State v. W. Va. Crime Victims Comp. Fund

232 W.Va. 728

753 S.E.2d 886

State of West Virginia ex rel. Angela Y. SMITH, Petitioner

v.WEST VIRGINIA CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION FUND and the Court of Claims for the State of West Virginia, Respondents.

No. 12–0117.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: April 9, 2013.

Decided: May 24, 2013.

Syllabus by the Court

1. “A statute that is ambiguous must be construed before it can be applied.” Syl. Pt. 1, Farley v. Buckalew, 186 W.Va. 693, 414 S.E.2d 454 (1992).

2. “The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Syl. Pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975).

3. “Generally the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and familiar significance and meaning, and regard is to be had for their general and proper use.” Syl. Pt. 4, State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W.Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959).

4. The phrase “other scholastic monetary assistance” contained within the definition of “lost scholarship” set forth in West Virginia Code § 14–2A–3(m) (2009 & Supp.2012) includes student loans.

5. “ ‘A statute is enacted as a whole with a general purpose and intent, and each part should be considered in connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole. Words and clauses should be given a meaning which harmonizes with the subject matter and the general purpose of the statute. The general intention is the key to the whole and the interpretation of the whole controls the interpretation of its parts.’ Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Holbert v. Robinson, 134 W.Va. 524, 59 S.E.2d 884 (1950).” Syl. Pt. 2, Durham v. Jenkins, 229 W.Va.669, 735 S.E.2d 266 (2012).

6. Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 14–2A–3(m) (2009 & Supp.2012), economic loss that is subject to reimbursement from the West Virginia Crime Victims Compensation Fund includes “lost scholarship” only if the victim is unable to receive or use the “lost scholarship,” in whole or in part, due to injuries received from criminally injurious conduct.

Mark McMillian, Esq., Mark McMillian–Attorney at Law, L.C., Charleston, for Petitioner.

John R. Homburg, Esq., Richard F. Olsen, Esq., West Virginia Legislature, Joint Committee on Government and Finance, Legislative Services Division, Charleston, for Respondents.

LOUGHRY, Justice.

The petitioner, Angela Y. Smith, has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari ¹ seeking reversal of a decision of the Court of Claims for the State of West Virginia denying her compensation for unpaid student loans owed by her deceased son, Donte Newsome, a college student who was an innocent victim of murder. Ms. Smith contends that she is entitled to reimbursement for her son's unpaid student loans pursuant to the West Virginia Crime Victims Compensation Act, West Virginia Code §§ 14–2A–1 to – 29 (2009 & Supp.2012) (hereinafter “the Act”), which provides compensation to innocent victims of crime for injury suffered to their person or property. In denying her relief, the Court of Claims found that student loans are contractual obligations that cannot be reimbursed under the Act.

Upon consideration of the parties' briefs and oral argument, the submitted record, and the pertinent authorities, this Court denies the writ.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On July 5, 2008, Donte Newsome, a student at Marshall University in Huntington, West Virginia, was shot and killed by Jeral Garner. Garner was convicted of murder and is presently serving a prison sentence. Mr. Newsome was an innocent victim and did not contribute to his own demise.

On December 7, 2009, the decedent's mother, Ms. Smith, submitted an application to the Court of Claims seeking reimbursement from the West Virginia Crime Victims Compensation Fund. She sought compensation for medical expenses, funeral and burial costs, and student loans owed by the decedent at the time of his death.² By order entered on September 23, 2010, Ms. Smith was granted an award of $8,184.99 for medical expenses and funeral and burial costs. She was denied compensation for the student loans. Thereafter, Ms. Smith requested a hearing concerning whether reimbursement of unpaid student loans can be made pursuant to the Act.³ A hearing was held October 7, 2011. By order entered December 27, 2011, the Court of Claims denied Ms. Smith's request for reimbursement for her son's unpaid student loans. On June 26, 2012, Ms. Smith filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court seeking review of the decision of the Court of Claims.

II. Standard for Issuance of Writ

It has long been established that “[t]he remedy by writ of certiorari ... to review the judgment of a[n inferior tribunal], is not given as a matter of right, but is awarded by the court ... for cause on proper case shown.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Harrow v. Ohio River R. Co., 38 W.Va. 711, 18 S.E. 926 (1894); accord W.Va. Rev. R.A.P. 16(a) (“Issuance by the Court of an extraordinary writ is not a matter of right, but of discretion sparingly exercised.”). Therefore, “[w]hen determining whether to award a writ of certiorari in a particular case, the standard for the issuance of the writ is quite limited.” Foster Foundation v. Gainer, 228 W.Va. 99, 104, 717 S.E.2d 883, 888 (2011). To that end, “the scope of review under the common law writ of certiorari is very narrow. It does not involve an inquiry into the intrinsic correctness of the decision of the tribunal below, but only into the manner in which the decision was reached.” Syl. Pt. 3, Foster, 228 W.Va. at 101, 717 S.E.2d at 885.

In this case, the issue we are asked to resolve presents a question of law and involves statutory interpretation. Accordingly, we must also apply our de novo standard of review. See Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995) (“Where the issue ... is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.”). With these standards in mind, the parties' arguments will be considered.

III. Discussion

The question presented in this case is whether unpaid student loans constitute “economic loss” that is subject to compensation from the West Virginia Crime Victims Compensation Fund. Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 14–2A–10(a)(8) (2009), an application for a compensation award from the Crime Victims Compensation Fund must include “the total amount of economic loss that the victim, a dependent or the claimant sustained or will sustain as a result of the criminally injurious conduct[.]” “Economic loss” under the Act is defined as

economic detriment consisting only of allowable expense, work loss and replacement services loss. If criminally injurious conduct causes death, economic loss includes a dependent's economic loss and a dependent's replacement services loss. Noneconomic detriment is not economic loss, however, economic loss may be caused by pain and suffering or physical impairment For purposes of this article, the term “economic loss” includes a lost scholarship as defined in this section.

W. Va.Code § 14–2A–3(e) (2009 & Supp.2012)⁴ (emphasis added). Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 14–2A–3(m), “lost scholarship”

means a scholarship, academic award, stipend or other monetary scholastic assistance which had been awarded or conferred upon a victim in conjunction with a post-secondary school educational program and which the victim is unable to receive or use, in whole or in part, due to injuries received from criminally injurious conduct.

Ms. Smith argues that student loans fall within the definition of “lost scholarship,” particularly the phrase “other monetary scholastic assistance,” and, therefore, are subject to reimbursement from the Crime Victims Compensation Fund. She contends that in formulating this provision, the Legislature, through its use of broad and sweeping terms, meant to include all forms of financial assistance received for college including student loans. Ms. Smith states that it would be counter-intuitive to conclude that the Legislature intended to limit the potential compensation to merit, academic or athletic scholarships for which the student has not obligated himself or herself financially while not addressing a clear property right obtained through personal financial obligation.

Ms. Smith further asserts that the Court of Claims erred by finding the terms “awarded or conferred” decisive in its determination that student loans could not be reimbursed under the Act. Ms. Smith contends that use of the conjunctive “or” clearly indicates an intent on the part of the Legislature to encompass a broad range of meaning. She maintains that a financial aid award includes student loans. In that regard, she notes that Marshall University states on its website that “approximately seventy-two percent (72%) of Marshall University undergraduate students receive financial assistance in the form of grants, loans, student employment and/or academic scholarships.” Marshall University, Student Financial Assistance at Marshall University, http:// www. marshall. edu/ wpmus/ sfa (emphasis added). Ms. Smith reasons that when the purpose of the Act is considered, it must be concluded that the phrase “other monetary scholastic assistance” as used in the definition of “ lost scholarship” includes student loans.

In denying Ms. Smith compensation for the student loans owed by her son at the time of his death, the Court of Claims stated in its order:

Upon first glance, W. Va.Code § 14–2A–3(m) would appear to support the Claimant's position that lost scholarship in fact does refer to student loan payments. But a closer reading of the statute shows that the intent of the legislature was to allow compensation for scholarships awarded based on merit or other award-specific factors. The key feature of these awards is that the student possesses the award and has some vested interest. Another key feature of these types of awards is...