State v. Vonbargen

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. HAYDEN THOMAS VONBARGEN, Respondent.

No. 52823-1-II

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II

August 4, 2020

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LEE, C.J. — The State appeals the trial court's dismissal without prejudice of four counts of felony communication with a minor for immoral purposes against Hayden T. VonBargen. The trial court found VonBargen was incompetent to stand trial and that competency restoration would likely be unsuccessful. The trial court then dismissed the charges against VonBargen without prejudice.

The State contends that the trial court erred in concluding VonBargen's competency could not be restored and dismissing the charges against VonBargen without prejudice. The State further contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion for reconsideration. We affirm the trial court's competency determination and dismissal of charges without prejudice, but we remand to the trial court to comply with RCW 10.77.086(1)(c) and RCW 10.77.086(4).

FACTS

VonBargen is an intellectually disabled person.¹ The State alleged that he engaged in sexually explicit conversations with a 12 year old and charged VonBargen with four counts of felony communicating with a minor for immoral purposes. The trial court ordered an initial evaluation for competency and VonBargen was evaluated by 2 experts: Dr. Susannah David and Dr. Brent Oneal.

A. EXPERT REPORTS

The State's expert, Dr. David, interviewed VonBargen, reviewed his academic, social, and medical history, and diagnosed him with "intellectual disability (mild)." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 22. Dr. David opined that VonBargen "lacks the capacity to assist in his defense." CP at 24. This opinion was based on VonBargen's "limited familiarity with his legal peril and his constitutional rights, and his likely tendency to change responses, whether accurate or not." CP at 24. Dr. David also opined that VonBargen's "capacity to proceed to trial could and likely would improve from the educational program at [Western State Hospital]." CP at 25. Dr. David elaborated:

[S]hould the court find that [VonBargen] is not competent to stand trial and meets criteria for competency restoration treatment . . . then inpatient psychiatric treatment is recommended to assist in improving [VonBargen's] mental condition . . . . It is expected that clinically indicated treatment would help improve the understanding of the legal proceedings and the ability to assist in the defense.

CP at 25.

VonBargen's expert, Dr. Oneal, interviewed VonBargen, reviewed his personal history, and diagnosed him with intellectual disability. Dr. Oneal also administered the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence-Second Edition (WASI-II) IQ test. VonBargen's IQ score was73, which is in the fourth percentile and shows VonBargen's "cognitive abilities are . . . extremely low." CP at 30. The WASI-II is an "abbreviated tool" that is used to "estimate" intellectual functioning. CP at 30.

Dr. Oneal opined that due to VonBargen's intellectual disability, he "does not currently possess the basic capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings or assist in his defense." CP at 34. Dr. Oneal also opined that VonBargen "is not an appropriate candidate for . . . court-ordered competency restoration" because that process usually entails teaching about the court process and the administering of psychiatric medication, but "VonBargen's competency-related problems are the result of a developmental disability that is quite unlikely to be improved via basic teaching or psychiatric medication." CP at 34. Dr. Oneal further noted that VonBargen was not even "able to learn much of the information that he was taught during this competency evaluation." CP at 34.

B. COMPETENCY HEARING

The trial court held a competency hearing. Both Dr. David and Dr. Oneal testified regarding their evaluations and opinions as outlined above. Dr. David also testified that while VonBargen has a disability, he can still learn. VonBargen's IQ was in the "high end for intellectual disability" and "you can expect understanding and ability to assist counsel to be restored" for a person in the high end of intellectual disability. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (July 25, 2018) at 14, 18. Dr. Oneal testified that VonBargen is "at the 4th percentile of intellectual functioning" and "ha[s] very little ability to retain or recall information," which would hinder the ability to restore competency. VRP (July 25, 2018) at 35, 40.

The trial court found that VonBargen was not competent to stand trial. The trial court further found that "[a]lthough the experts disagreed on whether [VonBargen's] competency could be restored, the Court finds that restoration would likely be unsuccessful." CP at 38. The trialcourt then concluded that VonBargen was "not competent to stand trial" and that "restoration . . . will likely not be successful and, as a result, the court will not order the restoration process." CP at 38.

The State filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. The trial court ultimately dismissed the charges against VonBargen without prejudice.

The State appeals.

ANALYSIS

The State contends that competency restoration was mandatory under former RCW 10.77.086(1)(a)(i) (July 1, 2015).² Therefore, according to the State, the trial court erred by not ordering competency restoration, in denying the State's motion for reconsideration, and in dismissing the charges without prejudice.³ We disagree that the trial court erred as alleged by the State, but we remand to the trial court to comply with RCW 10.77.086(1)(c) and RCW 10.77.086(4).

A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause of the United States Constitution guarantees an accused person the right not to stand trial unless they are legally competent. State v. Wicklund, 96 Wn.2d 798, 800, 638 P.2d 1241 (1982) (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172, 95 S. Ct. 896, 904, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975)). Likewise, under RCW 10.77.050, "Noincompetent person shall be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity continues." Under Washington law, we apply a two-part test to assess a criminal defendant's legal competency: "(1) whether the defendant understands the nature of the charges; and (2) whether [they are] capable of assisting in [their] defense." In re Pers. Restraint of Fleming, 142 Wn.2d 853, 862, 16 P.3d 610 (2001).

We review a trial court's competency determination for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 864. "A court abuses its discretion only when an 'order is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds'." State v. Ortiz-Abrego, 187 Wn.2d 394, 402, 387 P.3d 638 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Rhome, 172 Wash.2d 654, 668, 260 P.3d 874 (2011)). Additionally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by not ordering a subsequent evaluation under RCW 10.77.060 "[i]f the issue of competency is 'fairly debatable.'" State v. McCarthy, 193 Wn.2d 792, 803, 446 P.3d 167 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d 607, 623. 290 P.3d 942 (2012)).

We uphold a trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Fuentes, 183 Wn.2d 149, 157, 352 P.3d 152 (2015). Substantial evidence is evidence that is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the finding. State v. Froehlich, 197 Wn. App. 831, 837, 391 P.3d 559 (2017). We determine whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. State v. Homan, 181 Wn.2d 102, 106, 330 P.3d 182 (2014). Our review of whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law is de novo. Fuentes, 183 Wn.2d at 157. The weighing of evidence, including any inconsistencies and matters of credibility, is for the trial court; we will not reweigh such matters on appeal. State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 647, 870 P.2d 313 (1994).

We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Schultz, 146 Wn.2d 540, 544, 48 P.3d 301 (2002). Our primary goal is to effectuate legislative intent. State v. Whitaker, 195 Wn.2d 333, 338-39, 459 P.3d 1074 (2020). To determine the legislature's intent, we first look at the statute's plain meaning, "if the plain meaning is unambiguous, we give it effect." Id.

Lastly, we review motions for reconsideration and the dismissal of criminal charges for an abuse of discretion. State v. Puapuaga, 164 Wn.2d 515, 520-21, 192 P.3d 360 (2008); State v. Parada, 75 Wn. App. 224, 235, 877 P.2d 231 (1994).

B. NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION

The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding of fact 1.6 because substantial evidence does not support that finding. The State also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that VonBargen's competency cannot be restored.

The trial court's finding of fact 1.6 states that "[a]lthough the experts disagreed on whether [VonBargen's] competency could be restored, the Court finds that restoration would likely be unsuccessful." CP at 38. The trial court's conclusion of 2.2 states that "[t]he restoration process will likely not be successful and, as a result, the court will not order the restoration process." CP at 38.

Here, Dr. Oneal interviewed VonBargen and opined that VonBargen "is not an appropriate candidate for . . . court-ordered competency restoration" because that process usually entails teaching about the court process and the administering of psychiatric medication, but "VonBargen's competency-related problems are the result of a developmental disability that is quite unlikely to be improved via basic teaching or psychiatric medication." CP at 34. Dr. Oneal also testified that VonBargen "has very little ability to retain or recall information" and that this would hinder the ability to restore competency. VRP (July 25, 2018) at 40. Dr. Oneal based hisconclusion on VonBargen's low IQ score...