State v. Walton

542 P.3d 1041

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Frank Edmund WALTON, Appellant.

No. 83538-6-I

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

Filed February 12, 2024

Appeal from Snohomish Superior Court, Docket No: 20-1-00465-5, Honorable Anna Alexander, Judge.

Lila Jane Silverstein, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave. Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98101-1683, for Appellant.

Amanda Fern Esq. Campbell, Snohomish County Prosecutor’s Office, 3000 Rockefeller Ave., Everett, WA, 98201, for Respondent.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Hazelrigg, A.C.J.

¶1 Frank Walton appeals convictions for murder in the second degree and tampering with physical evidence, a gross misdemeanor. Walton avers the trial court erred in overruling two of his GR 37 objections to the State’s use of peremptory strikes and asserts that those rulings violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He further challenges the sufficiency of evidence regarding tampering with physical evidence and contends the trial court erred by not issuing a jury instruction on unanimity as to that charge. He also raises a number of issues in a statement of additional grounds for review. Because the trial court misinterpreted GR 37 and erroneously overruled Walton’s objections to the State’s peremptory challenges, we reverse.

FACTS

¶2 On March 28, 2020 at approximately 10 a.m., Howard Benzel left his house in Mukilteo to visit a rental property (Madison building) he owned in Everett. His wife, Denise Benzel,¹ expected him to be home by 1 p.m. Around 4 p.m., after Howard had neither returned nor called, Denise drove to the Madison building to look for him. When Denise arrived, she saw Howard’s truck and noticed his phone and wallet were both inside the vehicle. After discovering the back doors of the Madison building were locked, Denise went to unit 10 which Frank Walton rented. Denise was familiar with Walton and saw his car parked in front of the door to his unit.

¶3 Denise knocked on Walton’s door and, when he answered, she asked him to unlock the back door so she could see if Howard was inside. She then went around to the back where the door had been unlocked, entered the building and checked all the common areas but did not find Howard. At that point, she returned to her car and began to drive home. After she had driven about three or four blocks Denise decided to turn around, as she "thought something [wa]s terribly wrong." When she returned to the building, Denise noticed "[a] lot of blood spatters on [Walton’s] doorstep" and saw Walton leaning down "trying to clean the blood" with "cleaning solution and a rag." She called 911. Denise testified that she then addressed Walton: "what are you doing, are you cleaning up my husband’s blood? And [Walton] said no, it was spilled paint … [she] said, no, it isn’t, that’s my husband’s blood, you murdered my husband." Walton told her she was "crazy" and proceeded to "thr[o]w the bloody rags," along with two black plastic bags, into his car and drive away. Police officers arrived shortly thereafter.

¶4 Everett Police Department (EPD) Detective Alexander Helphrey testified that when he arrived at the scene, he "observed what appeared to be fresh blood on the concrete outside of the … entrance door on the Madison Street side which entered into [u]nits 8 and 10." EPD Officer Jason MacDonald also testified that he saw "blood on the sidewalk" just outside the door and "at least one blood drop out on the roadway." EPD Detective Maiya Atkins explained at trial that there were various articles of clothing with "significant amounts of blood on them" and bags with "Clorox-type wipes"² and other cleaning supplies inside of them inside Walton’s unit. The bags also contained disposable surgical gloves with what appeared to be blood on them. Atkins further testified that there were garbage bags in the dumpster behind the building filled with cleaning supplies, Lysol,³ towels, and paper towels stained with cleaning fluid and what was believed to be blood. A forensic specialist from the Washington State Patrol Crime Lab confirmed that there was blood inside Walton’s unit which indicated that an assault had taken place there. The blood stains in Walton’s unit also indicated that someone had wiped up the blood before it dried completely.

¶5 Later that night, officers found Walton in Marysville and detained him for investigation. Walton’s vehicle was parked near a dumpster in which officers found what appeared to be the missing passenger floor mat from Walton’s car, along with plastic bags containing items with "a lot of blood saturation on them." Officers also found a poster linked to Howard’s building with Walton’s fingerprints on it. Initially, Walton told the officers that he did not know what happened to Howard, but he later claimed that "two guys" came into his office "flashing guns and stuff," "punched [Howard] in his head," and took Howard out the front door of Walton’s unit. Walton stated that there was blood, which "freaked [him] out," and "that’s why [he] didn’t really say anything about it." According to Walton, the two individuals were "Hispanic" and he "could definitely tell that they belong[ed] to the cartel."

¶6 Two days later, a couple pulled over while traveling on Highway 9 in Skagit County and discovered Howard’s dead body about 20 yards off the road. His body was found wrapped in plastic bags. Over a year later, on July 1, 2021, the State charged Walton with one count of murder in the first degree, with a deadly weapon enhancement, and one count of tampering with physical evidence, a gross misdemeanor.

¶7 During voir dire, the trial court issued a preliminary ruling on GR 37 where it stated that "the Supreme Court intended the rule to apply only when the objection was made to a peremptory challenge of a juror who appears to be a racial or ethnic minority." (Emphasis added.) The trial court found that "it would not be discriminatory to allow a peremptory against a juror who does not appear to be a juror of color." The State used peremptory challenges on two jurors who the court and attorneys perceived as White, juror 22 and juror 38.⁴ The prosecutor challenged the jurors as biased against police. The defense objected based on GR 37 and argued that an objective observer could view race as a factor in both challenges based on the answers they had provided to the attorneys’ questions. In accordance with its preliminary ruling, the trial court denied both GR 37 objections based on its perception of the race of juror 22 and 38 and granted the State’s peremptory challenges.

¶8 The jury acquitted Walton of murder in the first degree and did not reach a verdict on the deadly weapon enhancement. He was convicted of the lesser included charge of murder in the second degree and tampering with physical evidence.

¶9 Walton timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

I. Interpretation of Court Rules

¶10 Walton assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his GR 37 objections concerning jurors 22 and 38 who appeared to the parties and trial court not to be Black, Indigenous, or People of Color (BIPOC). The State argues in briefing that GR 37 is inapposite as that rule "applies only to attempts to remove people of color from juries." Because the trial court’s decisions as to these two challenges were based on its preliminary determination that GR 37 only addresses the use of a peremptory challenge against a potential juror who "appears to be a racial or ethnic minority," our analysis begins with the interpretation of the rule.

[1–5] ¶11 The meaning of a court rule is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v. Stump, 185 Wash.2d 454, 458, 374 P.3d 89 (2016). We interpret court rules in the same manner as we do statutes. Jafar v. Webb, 177 Wash.2d 520, 526-27, 303 P.3d 1042 (2013). Our inquiry begins with reading the text of the rule, focusing on its plain language to discern the meaning. State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wash.2d 614, 621, 106 P.3d 196 (2005); State v. Armendariz, 160 Wash.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007). Rather than examining the rule’s language in isolation, we look at it "in context, considering related provisions, and in light of the statutory or rule-making scheme as a whole." Stump, 185 Wash.2d at 460, 374 P.3d 89. If only one reasonable interpretation can be derived from the rule, "then it is unambiguous and ‘our inquiry ends.’" State v. Jieta, 12 Wash. App. 2d 227, 231, 457 P.3d 1209 (2020) (quoting City of Seattle v. Holifield, 170 Wash.2d 230, 237, 240 P.3d 1162 (2010)).

[6–8] ¶12 An unambiguous rule is "not subject to judicial construction." State v. Watson, 146 Wash.2d 947, 955, 51 P.3d 66 (2002). Rather, we assume the drafting body "means exactly what it says" and we "‘must not add words where the [drafting body] has chosen not to include them.’" State v. Keller, 143 Wash.2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001); State v. James-Buhl, 190 Wash.2d 470, 474, 415 P.3d 234 (2018) (quoting Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wash.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003)). Even if we believe the drafters intended something else but failed to adequately express it, we will not add language to a clear rule unless such an addition is "imperatively required to make the [rule] rational." Watson, 146 Wash.2d at 955, 51 P.3d 66. When the plain language is unambiguous, we must give it effect. James-Buhl, 190 Wash.2d at 474, 415 P.3d 234.

[9–11] ¶13 However, if the language of a rule remains "amenable to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is deemed to be ambiguous" and our inquiry continues. Roggenkamp, 153 Wash.2d at 621, 106 P.3d 196. In order to interpret an ambiguous rule, we may "resort to principles of statutory construction,⁵ legislative history, and relevant case law." Watson, 146 Wash.2d at 955, 51 P.3d 66. Accordingly, unless GR 37 is ambiguous, our interpretation is governed by the plain language. See State v. Sullivan, 143 Wash.2d 162, 175, 19 P.3d 1012 (2001); see also Roggenkamp, 153 Wash.2d at...