at issue permitted the state to hold a defendant in custody indefinitely solely on the basis of his incompetency to stand trial, even though that defendant had been found to have very dim prospects of competency restoration. ¹⁰ The Supreme Court found both an equal protection and a due process violation, holding that "a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future." ¹¹ Otherwise, "the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant." ¹² Most states have since updated their statutes or court rules authorizing detention of incompetent defendants to institute time limits for detention, periodic review of the individual's prognosis for competency restoration, or other limiting features consistent with the holding in Jackson . ¹³

In 1979, an insanity acquittee challenged his commitment under 11 Del. C. § 403, citing Jackson to argue that such commitment, without the procedural steps required by Delaware's generally applicable civil commitment statute, violated his right to equal protection. ¹⁴ The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this argument, explaining that

insanity acquitees have performed acts which, but for the existence of a mental disease or defect that [sic] the time of the acts, would otherwise have subjected them to criminal sanctions. These past criminal acts are sufficient to justify the procedural differences in initial commitment between the two groups. ¹⁵

Moreover, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the analogy to Jackson , noting that the U.S. Supreme Court had not addressed "the constitutional validity of procedures for initial commitment of an insanity acquitee." ¹⁶ In addition to upholding the acquittee's initial commitment, the court found no equal protection violation in denying insanity acquittees the same "administrative release procedure" afforded to people civilly committed to the Delaware State Hospital. ¹⁷

In 1985, several years after Lewis was decided, the General Assembly amended 11 Del. C. § 403(b) by adding a cross-reference to Section 404 (among other provisions). ¹⁸ As a result of the cross-reference, Section 403 ’s standard of release applies to incompetent defendants confined at the DPC, providing a potential avenue for release separate from the prima facie hearing provided under Section 404(a). To the Court's knowledge, for reasons unknown, no release hearing has ever been held pursuant to Section 403 to test the appropriateness of continued confinement of an incompetent defendant.

In operation, Sections 403 and 404 have remained largely the same since 1985. Thus, at present, Section 404(a) provides that an incompetent criminal defendant may "be confined and treated in the Delaware Psychiatric Center until the accused person is capable of standing trial." ¹⁹ Upon the defendant's motion, the court may conduct a hearing "to determine whether the State can make out a prima facie case against the defendant, and if the State fails to present sufficient evidence to constitute a prima facie case, the court shall dismiss the charge." ²⁰ Otherwise, an incompetent person remains at the DPC unless eligible for release pursuant to Section 403(b), i.e., unless the Court "is satisfied that the public safety will not be endangered by the patient's release." ²¹ Despite the holding in Jackson , both statutes remain silent regarding defendants who appear unlikely to be restored to competency in the foreseeable future.

II. Civil Commitment in Delaware

Like most states, Delaware provides a mechanism for the involuntary commitment of mentally ill individuals who pose a danger to themselves or to others, without the involvement of the criminal justice system. The requirements and procedure for civil commitment are set forth in 16 Del. C. ch. 50. Specifically, 16 Del. C. § 5011 requires the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the individual is a person with a "mental condition"; ²² (2) based upon manifest indications, the individual is "dangerous to self" or "dangerous to others"; (3) any less restrictive alternatives "have been considered and determined to be clinically inappropriate"; and (4) the individual "has declined voluntarily inpatient treatment, or lacks the capacity to knowingly and voluntarily consent to inpatient treatment." ²³ A person is considered "dangerous to others" when "by reason of mental condition there is a substantial likelihood that the person will inflict serious bodily harm upon another person within the immediate future." ²⁴ "Serious bodily harm" is defined as "physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, significant and prolonged disfigurement, significant impairment of health, or significant impairment of the function of any bodily organ." ²⁵

A person involuntarily committed is entitled to written notice, a judicial hearing, representation by counsel, discovery, a full record of the proceedings, and a right to appeal. ²⁶ A court order for involuntary commitment cannot exceed three months, at which point a new hearing with all the same procedural protections is required in order to justify continued commitment. ²⁷ Moreover, whenever "the hospital determines that the involuntary patient no longer meets the criteria for provisional admission or involuntary inpatient commitment, the hospital shall so certify in writing and immediately discharge the person and advise the court of its determination and the discharge." ²⁸ In other words, the DPC staff may discharge an involuntary civil committee based on their professional judgment, without further court involvement. ²⁹

III. Commitment Under Section 403

On its face, the operative phrase "the public safety will not be endangered by the patient's release" sheds little light on the substantive standard for release under Section 403. Case law construing this provision in the not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity context, however, clarifies the meaning of this standard.

First, the Delaware Supreme Court in Lewis looked to the definitions in the involuntary commitment statute for guidance in construing the public safety standard. ³⁰ At the time, the court construed the phrase to mean "that...