State v. Waiters

347 So.3d 533

STATE of Florida, Appellant,

v.Anthony Levern WAITERS, Appellee.

No. 2D21-1477

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

September 23, 2022

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Peter N. Koclanes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa; Lindsay Danielle Turner, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa (substituted as counsel of record); and Taylor A. Schell (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellant.

Larry L. Eger, Public Defender, and Layron Jamie Gaither, Assistant Public Defender, Bradenton, for Appellant.

LaROSE, Judge.

For want of a nail the shoe was lost.

For want of a shoe the horse was lost.

For want of a horse the rider was lost.

For want of a rider the message was lost.

For want of a message the battle was lost.

For want of a battle the kingdom was lost.

And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.

Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard's Almanac 275 (G.P. Putman's Sons eds. 1889) (1758). In Mr. Franklin's tale, a lone lost nail leads to a lost kingdom. This attenuated chain of events highlights the pitfalls of employing "but for" causation in the context of criminal liability and, as relevant here, immunity from prosecution.

The State appeals the trial court's order finding that "but for" causation immunized Anthony Levern Waiters from prosecution for drug-related offenses under the 911 Good Samaritan Act, § 893.21(2), Fla. Stat. (2020). See ch. 12-36 § 1, Laws of Fla. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A) ; 9.140(c)(1)(A). Because the contraband was not obtained as a proximate, or direct, result of Mr. Waiter's seeking medical assistance, we reverse.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The relevant facts are not in dispute. Mr. Waiters used crack cocaine. He then began acting erratically, running around inside his sister's home, screaming, and grasping at his chest. Alarmed, his sister called 911.

Emergency medical services (EMS) personnel arrived in response to a possible drug overdose. Later, law enforcement officers arrived and evaluated Mr. Waiters under the Marchman Act¹ to determine whether he needed to be taken into protective custody. EMS concluded that Mr. Waiters could be released without hospitalization. In fact, Mr. Waiters signed a release declining further medical attention.

Mr. Waiters provided his name and date of birth to the attending EMS personnel and law enforcement officers. Running this information through dispatch, the law enforcement officers learned that Mr. Waiters had an outstanding felony arrest warrant.

Upon concluding that Mr. Waiters did not meet the Marchman Act criteria, and after he had declined further medical attention, the law enforcement officers arrested him. Before patting down Mr. Waiters and putting him in the patrol car, the law enforcement officers asked if there was anything on his person that posed a danger of sticking/poking the officers. Mr. Waiters admitted having a broken crack pipe stem and a piece of crack rock in his pocket. Thereafter, the State charged Mr. Waiters with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. §§ 893.13(6)(a), .147(1), Fla. Stat. (2020).

Mr. Waiters moved to dismiss the charges pursuant to section 893.21. He claimed that he was immune from prosecution because the contraband was "obtained as a result of [his] ... seeking medical assistance." After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion:

I'm going to go back to the language of [subsection] (2). It says, "If the evidence for such offense was obtained as a result of the person seeking medical assistance," I do find that that would -- the drugs [and] paraphernalia would not have been found on Mr. Waiters but for the call for help, in that the whole purpose of this statute I still find is to give people the safety and security where the family will call for them if they're clutching their chest for him to call on his own.

(Emphasis added). After the trial court rendered a written "Order on Defense Motion to Dismiss," the State appealed.²

II. Standards of Review

We employ two standards in reviewing the trial court's order. First, we apply de novo review to the trial court's interpretation of the statute. Johnson v. State , 78 So. 3d 1305, 1310 (Fla. 2012) ("Judicial interpretations of statutes are pure questions of law subject to de novo review." (citing State v. Sigler , 967 So. 2d 835, 841 (Fla. 2007) )).

To that end, "[l]egislative intent guides statutory analysis, and to discern that intent we must look first to the language of the statute and its plain meaning." Tasker v. State , 48 So. 3d 798, 804 (Fla. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. v. P.E. , 14 So. 3d 228, 234 (Fla. 2009) ); Calabro v. State , 995 So. 2d 307, 314 (Fla. 2008) ("This Court has held from time immemorial that we must primarily determine the effect and purpose of statutes and rules of court by first examining the actual words used in the statute or rule and determine the plain meaning of those words."); see also Bautista v. State , 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003) ("Our purpose in construing a statutory provision is to give effect to legislative intent. Legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis." (citing State v. J.M. , 824 So. 2d 105, 109 (Fla. 2002) )). "When the statutory language is clear or unambiguous, [we] need not look behind the statute's plain language or employ principles of statutory construction to determine legislative intent." English v. State , 191 So. 3d 448, 450 (Fla. 2016).

"If the statutory text is ambiguous, however, we turn to rules of statutory construction to determine its meaning." State v. Kwitowski , 250 So. 3d 210, 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018). "Statutory language is ambiguous when it could be reasonably understood as meaning two—or potentially more—different things." Id. ; see Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist. , 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992) ("Ambiguity suggests that reasonable persons can find different meanings in the same language."); Houston v. City of Tampa Firefighters & Police Officers’ Pension Fund Bd. of Trs. , 303 So. 3d 233, 240 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ("Statutory language is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation."). We are mindful that we should not seek out ambiguity when it does not exist. There is, after all, "a difference between ambiguity and unexpressed intention." Forsythe , 604 So. 2d at 455.

Second, we utilize a mixed standard of review when determining whether an individual is entitled to statutory immunity:

The question of entitlement to immunity under the Stand Your Ground law "is a mixed question of law and fact because to answer it one must determine the governing law as stated in the statute, find the operative facts, and apply the law to those facts." This court reviews the lower court's findings of fact for competent, substantial evidence, and we review the court's conclusions of law de novo.

Huckelby v. State , 313 So. 3d 861, 865 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (quoting and citing Bouie v. State , 292 So. 3d 471, 479 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) ).

With these ground rules in place, we begin by identifying the issues before us. After that, we will proceed with our analysis of the statutory language. Then, we will review Mr. Waiters’ entitlement to statutory immunity.

III. Section 893.21(2) and the issues before us

Under section 893.21(2),

[a] person who experiences, or has a good faith belief that he or she is experiencing, an alcohol-related or a drug-related overdose and is in need of medical assistance may not be arrested, charged, prosecuted, or penalized for a violation of [section] 893.147(1) or [section] 893.13(6), excluding paragraph (c), if the evidence for such offense was obtained as a result of the person's seeking medical assistance.

The parties invite us to discern the meaning of "as a result of." Id. Essentially, we must determine whether an intervening cause (the outstanding arrest warrant) leading to the discovery of the contraband is sufficient to break the causal chain. If so, the discovered evidence falls outside the ambit of Mr. Waiters’ seeking medical assistance.³ In other words, we first must determine whether "as a result of" calls for "but for" or proximate causation. Next, because the facts are not in dispute and our review is de novo, we then apply the proper test of causation to the undisputed facts.

IV. Analysis

A. The statutory language

The statute does not define the phrase "as a result of."⁴ See Newberger v. State , 641 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) ("The rules of statutory construction require that courts give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute."). Consequently, "the plain and ordinary meaning of [a] word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary." Sieniarecki v. State , 756 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Green v. State , 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992) ).

"Result" is defined as "[a] consequence, effect, or conclusion"; or [t]hat which is achieved, brought about, or obtained, esp[ecially] by purposeful action." Black's Law Dictionary 1509 (Deluxe 10th ed. 2014). Elsewhere, "result" is defined as "something that results as a consequence, issue, or conclusion" and "something obtained by calculation or investigation." Result , Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/result (last visited Aug. 16, 2022). "Result" is also defined as "something that happens or exists because of something else" and "as a result of something." Result , Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/result (last visited Aug. 16, 2022). These definitions are not helpful. In contrast, each party offers a reasonable, albeit different, interpretation of what "result" means, supported by out-of-state cases. Compare State v. Miller , 141 N.E.3d 604, 612-13 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019), with State v. W.S.B. , 453 N.J.Super. 206, 180 A.3d 1168, 1179 ...