State v. Webber

315 A.3d 320

225 Conn.App. 16

STATE of Connecticut

v.William WEBBER

(AC 46150)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 6, 2023

Officially Released April 23, 2024

James E. Mortimer, assigned counsel, for the appellant (acquittee).

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s attorney, and Rocco A. Chiarenza, senior assistant state’s attorney, and Melissa R. Holmes, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Bright, C. J., and Clark and Prescott, Js.

BRIGHT, C. J.

₂₁The acquittee,¹ William Webber, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying his petition to restrict the dissemination of his sexual offender registration information pursuant to General Statutes § 54-255 (c) (5).² On appeal, the acquittee claims that (1) the court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over his petition and (2) the statutory exclusion of his petition violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Although we agree with the acquittee that the court had jurisdiction over his petition, we nonetheless conclude that the court properly denied his petition because, even if we were to agree with him on his equal protection argument, he still would not meet all of the requisite statutory criteria under § 54-255 (c) (5). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court on this alternative ground.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. On May 23, 1984, the court, Norcott, J., found the acquittee not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect³ of two counts of sexual assault ₂₂in the first degree pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 53a-70.⁴ Following a hearing before the court, Kinney, J., on August 27, 1984, the court found that the acquittee was "mentally ill to the extent that his release would constitute a danger to himself or others" and committed him to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health (now the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services) for a maximum period of forty years pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 53a-47 (a) and (b).⁵ In July, 1985, the acquittee ₂₃was placed under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board (board). The board conditionally released the acquittee from confinement on July 17, 2007, after which the acquittee registered as a sexual offender with the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (department) pursuant to Megan’s Law, General Statutes § 54-250 et seq.⁶ After learning that the acquittee was in possession of pornography, the board revoked the acquittee’s conditional release in May, 2012. Following a hearing, the board terminated the acquittee’s conditional release and returned him to confinement on October 1, 2012, on the basis that he would be most safely treated in an inpatient hospital setting. On December 10, 2019, the board again conditionally released the acquittee from confinement.

On August 8, 2022, the acquittee filed a petition with the court, Harmon, J., pursuant to § 54-255 (c) (5), seeking an order directing the department to restrict the dissemination of his registration information for ₂₄law enforcement purposes only, such that it would no longer be available for public access. In support of his petition, the acquittee argued that, with the exception of the date that he was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, he meets all of the other statutory criteria to petition for the restriction of the dissemination of his registration information, including that he (1) has served no jail or prison time as a result of the finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, (2) has not subsequently been convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of any crime that would require registration under Megan’s Law, and (3) has registered with the department as required by Megan’s Law. The acquittee also noted that "under the terms of his conditional release, [he] does not present a threat to public safety requiring the dissemination of his registration information." The acquittee acknowledged that § 54-255 (c) (5) is "arguably not directly applicable" to him because he was acquitted prior to October 1, 1988, and not between October 1, 1988, and September 30, 1998, as the statutory remedy requires. Nonetheless, he maintained that, because he meets all of the other statutory criteria, distinguishing "between [him] and the eligible offenders [who fall] within the statutory time frame would be arbitrary and contrary to the legislature’s intention of mitigating the retroactive effects [of Megan’s Law] and inconsistent with the equal protection clause … of the United States constitution."

The court held a hearing on the acquittee’s petition on December 1, 2022. The state opposed the petition, arguing that the court could not grant the acquittee any relief under the current statutory framework. The court agreed with the state, concluding that, because the acquittee was acquitted outside of the date range set forth in § 54-255 (c) (5), the court either lacked jurisdiction or did not "have the ability" to grant the relief that ₂₅he sought. Accordingly, the court denied the petition.⁷ This appeal followed.

I

The acquittee first claims that the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over his petition to restrict the dissemination of his registration information and over his claim that the statutory exclusion of his petition to restrict the dissemination of his registration information violates his right to equal protection. According to the acquittee, the court had jurisdiction over his petition and his equal protection claim because "§ 54-255 (c) explicitly vests with the court the power to restrict the dissemination of registration information to law enforcement" and "the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution provide courts with the authority to strike down laws that violate their respective equal protection provisions."

In response, the state argues that the acquittee’s failure to satisfy two of the criteria set forth in § 54-255 (c) (5)—namely, the requirements to have been found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect between October 1, 1988, and September 30, 1998, and to have served no jail or prison time as a result of such finding—deprived the court of jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Additionally, the state argues that the court’s inherent authority to strike down laws that violate constitutional principles does not confer jurisdiction on the court to consider an equal protection claim raised in a petition that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider in the first place. Therefore, according to the state, the court should have dismissed rather than denied the petition. We agree with the acquittee that the court hac. jurisdiction to consider his petition.

[1–5] ₂₆"As a preliminary matter, we note that [i]t is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged. … When reviewing an issue of subject matter jurisdiction on appeal, [w]e have long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary. … Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it. … [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction …. The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn. 757, 770, 143 A.3d 578 (2016).

In the present case, the court concluded, on the basis of the date range criterion in § 54-255 (c) (5), that it "lack[ed] jurisdiction to change … the information being only available to the police department versus the general public at this time, and .. . [did not] have the ability to grant [the acquittee] the relief that [he was] seeking …. " Despite the court’s statement as to jurisdiction, it denied, rather than dismissed, the acquittee’s petition.

We previously have noted "the ongoing confusion as to whether the failure to plead or prove an essential fact [for purposes of invoking a statutory remedy] implicates the [tribunal’s] subject matter jurisdiction or its statutory authority. … [O]nce it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining the action. … [T]he question of whether the action ₂₇belongs to the class of cases that the tribunal has authority to decide is [s]eparate and distinct from … the question of whether a [tribunal] … properly exercises its statutory authority to act. … A challenge to the tribunal’s statutory authority raises a claim of statutory construction that is not jurisdictional. … [A] claim that a party has failed to allege or to establish an element of a statutory remedy implicates the tribunal’s statutory authority and the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport v. Freedom of Information Commission, 222 Conn. App. 17, 39–40, 304 A.3d 481 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 936, 306 A.3d 1072 (2024).

[6, 7] Pursuant to § 54-255 (c), any person who meets the criteria set forth in subdivision (5) "may petition the court to order the [department] to restrict the dissemination of the registration information to law enforcement purposes only and to not make such information available for public access." The court then "may order the [department] to...