State v. Troxell

78 S.W.3d 866

STATE of Tennessee v. David Walter TROXELL.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.

May 28, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William B. (Jake) Lockert, III, District Public Defender, Twenty Third Judicial District, for the appellant, David Walter Troxell.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Michael Moore, Solicitor General; Daryl J. Brand, Associate Solicitor General; Marvin E. Clements, Jr., Assistant Attorney General; Dan Mitchum Alsobrooks, District Attorney General; and Kim G. Menke, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

E. RILEY ANDERSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JANICE M. HOLDER, and WILLIAM M. BARKER, JJ., joined.

The defendant, David Walter Troxell, was charged with possession with intent to sell and/or deliver a controlled substance after officers discovered approximately 300 grams of cocaine in the gas tank of his pickup truck. The trial court suppressed the evidence after finding that the search of the undercarriage and gas tank of the defendant's vehicle exceeded the scope of the defendant's consent to search. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. After carefully considering the record and the relevant authorities, we conclude that the officer's, search of the undercarriage and gas tank of the defendant's vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 7 of the Tennessee Constitution because it exceeded the scope of the defendant's consent and resulted in the prolonged and unreasonable detention of the defendant. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

Background

The evidence presented at the suppression hearing revealed that on November 11, 1999, the defendant, David Walter Troxell, was stopped for speeding on Interstate 40 by Trooper Mark Norrod of the Tennessee Highway Patrol.¹ Troxell, who was traveling 78 to 80 miles per hour in a 70 miles per hour zone, admitted that he had accelerated to pass a tractor-trailer truck. Troxell produced his driver's license and said that he was driving a company truck registered in the name of his employer's wife.

Trooper Norrod issued a warning citation to the defendant and explained that it would not require a court appearance or a fine. Trooper Norrod then asked the defendant, "Do you have any weapons in the vehicle?" Troxell responded, "No, nothing." When Trooper Norrod asked if he could "take a look," Troxell answered, "Yeah, go ahead."² Trooper Norrod conducted a pat down search of the defendant and then searched the interior compartment of the pickup truck and all of the luggage inside. During the search, Troxell was led to the side of the roadway by another officer who had arrived at the scene, Trooper Ferrell.

After completing an extensive search of the interior of the pickup truck and the luggage therein that lasted nearly 20 minutes, Trooper Norrod then examined the underside of the vehicle. He observed that the bolts and hoses to the gas tank appeared to have been recently removed, and when he tapped on the gas tank, in his opinion it did not "resonate" as it would if it held only fuel. After obtaining a mirror and a flashlight from his patrol car, Trooper Norrod again looked under the truck and observed silicone sealant on and around the gas tank, which he believed was "not normal." Based on these observations and his experience in interdiction, Trooper Norrod concluded that there was something inside the tank other than fuel and that "it could have been [weapons]." Trooper Norrod instructed the defendant to drive to a service station so the gas tank could be removed. After asking that the owners of the vehicle be notified as to what was occurring, the defendant drove to the service station where the gas tank was removed and 300 grams of cocaine were discovered inside.³

Trooper Norrod admitted during the suppression hearing that although he asked the defendant specifically about weapons and not drugs, a K-9 unit arrived at the scene and a drug detection dog conducted a sweep of the vehicle, which was negative. He testified that "in his mind," the defendant's consent meant that he could search "anywhere" and that Troxell never objected to the search at any time. Trooper Norrod conceded, however, that "most people might reasonably think that would mean [he was] going to look inside the cab of their truck." Troxell testified during the suppression hearing that he believed the officer was going to search the interior cab of the pickup truck and that he did not object or attempt to limit the search because he had been led to the side of the road by Trooper Ferrell. Trooper Norrod testified that Troxell was moved out of the way so that the events could be videotaped and for safety and security reasons.

After considering the testimony and viewing the videotape of the encounter, the trial court found that the search exceeded the scope of the defendant's consent and suppressed the evidence. The trial court stated:

If the officer had asked for a consent to search for drugs in the vehicle, I think this would have been a valid consent, because that would be one of the places that could be searched for drugs. But for weapons, I tend to agree with ... the Defense.... One wouldn't normally think about weapons under the underside or secreted in some concealed fashion.

The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, however, concluding that Trooper Norrod's belief that the defendant's consent to search "in the vehicle" encompassed the undercarriage and gas tank of the truck was "objectively reasonable." The appellate court remanded the case for trial.

We granted the defendant's application for permission to appeal.

Standard of Review

A trial court's findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be upheld on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn.1996). Where the issue involves an application of law to undisputed facts, a question of law is presented which will be subject to de novo review. State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 423 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn.1998). Because the material facts in this case are not in dispute, our review of the legal issues is de novo.

Search and Seizure

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." Article I, § 7 of the Tennessee Constitution similarly prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and is identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment. State v. Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn.1997). "`Consequently, under both the federal and state constitutions, a warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.'" State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn.1997)).

The federal and state constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures also apply to vehicles. See State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tenn.1998). A law enforcement officer's stop of a vehicle therefore requires that the officer have probable cause, or reasonable suspicion supported by specific arid articulable facts, to believe that an offense has been or is about to be committed. State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tenn.2000).

Because a traffic stop is an investigative stop, the officer's actions must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and the detention "must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop," Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); State v. England, 19 S.W.3d at 767-68. Moreover, the officer should employ the least intrusive means reasonably available to investigate his or her suspicions in a short period of time. Florida v. Royer 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S.Ct. at 1326. As, this Court has said, "the proper inquiry is whether during the detention, the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly." State v. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d at 783 (citation omitted). Otherwise a reasonable traffic stop can become unreasonable and constitutionally invalid "if the time, manner or scope of the investigation exceeds the proper parameters." United States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir.2001); see also State v. Morelock, 851 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992).

Consent

When evidence is seized as a result of a warrantless search of a vehicle, the State must establish that the search was conducted pursuant to one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d at 865. One exception is a search conducted pursuant to an individual's consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). To satisfy the constitutional reasonableness standard, the consent must be "`unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by duress or coercion.'" State v. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d at 784 (quoting State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 547 (Tenn. 1992)). Moreover, even if the consent is voluntary, evidence seized in the search will not be admissible if the search exceeds the scope of the consent given. See generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1(c) (3d ed.1996).

In determining the scope of consent, the...