State v. Triebold

396 Wis.2d 176

955 N.W.2d 415

2021 WI App 13

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Todd N. TRIEBOLD,^† Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal No. 2019AP1209-CR

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs: May 12, 2020

Opinion Filed: January 20, 2021

On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Frederick A. Bechtold, Taylors Falls, Minnesota.

On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general, and Daniel J. O'Brien, assistant attorney general.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

HRUZ, J.

¶1 Todd Triebold is subject to lifetime sex offender registration in Wisconsin based upon a crime he committed in this state. Thereafter, Triebold relocated to Minnesota, and he later failed to provide both Wisconsin and Minnesota authorities with updated address information when he changed his residence within that state. He was prosecuted in Minnesota for his failure to update his registration there; afterward, Wisconsin authorities filed the charge in the present action for failing to comply with Wisconsin's sex offender registration law.

¶2 Triebold argues that because the acts constituting the registration offense charged under Wisconsin law occurred entirely within Minnesota, the circuit court lacked territorial jurisdiction to convict him for his registration violation. He further argues that, regardless of whether Wisconsin law provides for territorial jurisdiction in this instance, he could not be prosecuted in Wisconsin because the federal laws governing sex offender registration preempt state law and require registration only in the individual's state of residence. Last, he asserts that the State of Wisconsin is statutorily barred from prosecuting him in this instance because he has already been prosecuted for the same crime in Minnesota.

¶3 We reject Triebold's arguments. We conclude the circuit court possessed territorial jurisdiction under WIS. STAT. § 939.03(1)(c) (2017-18)¹ because Triebold's failure to update his registration had a criminal consequence in this state pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 301.45(6). We also conclude the federal sex offender registration laws do not preempt Wisconsin's enforcement of its requirement that offenders subject to registration in this state update their registration information even if they move while residing out of state. Finally, we conclude that Triebold's conviction in Wisconsin is not statutorily barred by the double jeopardy principles contained in WIS. STAT. § 939.71. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶4 Approximately twenty-five years ago, Triebold was convicted of second-degree sexual assault of a child in Pierce County case No. 1993CF27. As a result of his conviction, Triebold was subject to lifetime registration on the then newly created sex offender registry. See 1993 Wis. Act 98, § 116; WIS. STAT. § 175.45 (1993-94).² The sex offender registration requirements are now codified in WIS. STAT. § 301.45. In short, the statute—both then and now—requires a person subject to registration to provide personal information, including address information, upon release from state confinement and to update that information whenever it changes. Compare § 175.45(2), (3) and (4) (1993-94) with § 301.45(2), (3) and (4).

¶5 Triebold was released from prison in 1999. Around the time of his release, a social worker reviewed the registration form with Triebold. Triebold refused to sign the form, but he was notified (both at that time and through annual registration notices) that he was required to provide notice of any change in his address to Wisconsin authorities within ten days.

¶6 At some point prior to 2013, Triebold moved to Minnesota. On August 20, 2013, Triebold returned to Wisconsin officials the annual registration letter confirming he was residing at 750 Point Douglas Road in St. Paul.³ On May 20, 2014, St. Paul police officers discovered Triebold at a different St. Paul address, 259 English Street, while they were executing a search warrant involving internet crimes against children. Triebold appeared to have a bedroom there, and he was carrying an identification card issued in March 2014 that listed that address as his residence.⁴ Triebold told authorities he had been living at the 259 English Street address since December 24, 2013. Triebold had not notified the Wisconsin Department of Corrections of a change of address since he sent the August 2013 confirmation letter.

¶7 On June 17, 2014, Triebold was charged in Ramsey County, Minnesota, with a violation of that state's registry requirement under MINN. STAT. § 243.166, subd. 5(a) (2020).⁵ The statute required Triebold to register his address with Minnesota as a result of his Wisconsin conviction, and he had last provided state authorities there with the 750 Point Douglas Road address. The dates of noncompliance alleged in the complaint were from December 24, 2013, to May 20, 2014.⁶ Triebold pleaded guilty to that offense and was sentenced accordingly.

¶8 The Wisconsin Department of Corrections learned of the Minnesota investigation on June 18, 2014. Based on that information, Triebold was charged in Wisconsin for knowingly failing to update his address with Wisconsin authorities. Triebold filed two pretrial motions to dismiss the Wisconsin prosecution—one asserting lack of territorial jurisdiction, and one asserting the prosecution was statutorily barred by double jeopardy under WIS. STAT. § 939.71. The circuit court rejected both arguments and, following a bench trial, found Triebold guilty under WIS. STAT. § 301.45(6)(a)1. of failing to comply with Wisconsin's registration requirements. Triebold now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶9 Triebold renews on appeal the arguments he made in his motions to dismiss—namely, that the circuit court lacked territorial jurisdiction and that his conviction is barred by the double jeopardy principles elucidated in WIS. STAT. § 939.71. For the reasons explained below, neither argument has merit. The State sufficiently proved territorial jurisdiction, and Triebold has failed to demonstrate that his conviction is precluded by § 939.71.

I. Territorial Jurisdiction

¶10 Territorial jurisdiction is a necessary prerequisite to a valid judgment of conviction. State v. Randle , 2002 WI App 116, ¶8, 252 Wis. 2d 743, 647 N.W.2d 324. A court may act only upon crimes committed within the state's territorial jurisdiction. State v. Anderson , 2005 WI 54, ¶32, 280 Wis. 2d 104, 695 N.W.2d 731. Territorial jurisdiction is a function of the United States Constitution's Sixth Amendment requirement that a person be tried by an "impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." State v. Brown , 2003 WI App 34, ¶24, 260 Wis. 2d 125, 659 N.W.2d 110 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI ). In essence, territorial jurisdiction describes the reach of a state's laws, which may extend beyond its geographic boundaries. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL. , CRIM. PROC. § 16.1(a) (4th ed. 2017).

¶11 The legislature has defined the territorial reach of Wisconsin's criminal laws by enacting WIS. STAT. § 939.03. As relevant here, § 939.03 provides:

(1) A person is subject to prosecution and punishment under the law of this state if any of the following applies:

(a) The person commits a crime, any of the constituent elements of which takes place in this state.

....

(c) While out of this state, the person does an act with intent that it cause in this state a consequence set forth in a section defining a crime.

Triebold contends territorial jurisdiction did not exist under either subsec. (1)(a) or (1)(c). He also argues that, regardless of whether territorial jurisdiction would otherwise be appropriate under § 939.03, he cannot be convicted in Wisconsin for failure to update his registration because Wisconsin's registration requirements have been preempted by a federal statute, at least under the circumstances of this case.

¶12 Whether territorial jurisdiction exists under an undisputed set of facts presents a question of law. See Brown , 260 Wis. 2d 125, ¶25, 659 N.W.2d 110. To the extent resolving this question requires us to engage in statutory interpretation and application of WIS. STAT. § 939.03, we independently decide such matters. State v. Petty , 201 Wis. 2d 337, 354-55, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996).

¶13 We reject Triebold's arguments regarding whether territorial jurisdiction was appropriate under WIS. STAT. § 939.03. Section 939.03(1)(c) clearly provides a basis upon which the State could prosecute Triebold for his failure to provide Wisconsin authorities with his updated address information. See Mueller v. Raemisch , 740 F.3d 1128, 1132 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting this provision applied "straightforwardly" to the registration requirement, with criminal consequences for a failure to comply). Triebold's intentional act of omission had the consequence of depriving Wisconsin authorities of information concerning the location of his residence, a consequence expressly prohibited by WIS. STAT. § 301.45.⁷ Section 301.45(4)(a), in conjunction with § 301.45(2)(a)5., requires a person subject to the sex offender registry to update the Wisconsin Department of Corrections with his or her address information within ten days after it changes, and the knowing failure to do so is criminalized by § 301.45(6)(a)1.

¶14 Triebold responds that his failure to update his address information had a "consequence" in only one place: the State of Minnesota. He reasons that because he lived in Minnesota, only persons in that state (including area residents and law enforcement) were denied notice that a sex offender had relocated to their community. He lists a number of institutions and individuals in Wisconsin that he claims were unaffected by his failure to update his address information—i.e., schools, local law enforcement, and other concerned citizens. But Triebold's argument fails to acknowledge the basic realities that none of these individuals or...