State v. Van Blyenburg

152 Hawai‘i 66

520 P.3d 264

STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.George Van BLYENBURG, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

SCWC-20-0000714

Supreme Court of Hawai‘i.

November 23, 2022

Emmanuel G. Guerrero, Honolulu, for petitioner

Donn Fudo, Honolulu, for respondent

RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, AND EDDINS, JJ., AND WILSON, J., DISSENTING, WITH WHOM McKENNA, J., JOINS

OPINION OF THE COURT BY EDDINS, J.

I.

While driving on ‘Aiea Heights Road, George Van Blyenburg hit a man who was weed whacking next to the street. Van Blyenburg kept driving, but several motorists stopped and tried to help the man. Shortly after Van Blyenburg hit him, the man died.

Van Blyenburg did not return to the scene of the collision. Instead, he drove to his friend's house nearby and parked in his friend's garage. He covered the damaged front end of his Honda CRV with blankets and boxes. Then, he went with his friend, in his friend's car, to Turtle Bay.

The State indicted Van Blyenburg for two crimes: (1) leaving the scene of an accident involving death or serious bodily injury, HRS § 291C-12 (2007 & Supp. 2015) (Count 1); and (2) negligent homicide in the second degree, HRS § 707-703(1)(b) (2014) (Count 2).

At trial, Van Blyenburg testified to "blacking out." He remembers driving and then "just nothing" before being "jerk[ed]" awake by a "kind of metal bang." Van Blyenburg said that he looked in his rearview mirror but did not see the man. He thought he'd hit a metal sign. And he drove off because he didn't want to get stuck with paying to fix it.

The jury found Van Blyenburg guilty on both Count 1 and Count 2.

After the verdict, but before sentencing, Van Blyenburg moved to dismiss both counts.

Van Blyenburg argued Count 1 was defective because it was missing an essential element of the offense it charged.

HRS § 291C-12(a) requires drivers of vehicles involved in collisions resulting in serious bodily injury or death to "immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the collision or as close thereto as possible." The statute also provides that stops "shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary."¹ This "shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary" language (the Traffic Proviso) was missing from the indictment. Relying on State v. Baker, 146 Hawai‘i 299, 463 P.3d 956 (2020), Van Blyenburg argued this omission violated his due process rights because the proviso that stops "shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary" is an attendant circumstance element of HRS § 291C-12(a).

Regarding Count 2, Van Blyenburg argued it was defective because it did not define "simple negligence."

A person commits negligent homicide in the second degree if they cause the death of "[a] vulnerable user by the operation of a vehicle in a manner that constitutes simple negligence as defined in section 707-704(2)." HRS § 707-703(1)(b) (emphasis added). The indictment said as much. But it didn't spell out the definition of "simple negligence." Van Blyenburg characterized "simple negligence" as an element of HRS § 707-703.² And he argued the indictment should have defined that element in simple terms since its meaning is "not readily comprehensible to persons of common understanding."

The circuit court was not persuaded by Van Blyenburg's arguments. It denied Van Blyenburg's motion to dismiss as to both Counts 1 and 2.

Van Blyenburg appealed.

The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the circuit court in a summary disposition order.

In evaluating whether Van Blyenburg was adequately informed of the charges against him in Count 1 and Count 2, the ICA considered not only the indictment, but also the State's requested jury instructions, which were filed before Van Blyenburg's motion to dismiss.³ The ICA's analysis was the same as to both counts. The State's requested jury instructions included HRS § 291C-12(a) ’s "[e]very stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary" caveat and the complete statutory definition of "simple negligence."⁴ So, the ICA reasoned, Van Blyenburg had notice of what he had to defend against. And the circuit court did not err in denying his motion to dismiss.

Because the ICA held that the State's requested jury instructions apprised Van Blyenburg of the charges against him, it did not decide whether the indictment, standing alone, sufficiently informed Van Blyenburg of the crimes the State alleged he'd committed.

We do so now.

We hold that both Count 1 and Count 2 of the indictment gave Van Blyenburg adequate notice of what he had to defend against.

Regarding Count 1, Van Blyenburg is correct that without the Traffic Proviso the indictment cannot state a HRS § 291C-12(a) offense premised on the theory that Van Blyenburg stopped near — but not "as close as possible to" — the collision scene. But the Traffic Proviso is irrelevant to the question of whether Van Blyenburg violated HRS § 291C-12(a) by not stopping at all or by failing to comply with HRS § 291C-14. And the indictment — even without the Traffic Proviso — adequately states a HRS § 291C-12(a) violation premised on allegations that Van Blyenburg violated HRS § 291C-12 by altogether failing to stop (as opposed to stopping too far from the scene of the collision) and by failing to comply with HRS § 291C-14.

Count 2 is sufficient because "simple negligence" is a state of mind, not an element of HRS § 707-703. The State must identify the requisite states of mind for each crime it charges. But it need not define them.

II.

HRS § 291C-12(a) reads:

The driver of any vehicle involved in a collision resulting in serious bodily injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the collision or as close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the collision until the driver has fulfilled the requirements of section 291C-14. Every stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.

This statute "proscribes an offense that can be committed by factually alternative types of conduct." See State v. Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 249–50, 831 P.2d 924, 932 (1992). A driver could stop at the scene of the collision, but then transgress HRS § 291C-12(a) ’s commands by refusing, for example, to share their name and vehicle registration information with an investigating police officer. A driver could also violate HRS § 291C-12(a) by stopping a ways away from a collision site and then taking a long time to return to the collision site for reasons other than the need to avoid obstructing traffic more than necessary. Or, like Van Blyenburg, a driver could break this law by failing to stop altogether.

Defendants "can be charged with having committed an offense in two different ways when [they are] alleged to have committed it in both ways." Batson, 73 Haw. at 250, 831 P.2d at 932. Here, Count 1 of the State's wordy indictment⁵ charged three alternative theories of how Van Blyenburg violated HRS § 291C-12(a) :

COUNT 1: On or about August 6, 2016, in the City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawai‘i, GEORGE VAN BLYENBURG, as the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in serious bodily injury to or death of [decedent], with intent, knowledge, or reckless disregard of the substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was such a driver, did intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly [1] fail to immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or [2] as close thereto as possible, and did intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fail to forthwith return to and in every event remain at the scene of the accident and [3] fulfill the requirements of [3a] Section 291C-14(a) of the Hawai‘i Revised Statutes and/or [3b] Section 291C-14(b) of the Hawai‘i Revised Statutes, thereby committing the offense of Accidents Involving Death or Serious Bodily Injury, in violation of Section 291C-12 of the Hawai‘i Revised Statutes.⁶

(Emphasis added.)

Van Blyenburg argues this indictment is inadequate because it did not inform him that the stops required by HRS § 291C-12(a) "shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary."

In a very limited sense, we agree. To the extent that Count 1 alleges Van Blyenburg violated HRS § 291C-12(a) by stopping near the scene of the collision, but not near enough, it is inadequate.

Because of the Traffic Proviso, the phrase "as close thereto as possible" in HRS § 291C-12(a) has a statutory meaning that differs from its common definition. "As close thereto as possible" as used in the statute may sometimes mean "the closest location to the accident scene that does not result in an unnecessary traffic obstruction." See Baker, 146 Hawai‘i at 307, 463 P.3d at 964. This discrepancy means that the State cannot charge a violation of HRS § 291C-12(a) predicated on the theory that the defendant stopped near the scene of a collision, just not as near as the statute requires, without informing the defendant that stops mandated by HRS § 291C-12(a) "shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary." See id. at 305-08, 463 P.3d at 962-65. Because Count 1 didn't advise Van Blyenburg of the Traffic Proviso, it did not state an HRS § 291C-12(a) offense based on the theory that Van Blyenburg stopped further from the collision than the law requires.

But Count 1 did adequately state a HRS § 291C-12(a) offense premised on allegations that Van Blyenburg: (1) altogether failed to stop in the proximity of the collision scene; and (2) failed to comply with HRS § 291C-14. The Traffic Proviso is irrelevant to these theories of the offense. The obstruction or non-obstruction of traffic has nothing to do, for example, with the State's ability to prove Van Blyenburg violated HRS § 291C-12(a) by failing to comply with HRS § 291C-14. For this reason, the indictment contained all of the "elements of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprise[d] the defendant of what [they] must be prepared to...