State v. Vlahos

138 Conn.App. 379

51 A.3d 1173

STATE of Connecticut

v.Dean Steven VLAHOS.

No. 30217.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 5, 2012.

Decided Oct. 2, 2012.

Dean Steven Vlahos, pro se, the appellant (defendant).

James M. Ralls, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Stephen J. Sedensky III, state's attorney, and Sharmese L. Hodge, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

BEACH, SHELDON and BORDEN, Js.

BEACH, J.

The defendant, Dean Steven Vlahos, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of operating a motor vehicle without a driver's license in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 14–36(a). Pursuant to a part B information, the defendant's sentence was enhanced by virtue of § 14–36(h)(2)(B). The defendant claims that (1) the information failed to state an offense, (2) the state erred in charging him under § 14–36(a), (3) the court's instructions misled the jury, (4) the court erred in denying his motion for a bill of particulars and (5) the court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the amended part B information. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant. The defendant obtained his first driver's license in 1982. On March 7, 2001, the defendant's license was suspended for one year due to a conviction for operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension. On March 14, 2001, his license was suspended for five years due to a second conviction for operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension. On August 15, 2001, his license was suspended for five years due to a third conviction for operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension.¹ These periods of suspension ended at the latest on August 15, 2006.²

On February 6, 2007, at approximately 8:26 p.m., Gregory Topa, an officer with the Danbury police department, stopped the defendant for a motor vehicle violation. When Topa asked the defendant for his driver's license, registration and insurance, the defendant responded that he did not have a driver's license, that his vehicle was unregistered and that he did not have an insurance card. At the time of the incident, the defendant's license had not been reinstated; he did not reinstate his license until February 27, 2007. The defendant was arrested.

By way of a substitute long form part A information, the state charged the defendant with operating a motor vehicle without a license in violation of § 14–36(a).³ By way of a substitute part B information, the state charged the defendant with previously having been convicted of operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension in violation of General Statutes §§ 14–215(a) and 14–36(a). Following a jury trial on the part A information, the jury found the defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle without a license. Following a court trial on the part B information, the court found the defendant guilty. The court sentenced the defendant to ninety days incarceration.⁴ This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the information failed to state an offense because an element of § 14–36(a),⁵operation on a public highway, was omitted.⁶ We disagree.

The one count substitute long form information (substitute information) charged the defendant with “operating a motor vehicle without a license and charge[d] that in the city of Danbury on or about the 6th day of February 2007 at approximately 8:26 p.m., [the defendant] did operate a motor vehicle without a license in violation of Connecticut General Statute § 14–36(a).” Section 14–36(a) provides in relevant part that “no person shall operate a motor vehicle on any public highway of this state or private road on which a speed limit has been established in accordance with subsection (a) of [General Statutes §] 14–218a until such person has obtained a motor vehicle operator's license.”

“The underlying purpose of the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of a criminal charge is to inform the defendant of the charge against him with sufficient precision to enable him to prepare his defense and to avoid prejudicial surprise and to make the charge definite enough to enable [the defendant] to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of any future prosecution for the same offense.... When reviewing a claim, not raised prior to the verdict,⁷ that an information fails to charge all the essential elements of an offense, we must construe the information liberally in favor of the state.... Under the applicable standard of review, a conviction based upon a challenged information is valid unless the information is so obviously defective that by no reasonable construction can it be said to charge the offense for which conviction was had.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McMurray, 217 Conn. 243, 249–50, 585 A.2d 677 (1991).

In State v. Reed, 55 Conn.App. 170, 740 A.2d 383, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 921, 742 A.2d 361 (1999), this court addressed a case in which the defendant was charged with sexual assault in the first degree. The long form information filed by the state in that case alleged that the defendant had “engaged in sexual intercourse with another person and such other person was under thirteen ... years of age, in violation of section 53a–70 (a)(2) of the Connecticut General Statutes.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 175, 740 A.2d 383. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim that this allegation failed to set forth the essential elements of sexual assault in the first degree, this court stated: “Neither information in this case specifically articulated each of the elements required to prove sexual assault in the first degree. The long form information, however, provided the defendant with the exact section and subsection of the statute under which he was charged.... We conclude that a reasonable construction of the information shows that it charged the defendant with the offense for which he was convicted. Moreover, the information was sufficiently precise to enable him adequately to prepare his defense.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 176–77, 740 A.2d 383.

In this case, the substitute information did not specifically state the element of operation on a public highway. It did, however, provide the defendant with the statutory section under which he was charged as well as the time and place of the incident. The state's inclusion of these items in the information was sufficient to inform the defendant of the charges against him.

II

The defendant next claims that the state erred in charging him under § 14–36(a), rather than under General Statutes § 14–41(c), driving with an expired license, or General Statutes § 14–215b, driving after the expiration of a period of suspension. We disagree.

We first set forth our standard of review. “The issue in this case ... raises a question of statutory construction, which is a [question] of law, over which we exercise plenary review.... The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply.... When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, [we] first ... consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 286 Conn. 454, 464–65, 944 A.2d 315 (2008).

The defendant argues that it was improper for the state to charge him with violating § 14–36(a) because that statute does not apply to persons who previously have obtained valid Connecticut driver's licenses but only to persons who have never obtained valid Connecticut driver's licenses. He argues that the language of § 14–36(a)—that a person shall not operate a motor vehicle on a public highway “until such person has obtained a motor vehicle operator's license”—prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle on a public highway until that person has obtained his or her first driver's license. He claims that this interpretation is buttressed by § 14–36(e),⁸ which sets forth the requirements for obtaining an initial driver's license. Once a person has satisfied the requirements of § 14–36(e) for obtaining an initial driver's license, he argues, that person has satisfied the requirements of § 14–36(a). He claims that, because he had obtained a driver's license in 1982, he satisfied the requirements of § 14–36(a) for all time and, accordingly, cannot logically be charged under that statute on the facts of this case. He argues that if the state wanted to subject a person, who operated a motor vehicle without renewing his license after the period of license suspension had ended, to the penalties of § 14–36, the state would have to charge and to prove a violation of § 14–41 or § 14–215b.

We conclude that, on the facts of this case, the state's choice to charge a violation of § 14–36(a) was not illogical and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Section 14–36(a) provides in relevant part that “no person shall operate a motor vehicle on any public highway of this...