State v. Treadway

240 A.3d 66

STATE of Maine

v.Stephen A. TREADWAY

Docket: Pen-20-47

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: September 17, 2020

Decided: October 29, 2020

Jeffrey M. Silverstein, Esq. (orally), Silverstein-Law, PA, Bangor, for appellant Stephen A. Treadway

Marianne Lynch, District Attorney, and Mark A. Rucci, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Prosecutorial District V, Bangor, for appellee State of Maine

Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.

GORMAN, J.

[¶1] Stephen A. Treadway appeals from a judgment of conviction of aggravated assault (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 208(1)(C) (2020) ; domestic violence criminal threatening (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 209-A(1)(B)(1) (2020) ; tampering with a victim (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 454(1-B)(A)(2) (2020) ; violation of a protective order (Class D), 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1) (2020) ; and two counts of domestic violence assault (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(B)(1) (2020), entered in the trial court (Penobscot County, Anderson, J. ) after a jury-waived trial. Treadway argues that the trial court erred when it admitted expert testimony regarding strangulation because the testimony was overly confusing. He further argues that the court erred by imposing consecutive sentences on the convictions for aggravated assault and domestic violence assault and by considering his criminal history as an aggravating factor when one of his prior convictions had already resulted in an enhancement of the classification of the charge of domestic violence assault. We affirm the judgment and the sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual and Procedural History

[¶2] In explaining its verdict after trial, the court made the following findings of fact, which are supported by competent record evidence from the trial. See State v. Conroy, 2020 ME 22, ¶ 2, 225 A.3d 1011. At the time of the events in question, the victim and Treadway were living together in Bangor with their infant twins. On October 24, 2018, the victim and Treadway got into an argument concerning a visit from the victim's relatives. At some point during the argument, Treadway assaulted the victim by putting his hand around her neck, which caused her to have difficulty breathing and impaired her vision. This assault also left the victim with neck and throat pain for a few days after the incident.

[¶3] On October 27, 2018, in the course of another argument, after telling the victim that he "own[ed her] and agreeing with [him] is what love is all about," Treadway again put his hand around the victim's neck and applied more pressure than he had just days earlier. This time Treadway's actions caused the victim to slip toward unconsciousness. Treadway then threw the victim by the arm into the closet and told her that "there was no piece of paper that could protect her and some day she would set him off and he could kill her." The court found that, during both incidents, the victim was holding one of their infants.

[¶4] Treadway was arrested and, from jail, sent letters to a minister asking that he read the letters to the victim. The letters were an attempt by Treadway to convince the victim not to testify at trial. At the time Treadway sent the letters, he knew that the victim had a protection order against him.

[¶5] In two separate indictments, Treadway was charged with a total of seven counts:¹ aggravated assault (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 208(1)(C) ; domestic violence criminal threatening (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 209-A(1)(B)(1) ; tampering with a victim (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 454(1-B)(A)(2) ; violation of a condition of release (Class C), 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(B) (2020) ; violation of a protective order (Class D), 19-A M.R.S. § 4011(1) ; and two counts of domestic violence assault (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(B)(1). He entered pleas of not guilty to all charges and waived his right to a jury trial. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 23(a).

[¶6] In June of 2019, the court conducted a jury-waived trial. Both Treadway and the victim testified. The State also introduced the testimony of a qualified expert—a forensic nurse and educator—to explain strangulation from a medical perspective. The expert testified about the medical distinction between strangulation and choking, and she described the physiological effects of strangulation, including the effects that a loss of oxygen to the brain may cause. She also described the external signs of strangulation that could be seen during a physical examination, including the prevalence and duration of bruising and petechiae. Treadway objected throughout the testimony. His objections fell into three general categories: (1) that the expert did not adequately distinguish between the legal and medical definitions of strangulation, (2) that testimony about the external signs typically associated with strangulation would not be helpful to the court because the expert had not personally examined the victim, and (3) that the expert was not qualified to testify about the prevalence of particular external signs of strangulation. The court overruled Treadway's objections, noting that the State was permitted to present evidence "on the topic in a general way," and that the court's obligation was to analyze whether and how the testimony had any relationship to the charges against Treadway.

[¶7] After hearing from all of the witnesses and considering the parties’ closing arguments, the court found Treadway not guilty on the count of violation of condition of release but guilty on the other six counts.

B. Sentencing

[¶8] At the sentencing hearing, the court stated that because the October 24 Class C domestic violence assault, the October 27 Class B aggravated assault, and the Class B witness tampering offense constituted "separate criminal episodes" for sentencing purposes, it would impose consecutive sentences. The court then set the basic sentence at three years for the aggravated assault charge and two years for the charge of domestic violence assault. After considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including Treadway's criminal record "and the impact on [the victim]," the court imposed three consecutive sentences: five years in prison on the Class B aggravated assault; three years in prison on the Class C domestic violence assault; and three years, all suspended, with three years of probation, on the Class B witness tampering conviction.²

[¶9] Treadway timely appealed the judgment. See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2020) ; M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1). He also sought and obtained leave to appeal portions of his sentence from the Sentence Review Panel. See 15 M.R.S. § 2151 (2020) ; M.R. App. P. 20 ; State v. Treadway , No. SRP-20-46 (Me. Sent. Rev. Panel Mar. 17, 2020).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Expert Testimony

[¶10] Treadway contends that the court erred in admitting the expert testimony regarding strangulation because the testimony was overly confusing and therefore did not satisfy the requirement that expert testimony be helpful. See M.R. Evid. 702.

[¶11] We review Treadway's argument regarding the distinction between legal and medical strangulation for an abuse of discretion, and review his remaining arguments for obvious error because he did not raise them at trial. State v. Rourke , 2017 ME 10, ¶ 10, 154 A.3d 127 ; see also State v. Thompson , 1997 ME 109, ¶ 14, 695 A.2d 1174. "To be admissible, expert testimony must (1) meet a threshold level of reliability, (2) be relevant pursuant to M.R. Evid. 401, and (3) assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue." Bergin v. Bergin , 2019 ME 133, ¶ 9, 214 A.3d 1071 (quotation marks omitted); see M.R. Evid. 702. Treadway argues that the expert's testimony did not satisfy the third criterion because the testimony was irredeemably confusing.

[¶12] Treadway's arguments are unpersuasive. As we explained in State v. Perry , expert testimony about "the physiological effects of and symptoms associated with strangulation" could assist the trier of fact in "determining a fact in issue." 2017 ME 74, ¶ 20, 159 A.3d 840 (quoting M.R. Evid. 702). Here, as in Perry , the fact-finder had to determine whether the State had proved that Treadway's conduct constituted "strangulation" as defined in 17-A M.R.S. § 208(1)(C). The expert's testimony was directly relevant and helpful on that question.³ Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion or commit obvious error by admitting the expert's testimony.

B. Consecutive Sentences

[¶13] In Treadway's sentence appeal, he argues that the court erred by imposing consecutive sentences pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1256 (2018)⁴ on the counts of aggravated assault and domestic violence assault because the two assaults were part of the same criminal episode. "We review a sentencing court's imposition of consecutive sentences for an abuse of discretion," Perry , 2017 ME 74, ¶ 22, 159 A.3d 840 (quotation marks omitted), but review a "court's determination as to the presence of [one of the factors listed in 17-A M.R.S. § 1256(2) ] for clear error," State v. Ilsley , 604 A.2d 17, 19 (Me. 1992) (quotation marks omitted); see State v. Hofland , 2012 ME 129, ¶ 27, 58 A.3d 1023.

[¶14] Generally, "a court must impose [multiple] sentences concurrently unless it finds a statutory basis for imposing the sentences consecutively." Perry , 2017 ME 74, ¶ 22, 159 A.3d 840 (quotation marks omitted). One such statutory basis, and the one on which the court here relied,⁵ is that "the convictions are for offenses ... arising from different criminal episodes." 17-A M.R.S. § 1256(2)(A).

[¶15] The court's finding that the two assaults arose from different criminal episodes is supported by the record, including the victim's testimony that, during the two days in between the assaults, Treadway acted "just normal ..., like nothing had been going on," that the assaults took place in different locations in the apartment, that the force of the second assault was "worse" than the first, and that Treadway made different and more severe verbal threats...