State v. Toulouse

418 Mont. 1

STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.CHRISTOPHER I TOULOUSE, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 21-0614.

Submitted on Briefs August 6, 2024.

Decided August 27, 2024.

2024 MT 184.

418 Mont. 1.

__ P.3d __.

Appeal from the District Court of Missoula County.

Fourth Judicial District Court, Cause No. DC-2020-189.

Honorable John W. Larson, Judge.

The district court erred because it issued an illegal sentence upon revocation by imposing a longer term of imprisonment than the original suspended sentence, in violation of Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-203(7)(a)(iii). Defendant’s revocation sentence of 15 years exceeded the 10-year term of his original suspended sentences and therefore violated the statute.

Reversed.

JUSTICE RICE dissented, joined by JUSTICES BAKER and SHEA.

For Appellant: Mark S. Hilario, Attorney at Law, Billings.

For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Brad Fjeldheim, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Matthew C. Jennings, Missoula County Attorney, Brian C. Lowney, Deputy County Attorney, Missoula.

JUSTICE GUSTAFSON delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Defendant and Appellant Christopher I. Toulouse (Toulouse) appeals from the October 10, 2021 Judgment issued by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County.

¶2 We address the following restated issue on appeal:

Whether the District Court issued an illegal sentence upon revocation.

¶3 We reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4 In April 2020, Toulouse was charged with misdemeanor partner or family member assault (PFMA), felony intimidation, felony stalking, and misdemeanor violation of a no contact order stemming from a series of harassing incidents directed towards his ex-girlfriend, L.J., with whom he has two children. In August 2020, pursuant to a plea agreement, Toulouse pled guilty to the PFMA, intimidation, and stalking charges, and the State dismissed the violation of a no contact charge. The plea agreement called for Toulouse to receive a 1-year sentence at the Missoula County Detention Facility (MCDF) with all but 24 hours suspended for PFMA; a 10-year sentence to the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC), with 5 years suspended on the intimidation charge; and a 5-year DOC sentence for stalking, to be served concurrently with the intimidation sentence. The District Court held a sentencing hearing on October 1, 2020. At that hearing, the court informed the parties that it would not follow the plea agreement and intended to impose the stalking sentence consecutively to the intimidation sentence. The court allowed Toulouse to withdraw his guilty pleas at that time and set a hearing to schedule a trial.

¶5 The District Court held another hearing on October 15, 2020. At this hearing, Toulouse again pled guilty to the PFMA, intimidation, and stalking charges. The court sentenced Toulouse to 1 year at the MCDF with all but 24 hours suspended for PFMA; to a 10-year commitment to DOC with 5 years suspended for intimidation; and to a 5-year suspended DOC commitment for stalking, to be served consecutively to the intimidation sentence. Toulouse received credit for 181 days served and was remanded to DOC custody for placement. The District Court’s written "Zero Tolerance Judgment" followed on November 5, 2020. A condition of this judgment granted L.J. an order of protection for 75 years, that also applies to the parties’ children until they reach the age of 18, and allowed Toulouse telephonic contact with the children.

¶6 On April 2, 2021, the State filed a Petition to Revoke. The State’s petition asserted Toulouse was in violation of his probation due to new criminal charges—two counts of felony stalking, one count of misdemeanor violation of an order of protection, and six counts of felony violation of an order of protection—being filed against him in Cause No. DC-21-190 stemming from Toulouse, while at a prerelease center, commenting on photos in a Google account he shared with L.J. The petition requested Toulouse be brought before the District Court "for revocation of probation and imposition of sentence." Toulouse filed an Entry of Admissions & Waiver of Rights on August 31, 2021, admitting to two of the petition’s asserted violations—one misdemeanor violation of an order of protection and one felony violation of an order of protection. According to the District Court’s Minute Entry, as no transcript of this hearing was filed on appeal, the court held a hearing on September 2, 2021, where Toulouse admitted to those two violations in exchange for the charges in DC-21-190 being dismissed. The District Court then held a dispositional hearing on September 30, 2021. At that time, the State recommended the court revoke Toulouse’s sentences and commit him to the Montana State Prison (MSP) for a total of 15 years. Counsel for Toulouse recommended the court "continue his sentence without additional time, in a secure facility" as allowed by § 46-18-203(7)(a)(ii)(A), MCA, because it would likely be several months before Toulouse could be readmitted to a prerelease center. The District Court revoked its prior judgment and sentenced Toulouse to a ten-year commitment to MSP, with no time suspended, for the intimidation charge and to a consecutive five-year commitment to MSP, with no time suspended, for the stalking charge. The State thereafter dismissed DC-21-190. The District Court’s written Judgment, reflecting the total 15-year commitment to MSP with time served credit in the amount of 531 days, followed on October 12, 2021.

¶7 Toulouse appeals. Additional facts will be discussed as necessary below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 [1] We review criminal sentences for legality. State v. Souther, 2022 MT 203, ¶ 6, 410 Mont. 330, 519 P.3d 1 (citing State v. Seals, 2007 MT 71, ¶ 7, 336 Mont. 416, 156 P.3d 15). The interpretation and construction of a statute is a matter of law, and we review whether the district court interpreted and applied a statute correctly de novo. Souther, ¶ 6 (citing State v. Jardee, 2020 MT 81, ¶ 5, 399 Mont. 459, 461 P.3d 108).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Whether the District Court issued an illegal sentence upon revocation.

¶10 Toulouse asserts the sentence upon revocation contains a longer imprisonment time than his original sentence and is therefore illegal. The State contends the District Court did not exceed its sentencing authority when it sentenced Toulouse to a cumulative 15-year MSP commitment upon revocation.

¶11 [2] "Revocation proceedings are civil matters and fundamentally differ from underlying criminal conviction statutes." Souther, ¶ 9 (collecting cases). Accordingly, once a district court revokes a suspended sentence, its sentencing power "is ‘particularly and expressly’ governed by § 46-18-203, MCA." Souther, ¶ 10 (quoting State v. Osborn, 2015 MT 48, ¶ 13, 378 Mont. 244, 343 P.3d 1188). Section 46-18-203, MCA, "defines the district court’s options in a revocation proceeding." State v. Roberts, 2010 MT 110, ¶ 12, 356 Mont. 290, 233 P.3d 324. "A district court only has the authority to impose a sentence based on the authority granted by the applicable statute. Any sentence that exceeds such authority is illegal and facially invalid." State v. Southwick, 2007 MT 257, ¶ 26, 339 Mont. 281, 169 P.3d 698 (citations omitted).

¶12 [3, 4] On appeal, Toulouse has not challenged the propriety or legality of the underlying revocation of his sentence, only the sentence imposed by the District Court upon revocation. When sentencing an offender for violating the terms and conditions of a suspended or deferred sentence under § 46-18-203, MCA, a district court is presented with different options depending on whether the violation is a compliance violation or a noncompliance violation. State v. Puccinelli, 2024 MT 114, ¶ 25, 416 Mont. 444, 549 P.3d 441. In the proceedings below, Toulouse entered admissions to two noncompliance violations. When sentencing an offender for a noncompliance violation, a district court’s sentencing authority is expressly delineated by statute:

If the judge finds that the offender has violated the terms and conditions of the suspended or deferred sentence and the violation is not a compliance violation, the judge may:

(i) continue the suspended or deferred sentence without a change in conditions;

(ii) continue the suspended sentence with modified or additional terms and conditions, which may include placement in:

(A) a secure facility designated by the department for up to 9 months; or

(B) a community corrections facility or program designated by the department for up to 9 months, including but not limited to placement in a prerelease center, sanction or hold bed, transitional living program, enhanced supervision program, relapse intervention bed, chemical dependency treatment, or 24/7 sobriety program;

(iii) revoke the suspension of sentence and require the offender to serve either the sentence imposed or any sentence that could have been imposed that does not include a longer imprisonment or commitment term than the original sentence; or (iv) if the sentence was deferred, impose any sentence that might have been originally imposed.

Section 46-18-203(7)(a), MCA. The dispute in this case centers on the District Court’s authority under § 46-18-203(7)(a)(iii), MCA, to "revoke the suspension of sentence and require the offender to serve either the sentence imposed or any sentence that could have been imposed that does not include a longer imprisonment or commitment term than the original sentence" and whether the sentence actually imposed on Toulouse in this case violates the statute by imposing a longer imprisonment term than the original sentence.

¶13 Toulouse correctly notes that an MSP sentence is a more "burdensome sentence" than a DOC commitment of the same term. State v. Jackson, 2007 MT 186, ¶ 15, 338 Mont. 344, 165 P.3d 321. Beyond that observation, Toulouse’s brief provides little useful analysis for our consideration, as Jackson, which does not address sentencing upon revocation, is the...