State v. Vredenburg

State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Timothy Lee Vredenburg, Appellant.

A18-1451

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

July 15, 2019

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

Affirmed

Halbrooks, Judge

Mille Lacs County District Court

File No. 48-CR-17-2622

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Joe Walsh, Mille Lacs County Attorney, Milaca, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christen Chapman, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

HALBROOKS, Judge

Appellant challenges his conviction of felony domestic assault-fear, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to prove that (1) he intended to cause fear in the victim, (2) the prosecutor committed multiple instances of plainly erroneous misconduct, and (3) the district court erred by admitting substantially prejudicial relationship evidence and by failing to provide a contemporaneous limiting instruction. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Timothy Lee Vredenburg had an on-again, off-again relationship with D.K. for more than six years. Vredenburg and D.K. lived together for nearly half of the relationship until Vredenburg moved out in spring of 2017. In November 2017, unbeknownst to D.K., Vredenburg began staying with her neighbors.

In December 2017, D.K. went to the neighbors' home, and Vredenburg answered the door, surprising D.K. D.K. made a comment, and Vredenburg responded by picking D.K. up and carrying her out onto the deck. D.K. dropped to her knees to avoid being carried, but Vredenburg picked her up again. D.K. was afraid that Vredenburg was going to throw her down the deck stairs. Upset, she called the police. When the police arrived, they knocked on the door of the neighbors' house, causing the door to swing open. After the neighbors arrived home and gave consent, the police entered the home and found Vredenburg hiding in a bedroom, covered in blankets between a bed and the wall.

Vredenburg was arrested and charged with one felony count of domestic assault-fear, and one felony count of domestic assault-harm. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2016), the state moved to admit evidence of Vredenburg's past domestic conduct against D.K., which included striking and kicking her, throwing her down a flight of stairs, throwing her against a wall, taking away her phone, and confining her to a room. The district court allowed D.K. to testify about their relationship history during the two-dayjury trial in 2018. The jury convicted Vredenburg of domestic assault-fear but acquitted him of domestic assault-harm. The district court sentenced Vredenburg to 27 months in prison. This appeal follows.

DECISION

I.

Vredenburg challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, contending that it is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to cause fear in D.K. On review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). Vredenburg specifically challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the element of intent, which may be proved by circumstantial evidence. In re Welfare of T.N.Y., 632 N.W.2d 765, 769 (Minn. App. 2001); see also Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 860 (Minn. 2016) ("Intent is generally proved by inferences drawn from a person's words or actions in light of all the surrounding circumstances." (quotation omitted)). To determine if circumstantial evidence is consistent with Vredenburg's guilt, we apply a two-step analysis. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013).

First, we identify the circumstances proved, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferring to the jury's determinations. State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Minn. 2018). Second, we independently determine the reasonableness of the inferences a jury could draw from the circumstances proved. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599. We do not look at the circumstances proved as isolated facts but instead as a wholeto determine whether they form a "complete chain that . . . leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude . . . any reasonable inference other than guilt." State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). All circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010).

Vredenburg was convicted of felony domestic assault-fear pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subds. 1, 4 (2016), which provide that a person commits an assault and is guilty of a felony when, within ten years of the first of two or more previous domestic violence-related offense convictions, they commit "an act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death." "'With intent to' . . . means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful, will cause that result." Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2016). Although a finding of intent generally cannot be based solely on the effect that the actor's conduct has on the victim, a victim's reaction to that conduct is circumstantial evidence that is relevant to intent. State v. Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1975); T.N.Y., 632 N.W.2d at 769. Intent may be inferred "from the idea that a person intends the natural consequences of his or her actions." Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 860 (quotation omitted).

When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the circumstances proved are as follows: Vredenburg and D.K. lived together until he moved out of her home, and moved in with her neighbors. D.K. did not know that Vredenburg was staying there. A no-contact order was issued in 2017, prohibiting Vredenburg from having contact with D.K. In December 2017, D.K. went to the neighbors' home and was surprised whenVredenburg answered the door. D.K. made a comment to Vredenburg, who responded by picking her up and carrying her out onto the deck. D.K. tried to kneel in order to prevent Vredenburg from picking her up, but he continued to carry her. D.K. testified that she believed that Vredenburg was going to throw her down the stairs, in part because of their history. Vredenburg had previously thrown D.K. down a flight of stairs. D.K. called 911 twice and was distraught when officers arrived.

Vredenburg contends that the circumstances proved do not exclude a rational inference that he was trying to make space between himself and D.K. He argues that his conduct was not aggressive and that he did not carry her anywhere near the stairs, but was simply trying to create physical distance between them. But in light of the evidence presented at trial, Vredenburg's hypothesis is not a rational one.

Vredenburg chose to open the door to D.K. and to physically engage with her, despite the no-contact order. Vredenburg intended the natural and probable consequences of his actions when he grabbed D.K. See id. D.K. testified that she believed Vredenburg was going to throw her down the stairs and that she was afraid. When viewed in the context of the tumultuous relationship history between Vredenburg and D.K., the only rational hypothesis supported by the circumstances proved is that Vredenburg intended to cause fear in D.K. Based on our review of the record, Vredenburg's argument that the evidence is insufficient to prove his intent lacks merit. We conclude that the jury's finding of guilt is supported by sufficient evidence.

II.

Vredenburg asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because of multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Because Vredenburg did not object at trial, the standard of review is modified plain error. State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 104 (Minn. 2009). The burden is on Vredenburg to identify prosecutorial error and to demonstrate that the error was plain. Id. If successful, the burden shifts to the state to show that the plain error did not affect Vredenburg's substantial rights. Id. We will not order a new trial unless it is necessary to preserve the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. All of the statements that Vredenburg alleges are improper were made during the prosecutor's closing argument. On review of a closing argument, we do not isolate particular statements but instead view the argument as a whole. State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 656 (Minn. 2006).

Vredenburg contends that the prosecutor (1) impermissibly referred to facts not in evidence, (2) used the admitted relationship evidence for an improper purpose, (3) impermissibly disparaged the defense, (4) impermissibly invited the jury to consider Vredenburg's socioeconomic status, (5) impermissibly aligned himself with the jury through the use of collective pronouns, and (6) impermissibly vouched for D.K.'s credibility. We address each contention in turn.

First, Vredenburg asserts that the prosecutor impermissibly referred to facts not in evidence when using the phrase "battered women" because it invoked the theory of "battered woman syndrome" without supporting expert testimony. But when viewed in context of the entire closing, this argument is unavailing. A prosecutor may "present tothe jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, . . . analyze and explain the evidence, and . . . present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom." State v. Wahlberg, 296 N.W.2d 408, 419 (Minn. 1980). Here, the prosecutor's statement was in response to a rhetorical question by the defense. During closing argument, defense counsel attacked D.K.'s credibility and pointed out specific details from her...