State v. Towns

2020 Ohio 5120

State of Ohio/City of Bryan Appellee v. Steven M. Towns Appellant

Court of Appeals No. WM-19-023

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WILLIAMS COUNTY

October 30, 2020

Trial Court No. CRB1900417A

DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Mark R. Weaver and Ryan M. Stubenrauch, Special Prosecutors, for appellee.

Henry Schaefer, for appellant.

ZMUDA, P.J.

I. Introduction

{¶ 1} Appellant, Bryan Towns, appeals the judgment of the Bryan Municipal Court, sentencing him to 180 days in jail, suspending the entire jail sentence, ordering him to pay a fine and costs, and placing him on community control for a period of three years after a jury found him guilty of one count of disclosure by a public official. For the reasons that follow, we find no error in the proceedings below, and we therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.

A. Facts and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} This case began upon the state's filing of a complaint in the trial court on June 20, 2019, charging appellant with one count of disclosure by a public official in violation of R.C. 102.03(B), a misdemeanor of the first degree, and two counts of unauthorized dissemination in violation of R.C. 2151.421(I)(2)(a), misdemeanors of the fourth degree. These charges stemmed from appellant's October 19, 2018 posting of approximately 632 pages of documents related to cases of child abuse and neglect handled by the Williams County Job and Family Services (the "Job and Family Services report"), some of which contained confidential information, to the website of the Williams County Sheriff's Office. At the time of the posting of the Job and Family Services report, appellant was the sheriff of Williams County. In that role, appellant had prior dealings with the Williams County Job and Family Services, and was unsatisfied with the way in which the agency was handling reports of child abuse and neglect.

{¶ 3} On July 12, 2019, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the complaint, and the matter proceeded to pretrial discovery and motion practice. On September 26, 2019, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the state's complaint. In his motion, appellant argued that R.C. 102.03(B) and 2151.421(I)(2)(a) are unconstitutional under the constitutions of the United States and the state of Ohio, bothon their face and as applied to appellant, because these statutes infringed upon his freedom of speech and violated his rights to due process by imposing strict liability. Additionally, appellant contended that the Ohio Ethics Commission is the entity empowered to conduct investigations under R.C. 102.03(B) and that the state lacked jurisdiction under the statute absent a referral of the matter from the Ohio Ethics Commission. Appellant went on to note that this was the first time the state charged a defendant with a violation of R.C. 102.03(B) without a referral from the Ohio Ethics Commission, and urged the trial court to dismiss the matter based upon what appellant deemed was selective prosecution on the part of the state. Finally, appellant asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the two unauthorized dissemination counts because R.C. 2151.23(A)(5) grants the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving R.C. 2151.421(I)(2)(a).

{¶ 4} On October 10, 2019, the state filed a "motion for partial nolle prosequi," seeking leave of court to dismiss the counts of unauthorized dissemination under R.C. 2151.421(I)(2)(a). On that same day, the state filed its memorandum in opposition to appellant's motion to dismiss, in which it argued that neither R.C. 102.03(B) nor 2151.421(I)(2)(a) were unconstitutional. As to appellant's free speech claim, the state asserted that the First Amendment "does not entitle Defendant to release confidential child abuse reports as a form of political speech." The state further maintained that constitutional challenges similar to appellant's had already been rejected in Ohio, citing cases from the Tenth District and the Eighth District in support.

{¶ 5} In addition, the state argued that R.C. 102.03(B) is not a strict liability statute as appellant suggested in his motion to dismiss. Rather, the state maintained that the lack of an express mens rea in the statute results in the application of a default mens rea of recklessness.

{¶ 6} Next, the state insisted that the Ohio Ethics Commission does not hold exclusive authority to prosecute all violations of R.C. 102.03(B). The state noted that a grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Ohio Ethics Commission is not provided in the statute, and argued that "[i]f the General Assembly had intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction over all prosecutions pursuant to R.C. 102.03, they would have expressly said so." The state went on to argue that "the Ethics Commission does not have any adjudicative authority, it cannot impose fines or other punishment, and its proceedings are not governed by R.C. Chapter 119.

{¶ 7} Finally, the state rejected appellant's accusation of selective prosecution, noting that appellant failed to meet his burden of pointing to others similarly situated who were not prosecuted or demonstrating that the state acted in bad faith in selecting him for prosecution.

{¶ 8} The trial court issued its decision on appellant's motion to dismiss on October 21, 2019. In its decision, the trial court found that it had jurisdiction to proceed with the case, and further concluded that appellant's motion to dismiss did not "state sufficient legal grounds and is found not well taken and denied." In a separate order journalized the same day as its ruling on appellant's motion to dismiss, the trial courtgranted the state's motion for partial nolle prosequi, thereby dismissing the charges for unlawful dissemination.

{¶ 9} On October 22, 2019, the state filed a motion in limine, in which it sought to prevent appellant from introducing evidence at trial that it claimed was irrelevant to the proceeding, namely evidence pertaining to the following:

1. Statements and opinions of witnesses, including the Defendant, concerning the performance, faults, perceived faults, failures, or perceived failures of the Williams County Job and Family Services * * *, the Williams County Prosecutor's Office, the Ohio Attorney General's Office, or any other agency regarding their response or handling of complaints or reported crimes that aren't the subject of the above captioned case.

2. Any other evidence or testimony regarding the performance and/or alleged failure to act by Williams County Job and Family Services or any other agency with respect to previous reports or complaints of alleged child abuse and neglect occurring in Williams County, Ohio.

{¶ 10} On October 31, 2019, appellant filed his response to the state's motion in limine. In his response, appellant argued that the evidence the state sought to exclude was expressly permitted by Evid.R. 106, 404(B), 607, 608, 609, and 616, for the purpose of demonstrating that the state's witnesses were biased against appellant. In support, appellant cited testimony of a witness that agents working for the Bureau of Criminal Investigations ("BCI") brought the current charges against appellant as a vendetta forstatements appellant made to a newspaper that were critical of the BCI. Because the evidence would be admitted for the proper purpose of showing witness bias, appellant argued that the evidence should not be excluded.

{¶ 11} On November 4, 2019, the trial court issued its decision on the state's motion in limine, in which it found in favor of the state without expressly addressing appellant's bias argument. Immediately thereafter, the matter proceeded to a two-day jury trial.

{¶ 12} At trial, the state called ten witnesses. First, the state called Diana Hoover, a licensed social worker in the field of child protection. As a former director of the Hancock County Job and Family Services, Hoover oversaw cases of child abuse in which law enforcement was involved. According to Hoover, the cooperation between entities including job and family services agencies and local law enforcement is guided by a memorandum of understanding governing the investigation of reports of alleged child abuse and neglect. A copy of the memorandum of understanding bearing appellant's signature was admitted into evidence as plaintiff's exhibit 10.

{¶ 13} Hoover testified that the memorandum of understanding to which appellant subscribed regulates disclosure of confidential information. In particular, Hoover stated that under the memorandum of understanding and Ohio law, reports of alleged abuse or neglect from mandatory reporters are confidential, as are the names of the reporters. As such, Hoover indicated that law enforcement officials are not permitted to release the reports to the general public in any manner, including publishing the reports on theinternet or posting the reports onto the Facebook platform. However, Hoover acknowledged on cross-examination that subscribers to the Williams County memorandum of understanding are granted "professional discretion" to handle individual cases in a manner they deem appropriate.

{¶ 14} For its second witness, the state called Pam Hablawetz. As a licensed emergency room nurse at Community Memorial Hospital in Hicksville, Defiance County, Ohio, Hablawetz is a mandatory reporter of child abuse. While reporting is ordinarily directed to Child Protective Services, Hablawetz generally reports to local sheriff departments since she works from 7:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m., when Child Protective Services is closed.

{¶ 15} On June 28, 2016, Hablawetz assumed responsibility for a case involving an infant, in which she suspected child abuse due to bruising and injuries that she observed on the baby's body. In response, Hablawetz reported the suspected abuse to appellant's office. Tragically, the infant died one month later.

{¶ 16} Next, the state called deputy Ben Baldwin of the Williams County Sheriff's Office for its third...