State v. Williams

1

State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Marvel Galvaston Williams, Appellant.

No. A23-0793

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

May 28, 2024

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-21-19588

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Mary F Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney, Tacota LeMuel (certified student attorney) Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Christina Zauhar, Halberg Criminal Defense, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Gaitas, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Larson, Judge.

GAITAS, Judge

In this direct appeal from convictions for aiding and abetting attempted second-degree murder, aiding and abetting third-degree depraved-mind murder, and unlawful firearm possession, appellant Marvel Galvaston Williams argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, and alternatively, by denying his motion for a downward durational sentencing departure for the third-degree murder offense. Because the district court did not err in denying Williams's pleawithdrawal motion or abuse its discretion in imposing the presumptive sentence, we affirm.

FACTS

On an October night in 2021, the occupants of two vehicles had a gun fight while driving through downtown Minneapolis at speeds of over 90 miles per hour. One vehicle, a Range Rover chased the other vehicle, while the Range Rover's occupants fired guns at L.E., the driver of the other vehicle. During the course of this chase, L.E.'s vehicle struck pedestrian A.M., killing her.

Williams was a passenger in the front seat of the Range Rover. Following the incident, respondent State of Minnesota charged Williams by complaint with three counts: aiding and abetting attempted second-degree murder of L.E., aiding and abetting third-degree depraved-mind murder of A.M., and unlawful possession of a firearm due to a prior felony conviction.^[1] Williams pleaded not guilty to the charges, and a trial began in May 2022.

After jury selection, Williams decided to plead guilty. He confirmed his understanding that he was entering a "straight plea" to the three charges in the complaint and that there was no agreement regarding sentencing. Williams told the district court that he understood he was giving up his right to have a trial and his trial rights. He said that he was thinking clearly. And he affirmed that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty and not because his plea was based on any promises.

Following Williams's waiver of his trial rights, he admitted to the facts that made him guilty of the three offenses. Williams acknowledged that he had been a front-seat passenger in the Range Rover during the gun fight between the two vehicles. He agreed that he "intentionally advised and encouraged" the driver of the Range Rover to speed and "other people to fire their guns at [L.E.]." Williams admitted that he intended to kill L.E. during the incident. He acknowledged that the Range Rover sped through city streets at more than 90 miles per hour, endangering people on sidewalks and in other cars, and that his encouragement aided and abetted the driver's reckless driving conduct. Williams also admitted that he advised and encouraged the driver to engage in conduct that "evinced a depraved mind," with "no regard for human life," which ultimately caused A.M.'s death. Finally, Williams admitted that he was ineligible to possess a firearm due to a prior felony conviction.

At the end of the guilty plea colloquy, the district court deferred accepting the guilty plea until sentencing. The district court later ordered a presentence investigation and scheduled a sentencing hearing.

Almost nine months later, and before sentencing occurred, Williams's trial attorney filed a motion to withdraw Williams's guilty pleas. The motion asserted that Williams was entitled to withdraw the pleas because he "detrimentally relied" on an unwritten "proffer agreement with the prosecuting authority," which included a promise to "vastly reduce the duration of [Williams's] sentence if [his] information could be corroborated." Williams did not submit an affidavit or other evidence with the motion and did not request a hearing. His motion specifically requested that the district court "rule on the motion without holding a hearing on the matter." The state filed a response opposing Williams's motion, acknowledging that it had offered to consider making a favorable sentencing recommendation if Williams provided information about the incident that could be corroborated. The state's response further stated that it "was unable to corroborate or verify any of the information provided by [Williams]," and, "[i]n fact, some of the information provided by [Williams] appeared to contradict much of the physical evidence related to the death of A.M."

The district court denied Williams's motion to withdraw the guilty pleas on two grounds. First, although Williams's motion did not raise the manifest-injustice standard for plea withdrawal, the district court determined that there was no manifest injustice because Williams's pleas were accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Second, the district court determined that there was no fair and just reason for plea withdrawal. The district court observed that Williams entered a "straight plea" with no agreement as to the sentences he would receive. It also found that, due to the passage of time, plea withdrawal would prejudice the state.

At sentencing, Williams moved for a downward durational departure from the sentencing guidelines for the offenses of attempted second-degree murder and third-degree murder. He argued that the offenses were less serious than typical offenses because he had remorse and because he had been a passenger in the Range Rover. The district court denied the departure motion. It imposed concurrent prison sentences of 214.5 months for aiding and abetting second-degree attempted murder, 60 months for unlawful possession of a firearm, and 291 months for aiding and abetting third-degree depraved-mind murder-all presumptive sentences.

Following sentencing, Williams-who is now represented by new counsel-filed this direct appeal.

DECISION

I. Williams is not entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Williams argues that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas. He contends that plea withdrawal is required to correct a manifest injustice because (1) he "filed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea before the district court had accepted it," (2) the offense of aiding and abetting third-degree depraved-mind murder is not "a cognizable offense" under Minnesota law, (3) the statute prohibiting a convicted felon from possessing a firearm is unconstitutional, and (4) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Alternatively, he argues that allowing him to withdraw his plea would be fair and just because his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel and because the district court improperly allowed his trial attorney and the prosecutor to establish the factual bases for his guilty pleas with leading questions.

"A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it." Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). Plea withdrawal may be permitted under two circumstances. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010).

First, a district court must allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea "[a]t any time" if "withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice." Id. (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1). "A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid." Id. at 94. To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be intelligent, accurate, and voluntary. Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn. 2017). A defendant bears the burden of showing that a guilty plea does not comport with these requirements. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. Whether a guilty plea is valid is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo. Id.

Second, a district court may allow a defendant to "withdraw a plea at any time before sentence if it is fair and just to do so." Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. This decision is within the district court's discretion. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 97. An appellate court will reverse the district court's decision to grant or deny plea withdrawal under the fair-and-just standard "only in the rare case" that the district court abused its discretion. State v. Jones, 921 N.W.2d 774, 782 (Minn.App. 2018) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2019).

We first consider whether there was a manifest injustice requiring plea withdrawal. Then, we turn to Williams's argument that the district court abused its discretion in denying his plea-withdrawal motion under the fair-and-just standard.

A. There was no manifest injustice requiring plea withdrawal.^[2]

1. The district court's delayed acceptance of Williams's guilty pleas did not provide a basis for plea withdrawal.

Williams argues that because he "filed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea before the district court had accepted it, he should have been permitted to withdraw his plea." He asserts that the district court's decision to postpone its acceptance of the guilty pleas until sentencing effectively nullified the pleas. In support of his argument, Williams relies on the Minnesota Supreme Court's 1971 decision in State v. Loyd, which states that a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea "as a matter of right" before the district court has accepted the plea. 190 N.W.2d 123, 125 (Minn. 1971).

We reject Williams's argument. Loyd is a decision...