State v. Vargas

1

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MATHEW VARGAS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-1-CA-40208

Court of Appeals of New Mexico

February 21, 2024

Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.

Appeal from the District Court of Mckinley County Robert A. Aragon District Court Judge

Raul Torrez, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Van Snow, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Caitlin C.M. Smith Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BOGARDUS, JUDGE

{¶1} Defendant Mathew Vargas appeals his conviction for vehicular homicide (driving under the influence), contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-101(C) (2016). Defendant argues that fundamental error occurred because the causation instruction tendered to the jury affirmatively misstated the law. We agree and reverse Defendant's conviction.^[1]

BACKGROUND

{¶2} After attending a friend's wedding in Red Rock State Park outside of Gallup, New Mexico, Defendant began driving back home westbound toward Gallup on Route 66, a two-lane highway and was involved in a head-on collision, which resulted in the death of the other driver. A number of drivers witnessed the car accident. Marlin and Jennifer Simplicio, also driving westbound on Route 66, testified that they saw Defendant's vehicle steer into the eastbound lane to pass the car in front of him, and when he did, Defendant hit the victim's truck, which was traveling eastbound. Shakiva and Orlando John, who were driving in the eastbound lane, stated that they also saw Defendant's vehicle swerve into the eastbound lane and hit the victim's truck.

{¶3} As a result of the accident, the victim died at the scene and Defendant was seriously injured-the emergency brake from Defendant's vehicle was embedded in his leg, trapping him inside. The emergency medical technician (EMT) that tended to Defendant, testified that Defendant did not seem "altered in any way" and that he could answer basic questions about who he was and how he came to be at the scene of the accident. The EMT further noted that Defendant did not slur his speech, did not smell like alcohol, and did not seem intoxicated. However, according to the EMT, Defendant seemed "lethargic."

{¶4} At the scene, the EMT also found a baggie containing one and a half Xanax pills in Defendant's pocket. Defendant told the EMT that the Xanax pills were his and that he took them as needed for anxiety. When interviewed by police after the accident, Defendant denied taking Xanax on the day of the accident. He admitted that he did not have a current prescription for Xanax, although he claimed a doctor had prescribed it for him in the past. According to Defendant, he got the Xanax pills from a friend who gave them to him after he suffered from an anxiety attack. Defendant testified he had last taken a Xanax pill two days before the accident.

{¶5} Defendant was transported to the hospital, where hospital staff drew his blood-approximately seven to eight hours after the accident. Defendant had a concentration of 0.04 milligram per liter of alprazolam, the generic name for Xanax, in his system. Several days after the accident, Defendant was interviewed by detectives. During the interview, Defendant stated that he remembered the victim swerving into his lane. Defendant claimed he saw the victim briefly come into his lane and when he looked down to adjust the air conditioning in his vehicle and looked back up, the victim's truck was about to hit him. At trial, the State presented evidence from three experts in accident reconstruction who all testified that the accident occurred in the victim's lane-the eastbound lane of the highway. Defendant conceded that the evidence showed that the impact probably happened in the victim's lane. The jury convicted Defendant of vehicular homicide by driving under the influence.

DISCUSSION

{¶6} Defendant argues that fundamental error occurred because the jury received an instruction on the definition of causation that essentially "told the jury it could convict if it found that [his] driving was the proximate cause of [the victim's] death," instead of making clear that the jury had to find that Defendant's unlawful conduct driving under the influence, was the proximate cause of death. Specifically, Defendant contends that the dispute at trial was "whether [Defendant] was criminally responsible for [the victim's] death," not whether Defendant's driving killed the victim. Because the causation instruction misstated the proximate cause requirement, Defendant asserts that the jury "could have convicted him without finding beyond a reasonable doubt that an unlawful act was the proximate cause of [the victim's] death." The State responds that even if the causation instruction was erroneous, any error was not fundamental.

I. Standard of Review

{¶7} We review Defendant's argument for fundamental error because he failed to preserve this issue at trial. See State v. Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 10, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176 (stating "[t]he doctrine of fundamental error, embodied in Rule 12-216(B)(2) [NMRA], is an exception to the general rule requiring preservation of error"). We are mindful that "the fundamental error doctrine requires an appellate court to perform a difficult and often high-stakes inquiry." State v. Sivils, 2023-NMCA-080, ¶ 9, 538 P.3d 126.

{¶8} Fundamental error exists, in a particular case, if it would "shock the conscience" to affirm the conviction. See State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 14, 135 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 633. An error can "shock the conscience" in one of two ways, either: (1) because of "the obvious innocence of the defendant," id. ¶ 16, or (2) because "a mistake in the process makes a conviction fundamentally unfair notwithstanding the apparent guilt of the accused." Id. ¶ 17. Here, we are concerned with the latter-the procedural strand of the fundamental error doctrine. The procedural strand "focuses less on guilt and innocence and more on the process and the underlying integrity of our judicial system." Id. ¶ 16. "[N]ot all questions of fundamental error turn solely on guilt or innocence . . . [o]ur inquiry must probe deeper." Id. ¶ 14.

II. The Causation Instruction Was Erroneous

{¶9} First, we must determine whether an error occurred and in so doing we ask "whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected by the jury instruction" at issue. Id. ¶ 19. A jury instruction may cause confusion or misdirection when, "through omission or misstatement," it does not provide "an accurate rendition" of the relevant law. State v. Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134. Because the causation instruction "fail[ed] to provide the juror[s] with an accurate rendition of the relevant law," See State v. Cabezuela, 2011-NMSC-041, ¶ 22, 150 N.M. 654, 265 P.3d 705 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), we conclude that it was erroneous. In reaching this conclusion we interpret the causation element of our vehicular homicide statute. "Our primary goal when interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent." State v. Suazo, 2017-NMSC-011, ¶ 15, 390 P.3d 674 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{¶10} We begin with the plain language of the statute, which is "[t]he primary indicator of legislative intent." State v. Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 10, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863. Pursuant to Section 66-8-101(C), "[a] person who commits homicide by vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or while under the influence of any drug is guilty of a second[-]degree felony." Our Supreme Court has adopted a Uniform Jury Instruction (UJI)-UJI 14-240B NMRA regarding the violation. An instruction conforming with UJI 14-240B was provided to the jury. The instruction required the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. [D]efendant operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of alprazolam also referred to as [X]anax, a drug;

2. [Defendant's driving while under the influence of drugs caused the death of [the victim]; [and]

3. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 14th day of October, 2017.

Based on both the plain language of Section 66-8-101 and the elements instruction, the jury was required to find both that Defendant engaged in an unlawful activity (driving under the influence of Xanax) and that such unlawful activity (driving under the influence of Xanax) caused the death of the victim. See § 66-8-101(C).

{¶11} The definition of "causation" was of central importance to Defendant's right to a fair trial, see Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 25, because Defendant's theory of the case directly controverted the State's theory that his act of driving under the influence was the cause of the victim's death. Because Defendant raised a question as to whether impairment, i.e his use of Xanax, was actually the cause of the victim's Death, causation was clearly in issue. Significantly, throughout trial and on appeal, Defendant contested the State's theory that he acted unlawfully, and that the alleged unlawful activity caused the victim's death. According to Defendant, he "drifted out of his lane accidentally when he looked down to change the air settings in [his vehicle]." Specifically, Defendant claims that he reached down to adjust the air, looked up, and crashed. Defendant testified that when he left the wedding reception he felt "perfectly fine" and was not under the influence of anything. In other words, he contended that a moment of...