State v. U.S. Dep't of Justice

951 F.3d 84

STATE of New York, State of Connecticut, State of New Jersey, State of Washington, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Commonwealth of Virginia, State of Rhode Island, City of New York, Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.United States DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, William P. Barr, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 19-267(L)

19-275(con)

August Term 2018

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: June 18, 2019

Decided: February 26, 2020

Brad Hinshelwood (Mark B. Stern, Daniel Tenny, on the brief) for Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellants.

Anisha S. Dasgupta, for Letitia James, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, New York (Barbara D. Underwood, Eric R. Haren, Linda Fang, New York State Office of the Attorney General, New York, New York; Mark Francis Kohler, Michael Skold, for William Tong, Attorney General of the State of Connecticut, Hartford, Connecticut; Jeremy Feigenbaum, for Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, Trenton, New Jersey; Luke Alexander Eaton, for Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General of the State of Washington, Olympia, Washington; David Urena for Maura Healey, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Boston, Massachusetts; Victoria Pearson, for Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia; Michael W. Field, for Peter F. Neronha, Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island, Providence, Rhode Island, on the brief) for Plaintiffs-Appellees the States of New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Washington, Rhode Island, and the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Virginia.

Jamison Davies, Richard Dearing, Devin Slack, for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, New York for Plaintiff-Appellee the City of New York.

Adam Lurie, Caitlin Potratz Metcalf, Linklaters LLP, Washington, D.C., Counsel for Amicus Curiae American Jewish Committee.

Spencer E. Amdur, Lee Gelernt, Omar C. Jadwat, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, New York; Christopher Dunn, New York Civil Liberties Union, New York, New York; Mark Fleming, Heartland Alliance, Chicago, Illinois; Cody H. Wofsy, American Civil Liberties Union of California Immigrants’ Rights Project, San Francisco, California; Counsel for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, New York Civil Liberties Union, National Immigrant Justice Center, National Immigration Law Center, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, Asian Americans Advancing Justice—Asian Law Caucus, Washington Defender Association, and the New Orleans Workers’ Center for Racial Justice.

Before: Winter, Cabranes, and Raggi, Circuit Judges.

Reena Raggi, Circuit Judge:

INTRODUCTION

The principal legal question presented in this appeal is whether the federal government may deny grants of money to State and local governments that would be eligible for such awards but for their refusal to comply with three immigration-related conditions imposed by the Attorney General of the United States. Those conditions require grant applicants to certify that they will (1) comply with federal law prohibiting any restrictions on the communication of citizenship and alien status information with federal immigration authorities, see 8 U.S.C. § 1373 ; (2) provide federal authorities, upon request, with the release dates of incarcerated illegal aliens; and (3) afford federal immigration officers access to incarcerated illegal aliens.

The case implicates several of the most divisive issues confronting our country and, consequently, filling daily news headlines: national immigration policy, the enforcement of immigration laws, the status of illegal aliens in this country, and the ability of States and localities to adopt policies on such matters contrary to, or at odds with, those of the federal government.

Intertwined with these issues is a foundational legal question: how, if at all, should federal, State, and local governments coordinate in carrying out the nation’s immigration policy? There is also a corollary question: to what extent may States and localities seeking federal grant money to facilitate the enforcement of their own laws adopt policies to extricate themselves from, hinder, or even frustrate the enforcement of federal immigration laws?

At its core, this appeal presents questions of statutory construction. In proceedings below, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Edgardo Ramos, Judge ) determined that the Attorney General was not statutorily authorized to impose the challenged conditions and, therefore, enjoined their application. See New York v. Dep’t of Justice , 343 F. Supp. 3d 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). The thoughtful opinion of the district court requires us to examine the authorization question in detail. For reasons explained in this opinion, we conclude that the plain language of the relevant statutes authorizes the Attorney General to impose the challenged conditions.

In concluding otherwise, the district court relied on, among other things, an opinion of the Seventh Circuit in City of Chicago v. Sessions , 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018). While mindful of the respect owed to our sister circuits, we cannot agree that the federal government must be enjoined from imposing the challenged conditions on the federal grants here at issue. These conditions help the federal government enforce national immigration laws and policies supported by successive Democratic and Republican administrations. But more to the authorization point, they ensure that applicants satisfy particular statutory grant requirements imposed by Congress and subject to Attorney General oversight.

Nor can we agree with the district court that the challenged conditions impermissibly intrude on powers reserved to the States. See U.S. CONST. Amend. X. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed, in the realm of immigration policy, it is the federal government that maintains "broad," Arizona v. United States , 567 U.S. 387, 394, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012), and "preeminent," power, Toll v. Moreno , 458 U.S. 1, 10, 102 S.Ct. 2977, 73 L.Ed.2d 563 (1982), which is codified in an "extensive and complex" statutory scheme, Arizona v. United States , 567 U.S. at 395, 132 S.Ct. 2492. Thus, at the same time that the Supreme Court has acknowledged States’ "understandable frustrations with the problems caused by illegal immigration," it has made clear that a "State may not pursue policies that undermine federal law." Id. at 416, 132 S.Ct. 2492. As Chief Justice John Marshall wrote over 200 years ago, "the states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government." McCulloch v. Maryland , 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). This fundamental principle, a bedrock of our federalism, is no less applicable today. Indeed, it pertains with particular force when, as here, Congress acts pursuant to its power under the Spending Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

BACKGROUND

Invoking this court’s interlocutory jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), defendants the United States Department of Justice and the Attorney General of the United States (hereinafter, collectively, "DOJ") appeal from an award of partial summary judgment entered on November 30, 2018. See New York v. Dep’t of Justice , 343 F. Supp. 3d 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). That judgment grants plaintiffs, the States of New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Washington, the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Virginia (hereinafter, collectively, the "States"), and the City of New York (the "City"), injunctive relief from three immigration-related conditions imposed by DOJ on the receipt of 2017 Byrne Program Criminal Justice Assistance grants ("Byrne grants"). Those conditions required 2017 Byrne grant applicants (1) to certify their willingness to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which law precludes government entities and officials from prohibiting or restricting the sharing of citizenship or alien-status information with federal immigration authorities (the "Certification Condition"); (2) to provide assurance that, upon written request of federal immigration authorities, grant recipients would provide notice of an incarcerated alien’s scheduled release date (the "Notice Condition"); and (3) to certify that grant recipients would afford federal authorities access to State-incarcerated suspected aliens in order for those authorities to determine the aliens’ right to remain in the United States (the "Access Condition").¹ The district court’s judgment not only enjoins DOJ from enforcing these three requirements as to any of plaintiffs’ 2017 Byrne grants (which DOJ has otherwise awarded), but also mandates that DOJ release the withheld 2017 funds to plaintiffs without regard to the challenged conditions. See id. at 245–46 ; App. at 45 (modifying mandate).

Three of our sister circuits have now upheld injunctions precluding enforcement of some or all of the challenged conditions as to other jurisdictions applying for Byrne grants. See City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2019) (ruling as to Notice and Access Conditions); City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen. , 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019) (ruling as to all three conditions); City of Chicago v. Sessions , 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (ruling as to Notice and Access Conditions), reh’g en banc granted in part, opinion vacated in part , No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2018) (vacating nation-wide injunction), reh’g grant vacated , No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268814 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018). The district court relied on the Seventh Circuit decision in entering the challenged judgment, see New York v....