State v. Weddle

314 A.3d 234

2024 ME 26

STATE of Maine

v.Randall J. WEDDLE

Docket; SRP-23-108

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: January 10, 2024

Decided: April 16, 2024

Michelle R. King, Esq. (orally), Irwin & Morris, Portland, for appellant Randall J. Weddle

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Jeffrey Baroody, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

LAWRENCE, J.

[¶1] Randall J. Weddle appeals from the sentence the trial court (Knox County, Stokes, J.) imposed on two counts of manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A) (2023), two counts of causing a death while operating under the influence (Class B), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(1-A) (2023), and eleven other related charges.¹ We affirmed the judgment of conviction in State v. Weddle, 2020 ME 12, 224 A.3d 1035, and we now affirm the sentence imposed by the court.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

[¶2] The following facts are drawn from the procedural record and our 2020 opinion affirming Weddle’s conviction, Weddle, 2020 ME 12, ¶¶ 3-9, 224 A.3d 1035. See Gordon v. State, 2024 ME 7, ¶ 2, 308 A.3d 228.

[¶3] "On March 18, 2016, law enforcement officers, firefighters, and medical rescue personnel responded to a major motor vehicle accident on Route 17 in Washington, Maine." Weddle, 2020 ME 12, ¶ 3, 224 A.3d 1035. The accident involved five vehicles, one of which was engulfed in flames, and resulted in the death of two drivers. Id. After an investigation, officers determined that Weddle, the driver of a larger tractor trailer, had caused the accident. Id. ¶¶ 3-7. Hospital tests revealed that Weddle had alcohol in his system. Id. ¶ 7. Several days after the accident, officers found a three-quarters-full whiskey bottle and a shot glass in Weddle’s truck. Id. ¶ 7.

B. Procedure

[¶4] In June 2016, Weddle was charged by indictment with two counts of manslaughter (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A), two counts of aggravated criminal operating under the influence (Class B), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(1-A), one count of causing injury while operating under the influence (Class C), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(1), one count of aggravated driving to endanger (Class C), 29-A M.R.S. § 2413(1-A) (2023), one count of driving to endanger (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 2413(1), and eight counts of violating commercial motor carrier operator rules (Class E), 29-A M.R.S. § 558-A(1)(A) (2023). Id. ¶ 8.

[¶5] The court held a jury trial from January 23 to 29, 2018. The jury found Weddle guilty of all counts. On March 23, 2018, the court held a sentencing hearing. The court conducted a Hewey sentencing analysis, see State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1154-55 (Me. 1993); 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C (2018),² regarding the manslaughter counts. In setting the basic sentence at twenty years, the court considered the nature and circumstances of the crime. 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(1). Specifically, Weddle had operated a commercial vehicle carrying a load of lumber when he was ill, fatigued, and taking prescription medication for which the use of alcohol was contraindicated; and he had alcohol above the legal limit in his system.³ He exceeded the fifty-mile-per-hour speed limit by twenty to thirty miles per hour. The court also looked at comparable cases provided by Weddle and noted that most, if not all, of the comparable cases involved passenger automobiles, not commercial vehicles. The court noted the need to take account of "the difference between an automobile -- a passenger automobile and a commercial vehicle" weighing forty tons when fully loaded; the latter is "a massive projectile" that "carries with it the potential for lethality that is almost incalculable."

[¶6] In setting the maximum sentence at thirty years, the court weighed mitigating and aggravating factors. 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(2). For mitigating factors, the court considered Weddle’s work history and his letter of remorse.⁴ For aggravating factors, the court considered the impact of the multiple-vehicle crash on the victims and their families, Weddle’s criminal history (including twelve prior GUI convictions, eleven speeding violations, and Weddle’s loss of licenses in different states), and the need to protect the public. The court concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.

[¶7] The court set the final sentence at thirty years, with all but twenty-five years suspended, followed by four years of probation. The court believed that a period of supervision following Weddle’s release from incarceration would protect the public. The court imposed a range of terms of incarceration for the other counts to run concurrently with the two manslaughter sentences.

[¶8] Weddle did not timely apply for review of his sentence. See M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1) 20(b). He filed a petition for postconviction relief on April 21, 2020. During the post-conviction review proceeding,⁵ the parties and the court agreed to allow Weddle to apply for review of his sentence, see 15 M.R.S. § 2130 (2023) (permitting a postconviction court to "grant[ ] the right to take an appeal from the criminal judgment"), which he did. The Sentence Review panel granted his application to appeal his sentence. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 2151-52 (2023).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶9] On appeal, Weddle challenges both the legality and propriety of the sentence.⁶

A. Legality of the Sentence

[1–3] [¶10] Weddle first argues that his sentence is unconstitutional because it is not proportioned to the offense. We review de novo the legality and constitutionality of a sentence. State v. Lopez, 2018 ME 59, ¶ 13, 184 A.3d 880. We have established a two-part test to determine whether a sentence violates the Maine Constitution.⁷ State v. Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶¶ 18-19, 21 A.3d 1033; Lopez, 2018 ME 59, ¶ 15, 184 A.3d 880; see Me. Const. art. I, § 9 ("[A]ll penalties and punishments shall be proportioned to the offense."). We consider "whether the sentence imposed is greatly disproportionate" and "whether it offends prevailing notions of decency, whether it shocks the conscience of the public, or our own respective or collective sense of fairness, or whether it is inhuman or barbarous." Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶ 18, 21 A.3d 1033 (alterations and quotation marks omitted). "Because the Legislature is the voice of the sovereign people and thus expresses the people’s will, only the most extreme punishment decided upon by that body as appropriate for an offense could be unconstitutionally disproportionate." See State v. Gilman, 2010 ME 35, ¶ 23, 993 A.2d 14 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

[4] [¶11] When analyzing proportionality, we "begin by comparing the gravity of the offense [to] the severity of the sentence." Lopez, 2018 ME 59, ¶ 16, 184 A.3d 880 (quotation marks omitted). "We have previously compared a defendant’s offense to his sentence by (1) evaluating where that defendant’s term of imprisonment fell within the range of incarceration time authorized by the Legislature, and (2) considering the facts of a case in conjunction with the commonly accepted goals of punishment." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[5] [¶12] We examine the plain language and occasionally the legislative purpose and history of a classification of a crime to determine whether a defendant’s term of imprisonment fell within the range of incarceration time authorized by the Legislature. See Gilman, 2010 ME 35, ¶ 24, 993 A.2d 14; Lopez, 2018 ME 59, ¶ 20, 184 A.3d 880; cf. Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶¶ 28-29, 21 A.3d 1033. Here, 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(2)(A) permits a maximum term of imprisonment of thirty years for manslaughter. See 17-A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A). Vehicular manslaughter was originally designated as a Class C offense, permitting a maximum term of imprisonment of five years. See P.L. 1977, ch. 510, § 40 (effective October 24, 1977) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 203(3) (1977)); see 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(2)(C) (1975). The Legislature amended the statute to reclassify vehicular manslaughter as a Class B crime in 1989, and then in 1997 eliminated the distinction between vehicular manslaughter and other forms of manslaughter by classifying any manslaughter charge as a Class A crime. P.L. 1989, ch. 505, § 1 (effective Sept. 30, 1989) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 203(3)(A) (1989)); P.L. 1997, ch. 34, § 1 (effective June 26, 1997) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 203 (1997)).⁸ The evolving classification of manslaughter committed while operating a vehicle "signals the Legislature’s greater disdain for such serious criminal conduct" and its desire that such conduct be punished consistently with manslaughter committed in other ways. Lopez, 2018 ME 59, ¶ 20, 184 A.3d 880 (quotation marks omitted). Weddle’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum term of imprisonment of thirty years. See Gilman, 2010 ME 35, ¶ 23, 993 A.2d 14.

[6, 7] [¶13] The court did not err in considering the facts of the case and the goals of punishment. The court emphasized that Weddle was not only speeding while ill, fatigued, and under the influence of prescription drugs and alcohol but also behind the wheel of a large tractor trailer that the court characterized as a "massive projectile," "missile," and "deadly weapon that’s traveling on the road." The sentence also observes the gravity of the crime’s effect on the victims and their families. 17-A M.R.S. § 1151(8) (2018). Weddle’s sentence considers his criminal history, including double-digit numbers of prior OUI convictions and prior speeding violations, his history of losing driving privileges in multiple states, and the necessity for years of incarceration to deter further dangerous behavior by Weddle and to promote public safety. Id. § 1151(1). We therefore conclude that the sentence is not greatly disproportionate to the offense,⁹ and proceed to analyze whether Weddle’s sentence offends prevailing notions of decency.

[8] [¶14] A sentence close to the maxinum, such as the one at issue here, is not...