State v. Williams

553 P.3d 161

STATE of Arizona Respondent,

v.Bennett Laquan WILLIAMS, Petitioner.

No. CR-23-0068-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed August 6, 2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County, The Honorable Rosa Mroz, Judge (Deceased), No. CR2016-002220-001. REVERSED AND REMANDED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One, 254 Ariz. 516 (App. 2023). VACATED IN PART

Rachel H. Mitchell, Maricopa County Attorney, Quinton S. Gregory (argued), Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona

Randal McDonald (argued), Robert J. Dormady, Supervising Attorneys; Andi Humphreys; Hayley Worrell, Victoria Sturdy, Rule 39(c) Certified Law Students, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law Post-Conviction Clinic, Phoenix, Attorneys for Bennett Laquan Williams

Daniel Fenzel, Deputy Legal Advocate, Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate

JUSTICE BRUTINEL authored the Opinion of the Court., in which CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ, and JUSTICES BOLICK, BEENE, KING, and PELANDER (Ret.) joined.^*

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 A defendant’s plea agreement must have a factual basis to be accepted by the trial court. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.3(b). Here, the State concedes that the passage of Proposition 207, the Smart and Safe Arizona Act, constituted a change in the law allowing the defendant, Bennett Laquan Williams, to expunge his prior marijuana conviction, which served as part of the factual basis for his subsequent guilty plea. We hold that when a defendant successfully attacks a previously accepted guilty plea based on a change in the plea’s factual basis, the underlying plea agreement is voidable if the defendant is subsequently resentenced to a term different than what was agreed to in the plea agreement.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2016, the State of Arizona charged Williams with fourteen felonies, including sex trafficking, pandering, transporting persons for prostitution purposes, and various classes of misdemeanor assault. The State alleged that he was on probation when he committed the crimes. The State also alleged Williams had seven historical felony convictions. These convictions included California convictions for theft and possession of an assault weapon, Kansas convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, a Texas conviction for possession of a controlled substance, and—pertinent here—an Arizona use or possession of marijuana conviction from 2004.

¶3 In return for his guilty plea as a repeat offender to two counts of sex trafficking, and his avowal that he had "no more than seven prior felony convictions in any jurisdiction," the State agreed to dismiss the other twelve counts of Williams’s indictment as well as the allegation that he committed the crimes while on probation. The State further agreed to dismiss any allegations of prior felonies, except the Arizona use or possession of marijuana conviction from 2004.

¶4 Subsequently, in 2017, the superior court accepted Williams’s guilty plea to two counts of felony sex trafficking as a repeat offender. Each count was a Class 2, non-dangerous offense, which was made repetitive by, i.e., enhanced by—and exclusively by—the 2004 marijuana conviction. State v. Williams, 254 Ariz. 516, 518 ¶ 1, 524 P.3d 1172, 1174 (App. 2023). In the plea agreement, the parties stipulated to two, concurrent, twelve-year sentences.

¶5 After accepting the plea agreement and finding one mitigating factor and four aggravating factors, pursuant to that agreement and A.R.S. § 13-703, the superior court sentenced Williams as a prior offender "with a slightly aggravated term" to twelve years total of incarceration. See Williams, 254 Ariz. at 518 ¶ 1, 524 P.3d at 1174; § 13-703(B), (I) (providing that, for a class two offense, "[a] category two repetitive offender shall be sentenced" to a minimum of 6 years, presumptive sentence of 9.25 years, maximum of 18.5 years, and up to 23 years for aggravated offenses).

¶6 In 2020, Arizona voters adopted Proposition 207 (the "Act"), which authorizes expungement of adult convictions for the possession or use of small amounts of marijuana. Williams, 254 Ariz. at 518 ¶ 2, 524 P.3d at 1174; see also A.R.S. § 36-2862 (codifying the Act). In November 2021, Williams successfully obtained a court order vacating and expunging his 2004 marijuana conviction pursuant to the Act. Williams, 254 Ariz. at 518 ¶ 2, 524 P.3d at 1174. Subsequently, Williams petitioned for post-conviction relief ("PCR") under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1(g), claiming that his convictions and resulting sentences were invalid because there was no longer a valid prior offense to enhance his sentence under the plea agreement. Williams, 254 Ariz. at 518 ¶ 2, 524 P.3d at 1174. The superior court dismissed the petition, ruling that the Act did not "provide relief for prior convictions [or] the resulting sentencing that occurred" based on those convictions following their expungement. Id.

¶7 The court of appeals reversed, vacated Williams’s plea agreement, reinstated the original charges against him, and remanded. Id. at 521 ¶¶ 16–17, 524 P.3d at 1177. First, the court of appeals reasoned that the Act applied retroactively and allowed Williams to attack his conviction, under Rule 33.1(g), based on his plea to a sentence that was enhanced by a crime that no longer existed. Id. at 519-20 ¶¶ 11, 13, 524 P.3d at 1175–76. Then, the court applied contract law principles to find that the plea agreement’s terms were materially altered, thereby frustrating the agreement’s purpose. Id. at 520–21 ¶ 15, 524 P.3d at 1176–77. And then the court did something neither party requested: it found the plea agreement void, based on its belief that when the agreement’s purpose has been frustrated by the lack of a factual basis underlying the plea, the court "lacks authority to order Williams to be resentenced [under that agreement] pursuant to a modified plea." Id. ¶¶ 14–17.

¶8 The State petitioned for review, and Williams agreed that the court of appeals erred in vacating the plea agreement. In fact, the State and Williams disagreed only on whether the State can allege a new prior conviction under the plea agreement, which the agreement’s terms precluded.

¶9 This Court granted review to address two issues. First, whether the court of appeals erred by finding Williams’s plea agreement void because of the expungement of his sentence-enhancing marijuana conviction pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-2862. Second, whether the State may unilaterally allege a different prior conviction to enhance Williams’s sentence under the existing plea agreement. We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Act And The PCR Petition

[1–3] ¶10 "We review a trial court’s ruling on a PCR petition for an abuse of discretion, which occurs if the court makes an error of law …. " State v. Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, 407 ¶ 6, 492 P.3d 1020, 1025 (2021). "We review legal conclusions de novo." Id.

¶11 Both in this Court and in the court of appeals, the State conceded that Williams was entitled to relief under Rule 33.1(g). Like the court of appeals, we analyze Williams's claim under Rule 33.1(g) based on that concession. Under Rule 33.1(g), the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in reversing the superior court’s denial of Williams’s PCR petition because, following the marijuana conviction’s expungement, the factual basis for the crimes that Williams pleaded guilty to—two counts of sex trafficking as a repeat offender—no longer existed. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.1(g) (providing that PCR is appropriate when "there has been a significant change in the law that, if applicable to the defendant’s case, would probably overturn the defendant’s judgment or sentence").

¶12 By its plain terms, the Act allowed Williams to expunge his 2004 marijuana conviction. See A.R.S. § 36-2862(C)(1)(a)–(b) ("If the court grants a petition for expungement the signed order … shall … vacate the judgment of adjudication or conviction [and] [s]tate that it expunges any record of the petitioner’s arrest, charge, conviction, adjudication and sentence." (cleaned up)); § 36-2862(E) ("An individual whose record of … conviction or sentence is expunged pursuant to this section may state that [he or she] has never been … convicted of, or sentenced for the crime that is the subject of the expungement."); see also Garcia v. Butler, 251 Ariz. 191, 194 ¶ 12, 487 P.3d 256, 259 (2021) ("A statute’s plain language best indicates legislative intent …. " (quoting Premier Physicians Grp., PLLC v. Navarro, 240 Ariz. 193, 195 ¶ 9, 377 P.3d 988, 990 (2016))).

¶13 Before the Act, knowing use or possession of marijuana was a felony and, even if set aside, the conviction could be alleged as a prior offense. A.R.S. § 13-3405(A)(1), (B)(1)–(3) (2019); A.R.S. § 13-905(E)(3) (2019) (stating that a conviction that has been set aside may still be "[u]sed as a prior conviction"). However, after the Act, use or possession of marijuana became legal within certain limits, A.R.S. § 36-2852, and prior convictions arising from such use or possession must be vacated and expunged on request and cannot be used as prior convictions, § 36-2862(0(1)-(2), (E). The State concedes in this case that the Act significantly changed the law and marks a clear break with prior law because it allowed Williams to expunge the marijuana conviction, making his enhanced sentence retroactively illegal. See State v. Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, 118–19 ¶¶ 15–17, 203 P.3d 1175, 1178–79 (2009) (noting that, for a Rule 32 PCR petition to be granted on the basis of "a significant change in the law," the new law must: (1) clearly break from past law and (2) have retroactive application); see also State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 389 ¶ 5, 64 P.3d 828, 831 (2003) (noting that for purposes of a Rule 32 PCR petition, the court, must determine whether the new...