State v. Villeda

546 P.3d 268

372 Or. 108

STATE of Oregon, Petitioner on Review,

v.Julio Cesar VILLEDA, Respondent on Review.

(CC 19CR08759; 20CR10192) (SC S070188)

Supreme Court of Oregon, En Banc.

Argued and Submitted November 9, 2023

March 21, 2024

On review from the Court of Appeals.^* (CA A175679 (Control); A175680)

Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attor- ney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Brett J. Allin, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Deputy Defender, Criminal Appellate Section.

James S. Coon, Thomas, Coon, Newton & Frost, Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Gary Walter Higgs.

Rosalind M. Lee, Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, Eugene, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. Also on the brief were Stacy M. Du Clos, Nora E. Coon, and Daniel C. Silberman.

Shenoa Payne, Shenoa Payne Attorney at Law PC, Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.

BUSHONG, J.

₁₁₀A jury convicted defendant of two domestic violence offenses, acquitting him on more serious charges, including rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse of his domestic partner. Before trial, during jury selection, a prospective juror stated that she did not think that she could be fair and impartial because she had several close friends who had been sexually assaulted and that would influence her if she sat on the jury. The trial court denied defendant’s request to excuse that prospective juror for actual bias after hearing her responses to additional questions posed by the court and the prosecutor. The prospective juror did not sit on the jury that decided the case because defendant used one of his peremptory challenges to excuse her. In appealing his convictions, defendant contended that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s for-cause challenge to that juror. The Court of Appeals agreed and further concluded that the error was prejudicial because it resulted in the loss of a peremptory challenge. State v. Villeda, 324 Or App 502, 526 P.3d 1213 (2023).

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's challenge for cause, but we conclude that the error did not prejudice the defendant "in respect to a substantial right" as required for reversal under ORS 131.035. As explained below, the error did not interfere with defendant’s right to a fair trial before impartial Jurors, and whatever impact the error may have had on how defendant used his peremptory challenges did not prejudice him in respect to a substantial right. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

1. BACKGROUND

A. Standard of Review

[1–3] We review the trial court’s ruling on a challenge to a juror for cause for abuse of discretion. State v. Fanus, 336 Or. 63, 83, 79 P.3d 847 (2003), cert. den., 541 U.S. 1075, 124 S.Ct. 2416, 158 L.Ed.2d 987 (2004). Because the trial court has the advantage of observing the juror’s demeanor, a trial court’s decision on a challenge for cause "is entitled to deference and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion." Id. The trial court’s ₁₁₁discretion, however, is limited by the law that governs challenges for cause for actual bias. See ORCP 57 D(1)(g) (defining actual bias);¹ ORS 136.210(1) (adopting ORCP 57 D(1)(g) standards for jury selection in criminal cases); State v. Barone, 328 Or. 68, 74, 969 P.2d 1013 (1998) (describing abuse of discretion standard). The fact that a juror "has preconceived ideas about a matter relevant to the case is not determinative." Barone, 328 Or. at 74, 969 P.2d 1013. Rather, the test "is whether the prospective juror’s ideas or opinions would impair substantially [their] performance of the duties of a juror to decide the case fairly and impartially on the evidence presented in court." Id.

B. The Jury Selection Process in This Case

The relevant facts—involving the steps taken by the trial court during the jury selection process, also known as voir dire—are procedural and undisputed.

At the start of the jury selection process, the court read the charges in the indictment and asked if any of the prospective jurors had personal views about this type of case—involving allegations of domestic violence, including charges of rape, sodomy, and physical assault—that might affect their ability to be fair and impartial jurors. Juror 155 raised her hand. When defense counsel asked juror 155 why she might not be able to be fair and impartial, she stated, "I have several close friends who have been sexually assaulted or raped" and "that would influence how I would participate in this." When asked to explain further, juror 155 stated, "Well, I think generally when I hear about cases of sexual ₁₁₂abuse or rape, I tend to give credibility to the survivor. And, so, while I can still presume that [defendant] is innocent, I think my natural inclination is [to] stand with the survivor."

When defense counsel asked the juror if she could put that view aside, she stated, "I’m not sure if I could put it aside." Defense counsel then asked the juror if she had "a reasonable doubt about [her] ability to be fair to [defendant] in this case," and she replied, "Yes." Defense counsel then asked the court to excuse juror 155 for cause.

The court did not immediately rule on that request. Instead, the court spoke to the pool of prospective jurors about the role of the jury, explaining that, although the circumstances of the case might remind a person of their own life experiences, that does not necessarily mean that the person cannot be a fair and impartial juror. The court then asked juror 155 the following question:

"Do you think you could put those feelings aside * * * and be neutral, fair when you hear the evidence here * * * and then if it’s creeping back, wait, I know I have these feelings, but I can’t let them—no, no, I got to listen. I got to be fair to both sides * * *

"And then hear the evidence and then follow the law as I give it to you and just in essence, you know, to be fair. I mean, do you think you could do that * * * if you were a juror in this case?"

Juror 155 replied:

"Yes, I think so. I think, again, that my natural inclination would be to lend more support to the victim survivor, but I think I could check my biases and my past understanding of these issues."

At that point, the court permitted questioning of the prospective jurors to continue.

Later, defense counsel asked the prospective jurors if anyone believed that a woman would not lie about being raped. Juror 155 raised her hand and confirmed that her concern was the same as what she previously explained. Juror 155 also indicated that she agreed with defense counsel’s statements that a woman would not lie about being raped by someone that she was in a relationship with, and that a ₁₁₃woman would not lie "in court" about being raped. Defense counsel then asked juror 155 if she thought she would be a good juror for this case, and she replied that she thought she would be "biased" or "really emotional."

The court and prosecutor then inquired further:

"THE COURT: Ma’am, * * *we gave you a chance to hear other folks* * *? And again, you know, you heard my definition of what we’re looking for, everybody here * * * to be fair and * * * kind of keep * * * those emotions aside if you can* * *. So, do you think, ma’am, that you can do it in this case?

"[JUROR 155]: I don’t think I could keep my emotions to the side. Even just being in the room is just difficult.

"THE COURT: And would those emotions not allow you to be fair to one side.

"[JUROR 155]: Yeah. I don’t think they would allow me to be fair."

The court then allowed the state to inquire further:

"[THE PROSECUTOR]: Thank you. [Juror 155], I can see you’re getting a little upset, and I totally understand. The good news is that we’re not here to decide whether or not rape is a crime. There are certainly—it’s a crime within the books, and there are other heinous crimes that definitely happen in the courthouse that * * *would be hard to listen to. There’s child abuse. There’s murder. And nobody is asking you not to be a human when you’re hearing that. The question is when the judge tells you that, you know, you’re to follow the law and to weigh the evidence as it’s presented, do you think that’s something you could do?

"[JUROR 155]: To weigh the evidence as it’s presented?

"[THE PROSECUTOR]: Mm-hmm. The evidence and the law as its presented.

"[JUROR 155]: Yes."

Defense counsel again challenged juror 155 for cause, and the court denied the challenge. The court also denied defense counsel’s request for additional peremptory challenges. At the end of the jury selection process, defense counsel used one of defendant’s six peremptory challenges to excuse juror 155 and used the other five peremptory ₁₁₄challenges to excuse other prospective jurors. Defense counsel did not challenge for cause any of the jurors who were eventually seated on the jury, although counsel did state that the defense would have used peremptory challenges to excuse jurors 128 and 305 if two more peremptory challenges had been available.² Defense counsel did not challenge those jurors for cause, contend that they did not qualify as fair and impartial jurors, or explain why he would have excused those jurors peremptorily if he had more peremptory challenges.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of endangering a person protected by an order under the Family Abuse Prevention Act, ORS 163.192, and assault in the fourth degree constituting domestic violence, ORS 163.160(2). The jury found defendant not guilty on the other charged offenses, including...