State v. Williams

1

The State, Respondent, v. Royal Daniel Williams, III, Appellant.

No. 2024-UP-128

Appellate Case No. 2020-000049

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

April 17, 2024

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

Heard April 2, 2024

Appeal From Florence County Thomas A. Russo, Circuit Court Judge

Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best and Jillian Marie Lesley, both of Elizabeth Franklin-Best, P.C., of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General William Joseph Maye, both of Columbia, and Solicitor Edgar Lewis Clements, III, of Florence, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Royal D. Williams, III appeals his conviction of murder for which he was sentenced to life in prison without parole. Williams argues that the circuit court erred by (1) denying his motion for a directed verdict (2) denying his motion to suppress cell phone evidence obtained by law enforcement three years after the warrant for the evidence was issued, (3) finding probable cause to permit the State to obtain a buccal swab from Williams, (4) granting the State a continuance to remedy an evidentiary issue, and (5) not dismissing the case based on an alleged violation of Williams's right to a speedy trial. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. As to whether the circuit court erred in denying Williams's motion for a directed verdict, we conclude that the circuit court did not err because there was substantial circumstantial evidence such that the court was required to submit the case to the jury. See State v. Butler 407 S.C. 376, 381, 755 S.E.2d 457, 460 (2014) ("On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict, [appellate courts] view[] the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State."); id. ("If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, the [appellate court] must find the case was properly submitted to the jury." (quoting State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292-93, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006))); see also State v. Bennett, 415 S.C. 232, 236- 37, 781 S.E.2d 352, 354 (2016) ("[T]he trial court . . . must submit the case to the jury if there is 'any substantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced.'" (quoting State v. Littlejohn, 228 S.C. 324, 329, 89 S.E.2d 924, 926 (1955))); Id. at 236, 781 S.E.2d at 354 ("[In denying a directed verdict motion], a court is not required to find that the evidence infers guilt to the exclusion of any other reasonable hypothesis."). The circumstantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, includes the following: (1) DNA evidence connecting Williams to the scene of the crime; (2) cell phone data evidence connecting Williams to the scene of the crime and establishing Williams and the victim communicated extensively leading up to the time immediately prior to the victim's murder, after which Williams suddenly did not attempt to communicate with the victim further; (3) the testimony of two witnesses, a taxi driver and a taxi passenger, tending to establish that Williams was picked up by a taxi from the scene of the crime near the victim's approximate time of death; (4) a composite sketch created by a SLED artist working with the taxi passenger; (5) video footage^[1] and the testimony of the taxi company dispatcher corroborating the taxi driver's testimony about when and where she picked up Williams; (6) the testimony from the taxi driver that Williams had a partially-open black backpack visibly containing travel-sized toiletries with him when he entered the taxi; and (7) a black backpack that was later recovered by police from the home of Williams's former coworker,^[2] who identified the backpack as belonging to Williams. Altogether, this constitutes substantial circumstantial evidence such that the circuit court was required to submit the case to the jury for evaluation.

2. As to whether the circuit court erred in failing to suppress cell phone data that the State obtained three years after police obtained a warrant for it, we conclude that the circuit did not err because the warrant was properly executed within ten days after it was issued. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-140 (2014) ("Any warrant issued hereunder shall be executed and return made only within ten days after it is dated."). In 2016, police obtained a warrant for Williams's cell phone data from Sprint and executed the warrant within ten days; however, Sprint inadvertently turned over data on a cell phone tower other than the one described in the warrant. In 2019, police noticed the mistake, did not obtain a new warrant, and asked Sprint to correct the error and furnish the correct data, which it did. We find that the warrant was timely executed within the ten-day window of validity established by statute.

Additionally, we note that even if the ten-day requirement was violated, Williams did not meet his burden of establishing that he was prejudiced by the violation. See State v. Weaver, 374 S.C. 313, 323, 649 S.E.2d 479, 483-84 (2007) ("[F]ailure to observe the ten-day requirement for the execution and return of a warrant, a ministerial requirement, does not necessarily void the warrant. The warrant will be invalidated only if the defendant can show he was prejudiced by the failure." (citation omitted)); see also State v. Mollison, 319 S.C. 41, 47, 459 S.E.2d 88, 92 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Some deficiencies in search warrants are so substantial that they require exclusion of the evidence. However, failure to comply with inconsequential ministerial requirements of the statute does not require suppression in the absence of prejudice to the defendant."); id. (refusing to suppress evidence seized beyond the ten-day window pursuant to a warrant because the appellants did not establish that they were prejudiced by the belated execution). The correct cell phone data, which police received in 2019, was exactly the same as what they would have acquired in 2016 if Sprint had properly complied with the warrant and furnished the correct data.

3. As to whether the circuit court erred in granting the State's motion to obtain a DNA sample from Williams via a buccal swab for the purposes of comparing his DNA to the DNA collected from the crime scene, we conclude the court properly found probable cause and permitted the swab. See State v. Register, 308 S.C. 534, 537-38, 419 S.E.2d 771 773 (1992) ("[For warrants authorizing bodily intrusions,] the State must initially show that there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, and probable cause to believe that it was committed by a particular suspect."); see also State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 50, 625 S.E.2d 216, 221 (2006) (stating that appellate courts are charged with "ensur[ing] the [circuit court] had a substantial basis upon which to conclude that probable cause existed"); State v. Spears, 393 S.C. 466, 483, 713 S.E.2d 324, 333 (Ct. App. 2011) ("The appellate court should give great deference to a [circuit court's] determination of probable cause." (quoting State v. Dunbar, 361 S.C. 240, 253, 603 S.E.2d 615,...